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Abstract 
The importance of innovation for ensuring economic growth and solving 
modern societal challenges is now widely recognised and, consequently, promoting 
innovation has become a key priority for the EU. In order to achieve this, the EU has 
emphasised the need to reduce the gap between the better performing Western 
Member States and the newer Central and Eastern Member states whose innovation 
performance still lags behind. Through the main question How is Europeanisation affecting 
the nature and development of national innovation policies and institutional arrangements in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary?, this doctoral thesis focuses on the experiences of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary since their accession to the EU in 2004.  
In so doing, a number of factors are identified which are currently impeding 
Europeanisation within this vital policy area. Drawing from Historical Institutionalism 
and Varieties of Capitalism, according to which the Czech Republic and Hungary are 
defined as Dependent Market Economies, this thesis finds that path dependent 
historical legacies and economic structure play a significant role in mediating the 
impact of Europeanisation on the Czech and Hungarian National Systems of 
Innovation. Furthermore, the findings of this research indicate that the expansion of 
the EU has led to a diluted version of Europeanisation which not only weakens the 
influence of the EU but also increases the importance of national factors.  
This thesis makes an important contribution to the field of Europeanisation by 
drawing attention to the role of a number of variables, related to historical legacies and 
economic structure, which are important in explaining the success, or lack thereof, of 
Europeanisation. This could be valuable to future studies within this area. In addition, 
based on the findings of this research, various policy implications are identified which 
the EU should consider in order to improve the effectiveness of its policy approach and 
related policy tools. Given the current problems of Euroscepticism across EU Member 
States, it is crucial that the EU is aware of how to adapt its policy in order to deliver the 
expected results and improve national perceptions of the EU. 
 
Key Words: Czech Republic, Hungary, Innovation, Europeanisation, National Systems 
of Innovation, Varieties of Capitalism, Dependent Market Economies, Historical 
Institutionalism.  
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1) Introduction 
 
The critical importance of innovation could hardly be better underlined than by 
Freeman's (1987:266) rather succinct observation; ‘not to innovate is to die’. Not only is 
innovation vital for a company’s survival but, by increasing productivity, innovation is 
recognised as a key component of economic growth (Freeman & Soete 1997; Grossman 
& Helpman 1991; Nelson & Rosenberg 1993). Indeed, as the remit of this study was to 
investigate the economic development of two or more of the Visegrád countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic), it is the link between 
innovation and economic growth which served as the catalyst for this research project. 
Unsurprisingly, given the economic importance of innovation, the race to innovate has 
become so imperative that companies, universities and governments now invest 
considerable resources into finding ways to give themselves an innovative edge. With 
the aim of fostering innovation, the last few decades has, for example, witnessed an 
explosion of research and development laboratories, science and technology parks and 
innovation hubs. Moreover, governments now have whole departments, or in some 
cases even ministries, dedicated to the task of improving the national innovation 
environment. Yet technological progress is currently moving so quickly that the 
challenge for innovators, as well as those promoting innovation, seems ever greater. 
Within such a fast moving world, businesses, and countries, find themselves constantly 
fighting to remain at the forefront of the innovation frontier. 
The topic of innovation has, accordingly, captured a huge amount of academic 
attention as highlighted by the plethora of academic conferences, research papers and 
publications now dedicated to discussing innovation. As the number of studies has 
increased, so too has the academic toolkit with which researchers approach the study 
of innovation. For example, to name just some of the approaches, innovation has been 
studied in terms of networks, clusters and systems at national, regional and sectoral 
levels. (See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these approaches.) Nonetheless, 
there is still much uncertainty as to why some countries have been so effective at 
producing innovations while others have not and, furthermore, why certain policy 
measures seem to work in some countries but not in others. In other words, in spite of 
the increased detail with which researchers understand the complexities of innovation, 
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there remains a lack of consensus regarding what individual countries should do in 
order to ensure a successful innovation performance.     
As is often the case, some countries have received more attention than others. For 
instance, countries which have been especially successful at innovation, such as the 
United States, have been of particular interest to researchers (Mowery 1994; Nelson 
1993). On the other hand, countries still in the process of developing their innovation 
systems, such as the Central and Eastern European countries, have traditionally 
received less scholarly attention. Nonetheless, these countries have steadily been 
capturing more academic interest and some very notable research has now been carried 
out on these countries including that of Havas (2011), Lengyel & Cadil (2009), 
Radosevic (2004), Szalavetz (2014). There have also been a number of comparative 
studies (Krammer 2008; Suurna & Kattel 2010; Szpor et al. 2014; Tiits et al. 2008) 
which, although by including several countries have offered considerable breadth, have 
perhaps not offered sufficient depth to allow for a more thorough understanding of the 
reasons for the observed similarities and differences. The need for more research into 
these countries is even more imperative given the sheer enormity of change that they 
have experienced in recent history. In the nearly 30 years since the fall of communism, 
these countries have undergone a transformation to liberal market economies, the 
majority have joined the European Union (EU) and, most recently, they have been 
exposed to severe global financial and economic crises. Given these developments, it 
would be expected that change in these countries in terms of their approach to 
developing their innovation systems, would be rapid and, as such, these countries 
unquestionably require ongoing investigation. Without further and consistent 
academic research, these changes may pass by unobserved and the lessons that they 
could elucidate would be lost to history.  
It is for these reasons that this research investigates innovation and, more 
specifically, the national innovation policies and institutional arrangements of Central 
and Eastern European countries. The Czech Republic and Hungary offer a particularly 
interesting comparison because, in spite of a number of similarities, such as similar 
population size and a shared recent history, several differences are gradually starting to 
appear. As a result of these developments, the Czech Republic which was, in terms of 
innovation performance, behind Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s (Fidrmuc et al. 
2002), now ranks ahead of Hungary in nearly all innovation indicators according the 
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EU’s ‘European Innovation Scoreboard’ (EIS) (European Commission 2017a). 
Furthermore, for the ‘Innovation’ pillar in the latest World Economic Forum 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum 2017) the Czech Republic was 
ranked 36th (out of 142) compared to just 62nd for Hungary. Even more remarkably, in 
terms of ‘Capacity for innovation’ - one of the indicators from which the ‘Innovation’ 
pillar is compiled - the Czech Republic was ranked 27th compared to a disappointing 
96th for Hungary.  
Nonetheless, although the Czech Republic has shown some signs of improvement, 
both countries currently seem to be struggling to make more significant progress in 
terms of catching up with their Western European counterparts. The EIS (European 
Commission 2017a), for example, classifies both countries as ‘Moderate Innovators’ and 
both fall behind the European average in nearly all dimensions measured by the 
Scoreboard. (See Chapter 3 for more information on the dimensions used to compile the 
EIS.) This is all the more perplexing given the many favourable conditions in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, including a strong university tradition, geographical proximity 
to Western European countries and significant investment in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the European Union’s ‘Structural and Investment Funds’ 
(hereafter ‘Structural Funds’). During the course of this study, a number of fundamental 
problems have come to light which are preventing the Czech Republic and Hungary 
from capitalising on their considerable advantages.   
As both these countries are members of the European Union, the EU would be 
expected to have played a key role in the development of the Czech and Hungarian 
innovation systems. Due to the recognised economic, and also societal, benefits of 
innovation, promoting innovation has become a key aim of the EU. (See Chapter 4 for a 
discussion on the development of the EU’s Innovation Policy). In fact, the importance 
of innovation, or originally the knowledge economy, came to the forefront of the EU’s 
thinking around the turn of the millennium and featured prominently in the ‘Lisbon 
Strategy’ which was originally launched in 2000. This meant that at the time the Czech 
Republic and Hungary were in the process of accession talks, innovation was already a 
key EU priority and, in effect, since the beginning of their membership in 2004 they 
have been subject to the EU’s innovation agenda.  
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It seems logical, therefore, to expect that the EU would have had significant 
influence in the Czech and Hungarian innovation systems. Indeed, a key aim of the EU 
is to reduce the innovation divide between the old and new Member States and, 
accordingly, the EU has invested a sizeable amount of funding, via the previously 
mentioned Structural Funds, into helping the Czech Republic and Hungary develop 
their innovation systems. However, serious questions remain about how successful the 
EU has been in its attempts to bring the innovation performance of the new Member 
States closer to that of their better performing neighbours. As a result, it is perhaps not 
surprising that studies and reports (European Commission 2017c; European 
Commission 2016a) suggest that, on the whole, the new Member States continue to lag 
significantly behind the old Member States. Given the considerable investment the EU 
has made into assisting the catch-up of these new Member States, what this would 
seem to indicate is that, at present, a notable discrepancy exists between the financial 
input being made by the EU and the value of its output. In fact, the findings of this 
thesis suggest that problems relating to policy misfit and inefficient policy tools are 
limiting the EU’s attempts to influence the innovation systems of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. 
The rationale for focusing this research on the influence of the EU on the Czech and 
Hungarian innovation systems is all the more pertinent considering the launch in 2014 
of the EU’s latest ‘Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development’, known as ‘Horizon 2020’. Learning from previous experiences, Horizon 
2020 supposedly addresses some of the weaknesses of the previous strategy, the 
aforementioned Lisbon Strategy, such as a considerable divergence in terms of its 
implementation across Member States. Alongside the launch of Horizon 2020, this time 
period also witnessed the introduction of the so-called ‘Smart Specialisation Strategy’ 
(S3) as part of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. All Member States are now expected to design 
Smart Specialisation Strategies in order to be eligible to receive funding from the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). As the Smart-Specialisation Strategy 
approach is still relatively new, there are as of yet few studies which have assessed the 
response of Member States to designing and implementing their strategies. Through 
assessing the preliminary impact of the Smart Specialisation Strategy in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, this study suggests that the Smart Specialisation Strategy still 
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has many of the problems of previous strategies and, in fact, some new problems of its 
own.  
 
1.1) Research aims, questions and significance 
In order to understand the factors which have been impeding the Czech and 
Hungarian innovation performances and which are preventing them from converging 
with their West European counterparts, there is a vital need for further ongoing 
investigation into how these countries are developing their innovation systems. With 
this in mind, this research undertakes to gain a better understanding of the factors 
determining the national innovation policies and institutional frameworks of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. More specifically, this thesis seeks to identity the extent to 
which these have been influenced by the EU and its innovation agenda. Whilst the EU 
has sought to be more proactive in encouraging the promotion of innovation within EU 
countries, as previously discussed, there is much debate about how successful the EU 
has been at actually achieving this goal. This research, therefore, endeavours to add to 
the discussion on this topic and to better clarify the current situation. In other words, 
the main aim of this thesis is to shed light on how strong, or how weak, 
Europeanisation has become as a driver of national innovation policies and institutional 
arrangements. In doing so, this research draws from and seeks to add to the discussion 
on Europeanisation, Innovation and Varieties of Capitalism. (Whilst the relevance of 
these areas to this researched is explained below; a more detailed discussion of each 
topic is provided in Chapter 2.)  
With regard to the relationship between Innovation and Europeanisation, as 
mentioned earlier, the EU now has a considerable interest in promoting and 
encouraging innovation within EU Member States as it fights to carve out an 
innovative advantage over competitors such as the United States and, in more recent 
years, the rise of the BRICS countries. Whilst there is a very high-quality scientific base 
in the EU, there are concerns that the innovation performance of the Member States is 
not as strong as it should be and, therefore, the EU has taken measures which aim to 
address the impediments that are preventing Member States from unlocking their 
innovation potential. There is, however, still considerable concern that the situation is 
not improving quickly enough and, indeed, about how effective the EU’s attempts to 
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promote innovation have been in reality. This problem is confounded by the 
considerable divide between old and new Member States which, current studies 
suggest (European Commission 2017c; European Commission 2016a), remains an area 
of ongoing concern. This research, therefore, is intended to contribute to a better 
understanding of the EU’s influence on these two new Member States, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, in this vitally important policy area. In doing so, it adds to the 
discussion on convergence, or lack thereof, between Member States and identifies 
factors which are preventing, or assisting, the EU in its attempts to increase the 
innovation performance of these Central and Eastern European Member States.  
This research seeks to identify any key moments at which the EU has had influence, 
or whether the EU’s influence has increased or decreased over time. It considers the 
strategic approach of the EU, particularly the latest strategy known as the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy. It aims to gain a better understanding of how these strategies 
have been translated and implemented by the Czech Republic and Hungary. It also 
seeks to identify any strengths or problems with the EU’s strategic approach and to 
consider the effectiveness of the policy tools used by the EU. For example, it considers 
the use of hard tools such as the Structural Funds and their success at achieving the 
intended outcome.  
Based on these primary aims, the key question at the core of this research is formed: 
Main Research Question: ‘How is Europeanisation affecting the nature and 
development of national innovation policies and institutional arrangements in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary?’ 
In order to fully understand the impact of Europeanisation, however, other 
intervening factors need to be considered. Innovation is a complex policy area in which 
multiple actors play a role and whose influence must therefore be taken into account. 
Indeed, research suggests that the national environment plays an important role in the 
development of innovation systems. The literature of National Systems of Innovation 
(NSI) (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995; Nelson 1993) argues that a country’s innovation 
performance depends on how effectively the actors and institutions can work together 
as parts of a collective system of knowledge creation. The NSI approach places 
emphasis on not only the entrepreneurs and innovators themselves but also on 
government policy, higher education and national institutions. In order to gain a more 
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in-depth and accurate understanding of the Czech and Hungarian innovation systems, 
therefore, it is important that these factors are given sufficient attention.      
As such, the second aim of this research is to consider the role of these national 
factors. In doing so, this study seeks to identify whether national specificities impact 
upon the level of Europeanisation that can take place. For example, this research 
undertakes to gain a better understanding of the extent to which national factors, such 
as government policy, the research institute network and even national culture, can 
create an environment which can support or hinder the EU’s influence. As part of this, 
consideration is given to the role of historical legacies and the extent to which the 
communist past of the Czech Republic and Hungary continues to play a role in their 
present development. With these aims in mind, the first set of research sub-questions 
is: 
Research Sub-Questions 1: How important are national specificities to the 
process of Europeanisation? To what extent have national institutions 
assisted, or impeded, the process of Europeanisation?  
However, it is not just national elements that play an important role in innovation 
systems; economic factors are also particularly significant. It is in this respect that the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall & Soskice 2001; Nölke & Vliegenhart 
2009) contributes to this research in two key aspects. Firstly, the VoC approach states 
that a country’s model of capitalism will have an impact on the innovation system of 
that country. This argument suggests that Germany’s model of capitalism, for example, 
creates an environment which is more likely to produce incremental innovations, 
whereas the United States, by comparison, is more suited to radical innovation. The 
arrangement in the Czech Republic and Hungary, on the other hand, is very different as 
these countries returned to a liberal market economy system at a point in time when 
globalisation was having a notable impact on the way in which businesses and 
economies operate. As a result, not only did the Czech Republic and Hungary find 
themselves in a situation in which they needed to manage a transition to market 
economies, they also had to contend with the pressures and demands of globalisation at 
the same time. It would be expected for this to have had considerable impact on the 
development of the Czech and Hungarian models of capitalism and, following the 
argument outlined earlier, their innovation systems as well. 
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The second aspect of the VoC literature which is relevant to this research is the 
relationship between the model of capitalism and the EU. Although the need for 
researchers of Europeanisation to consider the VoC approach has already been 
highlighted (Featherstone et al. 2012), there is still a lack of studies which have 
approached the subject in this manner. Yet by doing so, the VoC toolkit offers a 
valuable opportunity for researchers to investigate any potential relationship between a 
country’s model of capitalism and its response to Europeanisation pressures. For 
example, studies could shed light on whether certain models of capitalism allow for a 
greater extent of Europeanisation than others. This is particularly interesting in the 
cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary as their models of capitalism differ quite 
strongly from those of the older Member States. It is for these explanatory insights that 
the VoC approach is so relevant to this research. Based on this, the second set of sub-
research questions has been developed: 
Research Sub-Questions 2: What impact have the models of capitalism in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary had on the development on their innovation 
systems? To what extent do the models of capitalism in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary affect their response to Europeanisation pressures? Are there 
particular aspects of the Czech and Hungarian models of capitalism which 
can be identified as having assisted, or impeded, the influence of the EU?  
In terms of time period, the focus of this research is principally on the period since 
the Czech Republic and Hungary became EU Member States in 2004. By concentrating 
on this time period, this study is able to identify not only the extent to which the 
developments which occurred as a direct result of EU accession have had a long-term 
impact on the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, but also how changes in the EU’s approach 
towards innovation policy have affected the Europeanisation process. For example, on 
joining the EU, the Lisbon Strategy was the key document driving the direction of 
innovation policy in the EU. More recently, however, the Lisbon Strategy has been 
superseded by Horizon 2020 which aims to address some of the weaknesses of its 
predecessor and, as such, a number of changes have taken place in terms of the policy 
direction and the policy support being offered to Member States by the EU. One 
example of this is the introduction of the Policy Support Facility (PSF), of which 
Hungary was actually one of the first countries to take advantage. In addition to these 
developments, as previously mentioned, the EU also announced a new approach 
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towards strategy formulation as part of its Cohesion Policy, namely the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy. The Smart Specialisation Strategy approach has been 
introduced at both national and regional levels and aims to encourage Member States 
to identify areas for strategic intervention based on a thorough analysis of their current 
strengths and weaknesses. Using a time frame from 2004 until now enables this 
research to observe how the countries under study have responded to these changes in 
the EU’s Innovation Policy. In should be noted, however, that although the main focus 
of this research starts at the point of EU accession, in order to provide background 
information which is important in explaining the current status of the Czech and 
Hungarian NSIs, some discussion of their NSIs prior to becoming EU Member States is 
included (see Chapters 5 and 6).   
The impact of this study lies in its ability to offer a current insight into the 
development of the Czech and Hungarian innovation systems. Empirically, this 
research shows that some notable differences between the Czech and Hungarian NSIs 
are now beginning to emerge. Furthermore, this study enables a deeper understanding 
of the role of the EU in influencing the development of the Czech and Hungarian 
innovation systems and draws attention to any changes in the EU’s influence during 
the nearly 15 years that these countries have been EU Member States. By doing so, this 
study provides a clearer explanation of the factors which are mediating the 
Europeanisation process which could, in turn, offer valuable information for guiding 
future EU policy-making decisions related to innovation and, potentially, other policy 
fields as well. This research also has contemporary significance as it will investigate 
these countries as they respond to the EU’s latest innovation-related initiatives, namely 
Horizon 2020 and the Smart Specialisation Strategy.  
In addition to contributing to the literature on Systems of Innovation and 
Europeanisation, it will contribute to a further understanding of the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach as identified by Hall & Soskice (2001) and redefined by Bohle & 
Greskovits (2012) and Nölke & Vliegenhart (2009) for the Visegrád peripheral 
economies. Theoretically, this research shows how the distinctive variety of capitalism 
which has developed in these two Visegrád states as a result of their historical legacies 
and rapid development since their accession to the EU, strongly affects the extent to 
which Europeanisation can take place.  Whilst most other literature has focused on 
either the relationship between systems of innovation and the EU or systems of 
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innovation and models of capitalism, this research identifies a clear relationship 
between all three factors. 
 
 1.2) Research structure 
This chapter has sought to introduce the topic of this thesis and to make clear the 
rationale for conducting this particular research project. It has briefly made reference to 
some of the research which already exists within this field and has explained how this 
research intends to contribute to the current body of knowledge. It has also drawn 
attention to the key research aims and questions, both main and sub-questions, which 
the remainder of this thesis is designed to address. In short, this chapter has laid down 
the foundations on which the remaining chapters will build.   
The literature which has been alluded to in this chapter, namely that relating to 
Innovation, Europeanisation and Varieties of Capitalism, is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. This chapter draws out and discusses the main aspects of these three subject 
areas that are relevant to this research. Additionally, it also draws attention to their 
strengths and weaknesses, conflicting academic opinions and any current gaps in the 
literature, especially those to which this research can contribute. Having surveyed and 
discussed the current available literature, the hypotheses to be tested during the course 
of this thesis are constructed.  
 Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical and methodological approach underpinning 
this study. Firstly, a conceptual framework, which is based on the literature discussed 
in Chapter 2 and which forms the basis for the main chapters of this thesis, is 
identified. The use of a historical institutionalist approach and its suitability to this 
research is given full consideration. Additionally, the case study selection, which has 
already been briefly mentioned, is explained in more detail during the course of this 
chapter. The methods of data collection, data analysis and the issues of reliability, 
validity and ethics are also discussed.  Finally, this chapter highlights the advantages 
and limitations of the methodology that were experienced during the course of the 
research and how any problems were overcome.  
The independent variable of this research, namely the EU’s strategy for 
developing the innovation capacity of its Member States, is considered in more detail in 
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Chapter 4. In order to assess how the EU’s approach towards innovation policy has 
developed over time, this section is divided into three time frames. The first time frame 
focuses on the pre-accession period (1989-2004) and considers the role of the EU in the 
Central and Eastern European candidate countries during this time. The following time 
frames look at the post-accession period and consider how the EU’s policy has changed 
by analysing the objectives and instruments of, firstly, the Lisbon Strategy and, 
secondly, the EU’s latest policy approach, Horizon 2020. This chapter presents a broad 
overview of the EU’s Innovation Policy with which the experiences of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, detailed in the following chapters, are compared.   
Chapters 5 and 6 present the main findings of this research for the Czech 
Republic and Hungary respectively. The structure of these chapters is based on the 
conceptual framework identified in Chapter 3. These chapters are divided into two 
sections. The first section of each chapter looks at the historical development of these 
innovation systems from (a) pre-1989, to (b) the transition period, through to (c) post-
accession to the EU. This section also discusses the role of FDI and assesses whether 
any clear progress in either country’s innovation performance can be identified. 
Secondly, these chapters consider the role of the EU and the EU’s policy tools in 
influencing these developments. In doing so, attention is drawn to a number of areas of 
misfit between the EU’s innovation policy approach and the national specificities of 
Czech Republic and Hungary, most of which are similar for both countries, which can 
be seen to mediate the Europeanisation process. Based on data gathered throughout 
this research, these chapters also present some initial findings on the response of these 
countries to the EU’s latest policy approach and, particularly, the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy. 
A concise conclusion of this research, which is based on the discussions of the 
previous chapters, is presented in Chapter 7. This chapter also compares the Czech and 
Hungarian case studies, highlighting a number of differences and similarities in their 
experiences. This discussion is then used to identify a number of important policy 
implications. These are constructed with the aim of enabling the EU to play a greater 
role in assisting the development of the Czech and Hungarian NSIs and, in turn, to 
improve their innovation performance. Finally, several research limitations and 
suggestions for future research options are discussed. 
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2) Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to survey the main bodies of literature in order, firstly, 
to identify the areas of academic disagreement and research gaps and, secondly, to 
construct the hypotheses which this research will test. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, three main bodies of literature have been selected for review on the basis that 
they shed light on the subject matter of the thesis; Europeanisation, Innovation and 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC). In addition to providing a systematic account of the 
development of academic thought within these fields, this review also aims to draw 
attention to the key concepts which have been identified to date. In doing so, this 
chapter seeks to provide a thorough discussion of the advantages and limitations of 
applying these concepts to this study. Throughout this chapter, conflicting reports and 
arguments are highlighted, as are areas which have received limited scholarly attention 
and to which this thesis intends to contribute. Furthermore, several methodological 
implications are identified which will be addressed further in the following chapter.  
 
2.1) Europeanisation 
An introduction to Europeanisation  
As demonstrated by the quantity of literature dedicated to Europeanisation 
(Bache 2008; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Ladrech 2010), this has become an important 
field of research for scholars drawn to the study of the EU. In spite of the interest it has 
received, the term has unfortunately become overstretched and inaccurately employed 
so that it has in fact been used in ‘varying and often conflicting scenarios’ (Menz 
2005:6). The concept of Europeanisation, with which this research is interested, began 
to be developed in the late 1990s when a shift was witnessed from a focus on the 
underlying dynamics of European integration (Moravcsik 1998) to one which explored 
the impact of the EU on the domestic politics and institutions of the Member States 
(Green Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli 2003; Windhoff-Héritier et 
al. 1996). At this point, it began to become clear that Member States were having to 
adapt to the EU’s enhanced influence in policy-making and that changes within their 
13 
 
domestic structures were taking place. Whilst this may not have resulted in ‘seismic 
shifts’ (Ladrech 2010:206) in the operation of national policy-making and institutions, 
there is strong evidence that membership in the EU does impact the evolving nature of 
the state (Ladrech 2010).  
From this perspective, Europeanisation can be understood as a change within a 
Member State due to either an EU policy or the EU’s decision-making process. 
Europeanisation, of course, is not the only external pressure impacting on Member 
States; globalisation too has played a significant role in determining the direction of 
change in the domestic structures of these countries (for the ‘globalisation versus 
Europeanisation debate’ see Fligstein & Merand 2002; Verdier & Breen 2001). ‘What 
distinguishes the argument concerning Europeanization of national political systems 
from the globalization thesis is the ability to trace specific domestic changes to 
developments emanating from the policy-making output and/or decision-making style 
of the European Union’ (Ladrech 2010:2). Risse et al. (2001:4), however, suggest that 
Europeanisation might itself respond to the globalisation process either by reinforcing 
these trends or protecting Member States against their undesired effects. This presents 
a considerable challenge to researchers in terms of disentangling the EU influence on 
national policy-making and institutions from any other external pressure(s).  
Indeed, it is not only the impact of the globalisation variable that needs to be 
considered but also that of domestic politics. The difficulty for researchers here is to 
ascertain whether domestic change has occurred as a result of Europeanisation or 
whether Europeanisation has in fact played a negligible role and the impetus for change 
has actually been provided by domestic politics.  This ‘problem is compounded by the 
strategy of political leaders to disguise globalisation or domestic politics under a 
discourse of Europeanisation – either by blame-shifting strategies or by using the 
appeal of Europe to add legitimacy to choices originating at home’ (Radaelli 2004:8). In 
addition to this point, Ladrech (2010:29-30) draws attention to the distinction between 
Member States implementation of policies and the actual consequences of this process 
‘which may be reflected in the development or creation of new policy instruments, 
standards, shifts in policy direction, and so on’. In other words, the compliance of 
Member States in implementing EU policy is not necessarily an indicator of 
Europeanisation. Rather, it is only if domestic change has taken place as a result of EU 
influence that Europeanisation can be said to have occurred.  Again, these issues need 
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to be fully considered in the methodology of research in this field and will be discussed 
in more detail later.  
There remains one further initial consideration for research using the 
Europeanisation concept, namely the consolidation of an appropriate definition. As 
previously mentioned, the term has been used inconsistently by scholars from different 
fields (for an overview see Featherstone 2003; Ladrech 2010; Olsen 2002). Dyson & 
Goetz (2002:2), for example, highlight the diversity in the breadth of focus with which 
the term has been used stating that ‘it is sometimes used narrowly to refer to 
implementation of EU legislation or more broadly to capture policy transfer and 
learning within the EU’. This research is aware of some of the conflicting usages of the 
Europeanisation concept and, therefore, proposes to use a broad definition as a 
foundation which will then be fine-tuned, as recommended by Ladrech (2010), so that 
it can precisely and appropriately be applied to answering the particular research 
questions of this thesis. The broad definition which will be used is provided by Radaelli 
(2003:30) who defines Europeanisation as:   
‘[p]rocessses of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing 
things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first designed and 
consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, 
and public policies’. 
In order to ‘fine tune’ this definition, some of the other elements of the Europeanisation 
literature will now be considered in more detail and their relevance to this research 
highlighted.   
 
Bottom-up or top-down? 
 The emphasis in Radaelli’s definition on construction, diffusion and 
institutionalisation directly relates to an earlier distinction made by Börzel & Risse 
(2003) between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dimensions in the concept of 
Europeanisation. Put simply, from a top-down perspective the EU institutions 
‘download’ their norms, rules or policies onto the Member States. From the bottom-up 
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perspective, on the other hand, these norms, rules and policies may have been 
influenced by Member States actively ‘uploading’ their preferences during the policy-
making process. Therefore, according to this argument, it is necessary to view 
Europeanisation as a two-way relationship (Bache 2008:11-12). Whilst this does beg a 
‘chicken and egg’ question in terms of which pressure comes first, a more serious 
criticism of this concept is that it does ‘not adequately reflect the emergence of cross-
national policy networks that are not directly ‘defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy’’ (Featherstone 2003:18). Indeed, in order to overcome this, there have been 
various studies which have attempted to include a third element of ‘cross-loading’ into 
the Europeanisation dynamics (Howell 2005; Major 2005). 
Studies from a bottom-up perspective follow a very different research design 
from those conducted from a top-own perspective. ‘Instead of starting from European 
policies (or politics) as an independent variable and tracking down the consequences 
for domestic actors, policies and politics, it starts and finishes at the level of domestic 
actors’ (Radaelli 2004:4). The starting point for research conducted using this 
approach is the system of interaction at the domestic level and, by including time and 
temporal causal sequences, academics using this approach are able to trace if, when and 
how pressure from the EU results in change in the main components of the system of 
interaction, the consequences of which can be measured in change at the domestic 
level. For example, Ugland (2003) uses a bottom-up approach which starts and finishes 
at the level of the domestic system of interaction to show that alcohol policy in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden has shifted from originally being within the remit of health policy 
to that of competition policy. This, he argues, is due to EU pressure and, more 
specifically, the introduction of the EU’s competition policy. 
There are several advantages of using a bottom-up approach to the study of 
Europeanisation. A particularly significant benefit is that it avoids falling into the 
pitfall of prejudging the role of Europeanisation (Dyson 2002). As previously 
mentioned, the implementation of EU policies is not in itself evidence that 
Europeanisation has taken place as these domestic changes may in fact be the result of 
another factor. Using a bottom-up approach allows Europeanisation to be seen as a 
process rather than an end product and for the researcher to investigate ‘what goes on 
inside the process’ (Radaelli 2004:5). Furthermore, Europeanisation from a bottom-up 
perspective does not require its own unique vocabulary but in fact imports theoretical 
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context from comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis (Featherstone & 
Radaelli 2003:340). Finally, it also provides a structure which allows space to consider 
both the vertical processes and the horizontal dynamics of Europeanisation.  
The top-down approach, on the other hand, whilst more typical of earlier work, 
is still used in some current research projects. Research is this area has tended to rely 
on the following ‘chain’: 
‘pressure from Europe on member states → intervening variables → reactions 
and change at the domestic level’ (Radaelli 2004:4). 
Earlier studies conducted from this angle focused on uni-directional changes and 
narrow impacts, specifically tracking down the implementation of European policies. 
More recent and ‘theoretically robust’ (Radaelli 2004:4) studies have moved away from 
the analysis of European integration to a focus on the domestic impact of the EU. 
Ladrech (2010:22), for example, justifies his use of a top-down approach by stating that 
‘we are not discounting the domestic political dynamics that may have fed into the EU-
policy-making process; what we are concerned to isolate is the actual impact – if any – 
of specific EU-level influences in the domestic arena’. Green Cowles et al. (2001) have 
also conducted prominent research into Europeanisation from a top-down perspective.   
Although the advantages of a bottom-up perspective are considerable, given 
that this research is focused on the downloading of the EU’s Innovation Policy onto the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, a top-down perspective has been selected as the most 
appropriate framework with which to conduct this study. This is not to deny the 
existence of Member State to EU dynamics, but the research aims of this study, namely 
to better understand the influence of the EU on national innovation policies, are best 
served by a top-down perspective. The implications of this decision, in terms of the 
‘dimensions, mechanisms and outcomes’ (Börzel & Risse 2007:485) of Europeanisation, 
will now be carefully considered.   
 
Dimensions, mechanisms and outcomes 
There are three main dimensions along which Europeanisation can influence 
domestic change; politics, polity and policy. Several scholars have used these 
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dimensions as a framework for their study and have found that Europeanisation can 
have differential impact across these dimensions (Featherstone 2003). Even the effect of 
Europeanisation within one dimension has been shown to vary. For example, the 
impact of Europeanisation has been much more profound in the areas of monetary and 
trade policy than it has in areas such as health care or employment policy (Bulmer & 
Radaelli 2004). Radaelli (2004:16) is critical of some of this literature as it has often 
worked in a ‘compartmentalised manner by considering only one dimension and 
ignoring others. The most exciting projects, however, have shown that the three 
dimensions (politics, policy, and polity) interact, often in subtle and indirect ways’. 
This, Radaelli goes on to argue, renders the adage that ‘policies change but politics and  
polity do not’ obsolete. Clearly this does represent an important consideration for this 
research and the interaction between all three dimensions will be taken into account. 
However, in order to meet the aims of this project, namely understanding the impact of 
the EU on innovation policies and the institutional framework, it is the domains of 
policy and polity that require particular emphasis.  
A further point regarding the policy dimension, which is of particular 
importance to this research, is the distinction that has been drawn between the EU’s 
use of ‘hard’ policy, the traditional method employed by the Commission, and ‘soft’ 
policy, which has become more prevalent in the last fifteen years or so. Hard policy has 
been further subdivided into positive integration, such as social integration and the 
correction of market failures, and negative integration, such as deregulation and the 
protection of economic interests. However, it is the area of soft policy, also referred to 
as ‘policy coordination’ or facilitated cooperation, which is of particular relevance to 
this research as much of the innovation policy falls into this category. For example, 
much of the EU’s involvement is ‘based on making recommendations to the Member 
States, setting monitoring and  benchmarking activities, encouraging exchange of best 
practices and proposing voluntary partnerships or coordination initiatives’ (European 
Parliament 2016a:6). This type of policy is best exemplified by the ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’ (OMC) which was formally defined as an instrument in the Lisbon 
Agenda. ‘Under facilitated cooperation, the EU organises cooperation among member 
states, but does not produce European legislation. It produces opportunities for 
learning – the default explanation of Europeanisation for this mode’ (Radaelli 2004:13). 
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There is much debate about whether or not the OMC can really deliver (De la Porte 
2002; Kröger 2009; Hatzopoulos 2007). 
The use of soft policy, rather than hard policy, also means that different 
mechanisms are used to ensure its implementation. Much of the original literature on 
Europeanisation, particularly studies using a top-down perspective, focused on the 
concept of ‘goodness of fit’ as a mechanism for domestic change (Featherstone 2003). 
According to this argument, depending on the degree of ‘misfit’ between the 
Europeanisation processes, on the one hand, and national institutional settings, rules, 
and practices, on the other, this would result in ‘adaptational pressures’. The greater 
the adaptational pressures, the more the domestic structure of a Member State would 
have to change in order to comply with European rules and policies. If adaptational 
pressures are very high, it was argued that ‘European institutions seriously challenge 
the identity, constitutive principles, core structures, and practices of national 
institutions’ (Featherstone 2003:8). This would be met defensively by Member States 
which might either opt-out or attempt to change EU policies and institutions. From 
this perspective, the fact that the extent of domestic structural change varied between 
Member States is accounted for by the existence of mediating or intervening factors, 
such as multiple veto points or mediating formal institutions, which either enable or 
inhibit change.      
The major criticism of this approach is that ‘this is not the only way things 
work’ (Radaelli 2004:7). Indeed, there are examples of Europeanisation occurring in the 
absence of major adaptational pressure (Jacquot & Woll 2003; Thatcher 2004). The 
‘goodness of fit’ approach, it is argued, overemphasises the role of structure, affording 
insufficient consideration to the function of agency. For example,  Bulmer & Radaelli 
(2004) argue that, in areas of soft policy, the EU’s supranational institutions have very 
weak powers and cannot act as strong agents promoting Europeanisation. This is not 
to suggest that Europeanisation is not taking place but that it is much more voluntary 
and non-hierarchical. The OMC literature has, however, identified a number of 
mechanisms through which Europeanisation can occur, of particular note are those of 
policy learning, shaming and peer pressure (Borrás & Radaelli 2010; Büchs 2008). 
Although empirical studies into the effectiveness of these mechanisms have produced 
mixed results, there is some agreement that national representatives do feel a pressure 
to meet common targets and fulfil agreed commitments (Featherstone et al. 2012).  
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In terms of the outcomes, Börzel & Risse (2007) identify five categories of 
domestic change in response to Europeanisation pressure: inertia (no change), 
retrenchment (resistance to change), absorption (low degree of change), 
accommodation (accommodation without changing core or essential features) and 
transformation (substantial change). The most occupied categories are those of 
absorption and accommodation although the difference between these categories in not 
precise (Ladrech 2010:38). In other words, it is often difficult for the researcher to 
determine at exactly what point one category ends and the next begins. Although this 
issue requires consideration, these categorisations can serve as useful benchmarks and 
have been used by several scholars in their research. Moreover, the literature suggests 
that it is ‘crisis moments in which the EU inputs into a member state resonate far more 
substantially than would be the case under normal circumstances’ (Ladrech 2010:37).  
Given that this research focuses on the period after the recent financial and economic 
crises, the category of transformation is of particular interest. 
A final point regarding outcome relates to the issue of convergence and 
divergence between EU Member States as a result of Europeanisation. Europeanisation, 
it is argued, is not convergence (Radaelli 2004). That is not to say that some 
convergence in terms of policy outcomes has not occurred but, as Börzel and Risse 
(2002:12) claim, this is at best ‘“clustered convergence” and continuing divergence with 
regard to policy processes and instrument, politics and polities’. However, an important 
point in terms of this study is the suggestion that ‘countries with the same structural 
characteristics respond with similar strategies to the opportunities and constraints 
provided by Europeanisation’ (Radaelli 2004:14). A similar claim is voiced by 
Featherstone (2003:18) who argues that there may be patterns in national responses to 
Europeanisation according to state characteristics. Currently, there is minimal 
comparative literature discussing the defining characteristics, or lack thereof, in the 
response of Central and Eastern European countries to Europeanisation pressures.     
 
Europeanisation and Central Eastern Europe  
 Much of the Europeanisation research agenda developed before EU enlargement 
in 2004 and had, therefore, primarily focused on the older EU Member States. Ladrech 
(2010:38-39) identifies four points distinguishing the situation in the new post-
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communist Member States during the accession period from their older Western 
counterparts. Firstly, in the new Member States the role of Europeanisation has been 
transformative and the downloading of the acquis communautaire has played a much 
more significant role. Secondly, much of the domestic change occurred prior to actual 
membership so, strictly speaking, Europeanisation began during the pre-accession 
period. Thirdly, the position of the new Member States meant that they had very little, 
if any, role in uploading their preferences to EU policy and were, for the most part, only 
downloaders. Finally, the strong desire of these countries to gain EU membership 
coupled with the conditionality of its realisation allowed the EU ‘an unprecedented 
influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range of public 
policies in the CEECs’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2008:88).  
 Whilst the differences between the older and newer Member States are still 
acknowledged, much of the post-accession research has gone on to consider issues such 
as the effectiveness of conditionality. Although, on the one hand, some studies argue 
that conditionality has been relatively successful as a strategy for EU compliance, 
others find that the EU’s influence has been limited through conditionality and that its 
impact has been differential (Hughes et al. 2004; Jacoby 2004). This latter finding has 
been described as ‘somewhat surprising, as there are good reasons to believe that the 
EU’s impact in the candidates should be more pervasive and induce greater 
convergence’ (Sedelmeier 2011:17). Questions have also been asked about whether the 
changes which were undertaken in order for the Central and Eastern European 
countries to achieve EU membership were deep or shallow and what their long-term 
impact will be (Börzel 2006). A recent study on Europeanisation in Poland by 
Dabrowski (2012) seems to point to a mixed picture of deep and shallow 
Europeanisation and suggests that the degree to which Europeanisation can occur is 
strongly regulated by agency. 
Sedelmeier (2011) also raises some interesting points about the readiness of these 
countries to comply with EU rules post-accession in the absence of conditionality, 
which he argues was the key mechanism that led to the adoption of EU rules by the 
candidate countries.  
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‘Can the EU’s compliance system – the ultimate threat of financial penalties 
imposed by the European Court of Justice – compensate for the absence of 
conditional incentives, i.e. the threat of withholding membership? Are the 
domestic changes generated by conditionality conducive to sustainable 
compliance – application and enforcement – after accession? What happens in 
areas of political conditionality where the powers of EU institutions vis-à-vis 
full members are limited?’ (Sedelmeier 2011:25) 
Or, as Bohle & Greskovits (2012:267) rather aptly phrase it ‘why take the sticks if there 
are no carrots left?’. 
 Taking this argument one step further, in a study of the Hungarian innovation 
system, Szalavetz (2014) argues that the ‘EU factor’ has in fact been of minor 
importance in comparison to the influence of globalisation. She argues that the 
integration of economic actors into global value chains has ‘more effectively 
contributed to knowledge-based upgrading, though the allocation of funding from 
Structural Funds to multinational companies’ local subsidiaries seems to have 
effectively accelerated this latter process’ (Szalavetz 2014:52). Her study also suggests 
that the EU is restricted in terms of blocking Member States from reversing reform or 
abusing the opportunities afforded by EU membership. The findings of Szalavetz’s 
study highlights some surprising developments regarding the more recent impact of 
Europeanisation in Hungary. These will be considered during the course of this thesis.  
  
2.2) Innovation 
Innovation and the European Union 
 In 1991, the World Bank produced a report in which the changing ideas of 
economists about economic development since World War II were reviewed (World 
Bank 1991). The report calls into question both classical economic theory and, more 
particularly, neoclassical economic theory, according to which the sustained economic 
growth of a country can only be possible through exogenous technical change due to 
the idea of falling marginal product of input (Solow 1957). In line with the neoclassical 
tradition, the growth rates of countries with access to the same technology would be 
expected to converge over time. The report notes, however, that in the developing 
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countries a divergence in growth rates had taken place and, as a result, it argues that 
even between countries with access to the same technology, ‘national growth rates can 
differ if human capital and the incentives to adopt new technology differ’ (World Bank 
1991). In support of this view, the report cites the ‘New Growth Theory’ which claims 
that technological change is endogenous and that education and knowledge can result 
in positive externalities or increasing returns (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Grossman & 
Helpman 1991). In other words, contrary to previous thought, the report suggests that 
economic growth is determined by investment in intangible knowledge accumulation 
rather than physical capital investment. In other words, ‘endogenous growth theory 
therefore implies that institutions and policies will have a greater influence on growth 
rate than is suggested by orthodox neo-classical economics’ (Barry Jones 2001:535). 
Policies which have been recognised to have an impact include those relating to trade, 
competition, education, taxes and intellectual property.   
 In an EU context, the impact of this new economic view can clearly been seen in 
the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ and its oft cited goal of making the EU ‘the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Parliament 
2000:5). Initially launched in 2000 (Lisbon I), the Strategy was later relaunched in 2005 
(Lisbon II) with a shift in emphasis towards more attention on growth and job creation 
and less focus on social cohesion. The extent to which the Lisbon Strategy was able to 
achieve its goals, particularly its aim to create a knowledge-based economy that could 
rival that of the world leader, the United States, is strongly disputed and there are 
various studies providing explanations for its failure (Collignon 2008; Copeland & 
Papadimitriou 2012). The EU’s inability to increase R&D spending to even close to the 
‘Barcelona target’ of 3% of GDP by 2010 is seen as a clear example of this failure. On the 
other hand, some authors, whilst acknowledging the areas in which the Strategy has 
had limited impact, have also noted some more positive outcomes of the Lisbon 
Strategy, especially Lisbon II. For example, in his analysis of research and innovation 
within the Lisbon Strategy, Edler (2012:185) writes that the verdict on Lisbon is ‘much 
less gloomy when we look at the various dynamics that have started to change the 
governance capacities across Europe, with potentially far-reaching consequences for 
the effectiveness with which funding for research and innovation may be organised in 
the future’.  
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Knowledge still remains an important element in EU discourse and, in fact, the 
free movement of knowledge was even proposed as the EU’s fifth freedom in 2007 
(Potočnik 2007). However, as the 2000s progressed, an increasing emphasis on 
innovation can be seen in EU publications (European Commission 2010). In 2014, for 
example, the European Commission claimed that the ‘EU’s future is connected to its 
power to innovate: to turn great ideas into products and services that will bring growth 
to our economy and create jobs’ (European Commission 2014:3). Furthermore, in 2015, 
Commissioner Modeas proposed that a European Innovation Council be created as a 
new instrument to foster innovation in Europe. Indeed, the European Paradox, a term 
which was introduced as early as 1995 (European Commission 1995), refers to the 
inability of EU countries to translate scientific knowledge into commercial success. In 
2010, the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020, was launched with the aim to 
deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth within the EU. Whilst, in some 
respects, a continuation from Lisbon II can be observed, the EU claims that Europe 
2020 differs as it ‘builds on lessons learned from the earlier strategy, recognising its 
strengths (the right goals of growth and job creation) but addressing its weaknesses 
(poor implementation, with big differences between EU countries in the speed and 
depth of reform)’ (European Commission 2010). Despite the optimistic claims made by 
the EU, there is nonetheless concern (Lundvall & Lorenz 2012:349) that without a 
radical step ahead in the EU integration process, it will not be possible to meet Europe 
2020’s ambitious targets.  
In terms of research and innovation, against a backdrop of economic and 
financial instability and facing an ‘innovation emergency’ (European Commission 2011), 
in 2014 the EU launched its eighth and largest ever ‘Framework Programme for 
Research and Technological Development’ called ‘Horizon 2020’. Instead of following 
the sequential numbering system of its predecessors (FP1, FP2 and so on), Horizon 
2020 has been given its own unique name and purportedly represents a break from the 
past and ‘a clear departure from business as usual’ (Geoghegan-Quinn 2011). Whilst 
recognising that all Member States have their own research policies and funding 
schemes, the EU claims that many key issues could be tackled by working together 
which thereby justifies the funding of research and innovation at the EU level 
(European Commission 2014:3). Although commonalities between Horizon 2020 and 
its precursor, FP7, are clearly evident, Young (2013) argues that there is more of a sense 
24 
 
of threat in Horizon 2020 than there had been earlier. He suggests that ‘FP7 is more 
positive in its positioning of the EU seeking to overtake the US as the leader, and by 
Horizon 2020 there is more a narrative of being under siege, with the possibility of 
losing position to other countries, most notably China’ (Young 2013:5).   
 Concurrent with the launching of Horizon 2020, this time period also 
witnessed the upgrading and refinement of the methodology for Structural Funds 
programming with the introduction of the so-called ‘Smart Specialisation Strategy’. 
National and regional authorities across Member States are expected to design Smart 
Specialisation Strategies, a prerequisite to receiving funding from the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which the EU anticipates will ensure a more 
efficient use of Structural Funds and also increase the synergies between different EU, 
national and regional policies (European Commission 2014a:2). These Strategies, it is 
stipulated, must be done ‘through a process of ‘entrepreneurial discovery’, i.e. involving 
key innovation stakeholders and business. Thus, rather than being a strategy imposed 
from above, smart specialisation involves businesses, research centres and universities 
working together’ (European Commission 2014a:7). As this is still a relatively new 
approach, most academic studies focus on the conception of the Smart Specialisation 
approach (Capello 2014; Carayannis & Rakhmatullin 2014) and there is currently a 
lack of published studies investigating the impact of these national and/or regional 
Smart Specialisation Strategies. (For a more detailed description of the EU’s approach 
towards innovation policy, see Chapter 4). 
  
Defining innovation and innovation policy 
It could be argued that the EU’s subtle transition from a focus on a knowledge-
based economy to one which is more innovation-centred mirrors a distinction made 
many years earlier by Joseph Schumpeter between inventions and innovations 
(Schumpeter 1964). According to Schumpeter, inventions, which are exogenous to the 
economy, may take the form of an idea, a sketch or a model for a new product that does 
not necessarily lead to technical innovation. Just as invention does not always result in 
innovation, Schumpeter argues that innovation can even be possible without invention. 
He distinguishes quite clearly between the intellectual inventor and the volitional 
businessman or entrepreneur – who may be, or more often not be, an inventor 
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themselves – who turns the invention into an innovation (Schumpeter 1964:60). In 
Schumpeterian terms, innovations are accomplished with the first commercial 
transaction involving the new product, system or device.  
Schumpeter’s (1964) work has served as the framework for many of the more 
recent studies on innovation. Schumpeter himself built on the work of the Russian 
economist Nikolai Kondratiev who had stated that the capitalist economy moves in 
long, regular cycles. Kondratiev’s theory was that these cycles occur regularly, lasting 
from 40 to 60 years, because they are caused by certain permanent evolutionary factors 
which must necessarily cause a boom after a recession. Although Schumpeter accepted 
the existence of the Kondratiev cycle, which many economists prefer to call ‘waves’ or 
‘phases’ of growth, his explanation for these cycles differed from that of Kondratiev. 
According to Schumpeter, each business cycle was unique not only because of the 
historical events such as wars, gold discoveries or harvest failures but, also, because of 
the variety of technical innovations. As Freeman and Soete (1997:20) note, in 
Schumpeter’s theory, ‘the ‘successive industrial revolutions’ were based on the 
qualitative transformation of the economy by new technologies, rather than the simple 
quantitative growth of individual industries’.  
A significant shift can be seen between Schumpeter’s earlier and later works, 
also referred to as ‘Mark I’ and ‘Mark II’. Although Schumpeter (1964) always stressed 
the crucial role of the entrepreneur in the innovative process, Schumpeter ‘Mark II’ 
acknowledged the internalisation of much scientific work within the firm. This, it has 
been argued (Freeman & Soete 1997), reflected the real change that had taken place in 
the United States between World War I and World War II and, more specifically, the 
rise of professional R&D. It is, in fact, thanks to Schumpeter that perhaps the most 
frequently cited definition of innovation, as used by international organisations such as 
the OECD and EU, has been developed: 
‘An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or 
external relations’ (OECD and Eurostat 2005:46).  
Additionally, innovation can be further subdivided into radical and incremental 
innovations. The former ‘entails substantial shifts in product lines, the development of 
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entirely new goods, or major changes to the production process’ whilst the latter is 
‘marked by continuous but small-scale improvements to existing product lines and 
production processes’ (Hall & Soskice 2001:38-39). As will be discussed in more detail 
later, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature suggests that there is a direct link 
between the category of innovation in which a country tends to predominate, radical or 
incremental, and its type of capitalism.   
Another important distinction is that between innovators and imitators, a 
separation which though seemingly simple in theory is much more difficult to apply in 
practice. If, for example, ‘Firm A’ introduces an innovation in one context and then later 
‘Firm B’ introduces the innovation in a different context, would ‘Firm B’ be classified as 
an imitator or innovator? Clearly ‘Firm B’ has imitated ‘Firm A’s’ innovation but, by 
applying it in a new context, this is arguably an innovation too. Expanding on these 
classifications in a study of firm strategy, Freeman and Soete (1997) identify six 
innovation strategies which firms may choose to follow; offensive, defensive, imitative, 
dependent, traditional and opportunist. In fact, it has been suggested that rather than 
try to ‘catch-up’ to the technology frontier, companies in some countries may be 
incentivised to imitate and ‘fall back’ in order to grow more through the diffusion of 
new innovations originating from the frontier (Benhabib et al. 2014).  This is not the 
only factor to discourage innovation that has so far been recognised. Social institutions 
which limit inequality have also been shown to reduce the incentives for innovation 
compared with a social system that encourages the sort of ‘cutthroat capitalism’ 
associated with the United States (Acemoglu et al. 2012).  Indeed, it is in this respect 
that the role of national institutions in providing an environment which encourages 
innovation, and the type of innovation that it promotes, begins to become evident.  
 With regard to innovation policy itself, one of the difficulties in defining 
innovation policy and its instruments is that innovation policy regularly overlaps with 
policies related to science, research and technology. Indeed, the terms are often used 
interchangeably or in varying combinations. A concise definition of innovation policy is 
provided by Edler et al. (2016:3) who describe it as ‘public intervention to support the 
generation and diffusion of innovation, whereby an innovation is a new product, 
service, process or business model that is to be put to use, commercially or non-
commercially’. The intervention referred to in this definition is designed and 
administered by government and its purpose is to provide support not just for the 
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generation of new ideas, but also for their introduction, diffusion and adoption. In this 
respect, innovation policy can be targeted at both ‘those actors who generate 
innovations from the supply side and also so those who ask for, absorb and use 
innovations from the demand side’ (Edler at al. 2016:3). The inclusion of not only 
knowledge production but also its diffusion and absorption marks a considerable 
development from previous approaches to innovation policy which tended to focus 
specifically, or even solely, on R&D (such as the EU’s earlier innovation policy 
approach described in Chapter 4). 
 
Perspectives on innovation and the nation state 
 Whilst the importance of innovation for a nation’s economic prosperity has 
generally been unanimously agreed (Drucker 1985; Freeman & Soete 1997; Porter 1990), 
there has been considerable debate regarding the actual drivers of innovation. Several 
perspectives have focused on the nation state as a unit of analysis and, in doing so, they 
have identified country-specific factors that influence the flow of innovation (Freeman 
1987; Furman et al. 2002; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990; Romer 1990). These 
studies recognise that the national environment has a considerable impact on both the 
direction of innovation and the speed at which it can occur. The four main paradigms in 
this area are: (a) endogenous growth theory, (b) microeconomics-models of national 
competitive advantage and industrial clusters, (c) research on National Systems of 
Innovation (NSIs) and (d) studies on National Innovative Capacity (NIC).  
The first of these theories, the endogenous growth theory, is arguably the most 
abstract of the conceptualisations (Furman et al. 2002:901). Although the importance of 
technological innovation to economic growth had been realised much earlier 
(Abramovitz 1989; Schumpeter 1964; Solow 1957), it was not until the late 1980s that it 
began to be seen an as an endogenous phenomenon (Romer 1990). The endogenous 
growth theory stresses the importance of investing in human capital and knowledge in 
order to secure long-term economic development. For example, according to the 
growth model developed by Romer (1990), the rate of new ideas is a function of the 
number of available skilled researchers and the existing stock of knowledge. Although 
there has been considerable debate about the validity of a model linking ideas 
production to long-term economic growth (Grossman & Helpman 1991; Kortum 1994), 
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there is relatively broad agreement that these factors are, indeed, crucial in explaining 
economy-wide innovation (Furman et al. 2002:902).  
In comparison to the endogenous growth theory, which focuses almost 
exclusively on a set of important but limited factors, the second theory emphasises the 
importance of microeconomics in the relationship between competition, innovation 
and economic growth (Furman et al. 2002:902). Much of this work focuses on the role 
of geographical clusters and the dynamic interactions between these clusters and 
specific institutions such as universities and public institutes. This concept is primarily 
associated with Porter (1990) who, building on important studies such as Rosenberg 
(1963), produced a framework identifying four key drivers of innovation. In Porter’s 
(1990:71-73) ‘diamond’, the determining factors of national advantage are: (i) the 
availability of high-quality and specialized innovation inputs, (ii) an intense 
competitive local context which rewards successful innovators, (iii) the nature of 
domestic demand for cluster producers and services and (iv) the availability and 
interconnectedness of vertically and horizontally related industries. Porter (1990:71) 
argues that nations cannot be competitive in all industries but that they can ‘succeed in 
particular industries because their home environment is the most dynamic and the 
most challenging and stimulates and prods firms to upgrade and widen their 
advantages over time’. In addition to placing firms firmly at the centre of his analysis, 
Porter accords only a partial role to government and its ability to influence the four 
determining factors of competitive advantage and thereby ‘stimulate dynamism and 
upgrading’ (Porter 1990:678). 
Literature on the third concept, National Systems of Innovation (NSIs), began 
to expand in the early 1990s and was quickly adopted by national governments and 
international organisations such as the OECD and the EU (OECD 1997). This systemic 
approach has become particularly popular with policy makers around the world as it 
‘offers them the potential to derive more appropriate leads for innovation policy’ 
(Lankhuizen & Klein Woolthuis 2003:7). Although still a fairly young approach, the 
concept can in fact be dated back to Friedrich List’s (1841) work on political economy, 
which is seen as the platform for more recent studies on NSIs (Edquist 1997; Freeman 
& Soete 1997; Lundvall 1992; Mjøset 1992; Nelson 1993). List, who was primarily 
concerned with the issue of Germany overtaking Britain as the industrial leader in the 
nineteenth century, developed a national perspective which emphasised the need for 
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countries to develop ‘productive forces’. In doing so, he criticised classical economists 
for not sufficiently considering the role of science, technology and skills in the growth 
of nations. He argued for the protection of ‘infant-industries’ and a broad range of 
policies aimed at learning about and applying new technologies which he believed 
would accelerate, or make possible, industrialisation or economic growth. Given the 
emphasis placed on what would now be considered innovation, it has been suggested 
(Freeman 1995:5) that List’s (1841) book, The National System of Political Economy, could 
just as easily have been called National Systems of Innovation.  
The NSI concept proposes that innovation is the result of a complex series of 
interactions between various actors and institutions within the system and that a 
country’s innovative performance will depend on how well these elements can relate to 
one another as parts of a collective system of knowledge creation (OECD 1997). It 
moves away from a linear approach towards innovation, which assumed that efforts in 
R&D cause innovation and commercialisation and subsequently better economic 
performance, and it places a greater emphasis on the role of government and 
government policy than Porter’s (1990) theory of national competitive advantage. The 
NSI literature stresses three important aspects: (a) the overall national policy 
environment (e.g. IP or trade policy), (b) higher education and (c) country-specific 
institutions (e.g. the funding approaches of specific agencies) (Furman et al. 2002:900). 
The definition of an NSI varies considerably between researchers (see Table 1) and, as a 
result, a further subdivision has been made between NSIs in a ‘narrow sense’ and NSIs 
in a ‘broad sense’. In a narrow sense, NSI research focuses on those institutions that are 
directly involved with R&D and the dissemination of the results of that R&D. Authors 
who approach NSIs in a broad sense, however, include not only the diffusion, 
absorption and use of innovation but it also suggest that there are major sources of 
innovation other than science. A major source of innovation other than science, for 
example, is the interactive learning that takes place in connection with production and 
sales (Lundvall 2005).  Nelson’s (1993) work provides an example of a narrow sense 
approach to NSIs whereas Freeman (1987) and Lundvall’s (1992) studies characterise 
NSIs in a broad sense. Whist it is important to be aware of the differences in the 
approaches to studying NSIs, it should be noted that the importance of national 
institutions is stressed in both narrow and broad approaches as can be seen in all of the 
definitions in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: Definition of an NSI 
 
The fourth perspective on national dimensions of innovation, National Innovative 
Capacity (NIC), has sought to integrate the three former viewpoints. NIC is defined as 
a ‘country’s potential – as both an economic and political entity- to produce a stream of 
commercially relevant innovations’ (Furman et al. 2002:905). Determinants of NIC are 
divided into three categories: (i) the common pool of institutions, resource 
commitments, and policies that support innovation across the economy, (ii) the 
particular innovation environment in the nation’s industrial cluster and (iii) the 
linkages between them (Furman et al. 2002:905). Using this framework, proponents of 
the NIC approach have used data to quantitatively calculate the innovative capacity of 
various countries (Furman et al. 2002). Although some further studies have been 
carried out using the NIC structure (Hu & Mathews 2005; Hu & Tseng 2007; Natario 
NSIs have been defined as:  
 all important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional and other 
factors that influence the development, diffusion and use of innovations’ 
(Edquist 1997:14). 
 ‘the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’ 
(Freeman 1987:1). 
  ‘a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance...of national firms’ (Nelson 1993:5). 
 ‘the national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that 
determine the rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume and 
composition of change generating activities) in a country’ (Patel & Pavitt 
1994:12). 
 ‘that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the 
development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the 
framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence 
the innovation process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to 
create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new 
technologies’ (Metcalfe 1995:462-463). 
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et al. 2011), it has arguably received less scholarly attention than the NSI approach and 
there is a considerably more limited literature dedicated to this concept. 
With regard to this research, the broad NSI approach has been selected as the most 
appropriate framework as it offers a much more extensive model with which to study 
innovation at a national level than that offered by the endogenous growth theory, the 
micro-economic models or the NIC theory. By allowing space for the role of 
government, firms, education and other relevant national institutions and using 
primarily qualitative data, the NSI concept provides a thorough toolkit with which to 
understand the complexities of innovation. Indeed the NSI concept has become a 
popular tool for understanding the differences in innovative performance between 
countries (Nelson 1993) and also the changing innovative performance within 
countries. It should be noted, however, that whilst this research will employ a national 
approach, the systems of innovation concept is not used exclusively at a national level. 
Other innovation studies have adopted a technological (Carlsson 1995), sectoral 
(Malerba 2005; Oltra & Saint Jean 2009) or regional (Asheim & Isaksen 2002; Braczyk 
et al. 1998; Cooke et al. 1997; Cooke 2001) focus, all of which can be grouped into the 
generic systems of innovation approach. As Edquist (2006:184) notes, ‘[w]hether the 
most appropriate conception of the system of innovation, in a certain context, should 
be national, sectoral or regional, depends to a large extent on the questions one wants 
to ask’. The national approach has been chosen for this research as it offers the most 
suitable analytical tool with which to answer the research questions. Whilst there are 
many advantages of the NSI approach, there are of course limitations which will now 
be discussed in more detail.  
 
Criticisms of the NSI approach  
The NSI approach has been particularly criticised for being conceptually diffuse 
and ambiguous (Edquist 2005). A clear example of this can be seen in the varying 
definitions of NSIs (Table 1 above), which underlines the lack of agreement as to 
exactly where the boundary around the innovation system lies. In many cases, authors 
have provided ‘no sharp guide to what should be included in the innovation system, and 
what can be left out’ (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993:5-6). Whilst others, Lundvall 
(1992:13), have insisted that ‘a definition of the system of innovation must be kept open 
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and flexible’. Even the ‘system’ element of the concept has received criticism for being 
vague as it could be argued that, in fact, it refers to a ‘network level’ rather than ‘system 
level’ process (Miettinen 2002).  
A similar lack of clarity is evident in the definition of an institution, a key 
element in the NSI approach. Some authors use the term to refer to different kinds of 
organisations or ‘players’ (Nelson & Rosenberg 1993), whereas for others (Lundvall 
1992), it represents the laws, rules, routines and other ‘rules of the game’. As a result, 
the term institution is used in several different senses in the literature (see Edquist 
2005). It is also important, in this respect, to differentiate between formal institutions, 
such as constitutions and contracts, and informal institutions, such as traditions, 
customs, moral values and ‘ways of doing things’ (North 1990). There is a further 
element of ambiguity apropos the theoretical value of the NSI approach as it does not 
specifically provide propositions regarding causal relations among variables. Given its 
lack of well-established empirical regularities, Edquist (2005:186) argues that it ‘should 
be labelled an approach or conceptual framework rather than a theory’. This will of 
course have methodological implications for this research which will be addressed in a 
later section.  
Proponents of the NSI approach have also had to contend with the issue of 
globalisation, and to a certain extent the issue of devolution, in order to defend the 
‘national’ element of the NSI concept. Due, in part, to the increasing rise in cross-
country production systems and interfirm connections, the previously mentioned 
‘sectoral’ and ‘regional’ innovation systems have been seen by some as an alternative to 
the national approach. Whilst these approaches represent an important analytical 
niche, both in their own right and as a compliment to the national approach, they do 
not represent a replacement of the NSI approach. As Lundvall et al. (2002:215, emphasis 
in original) note ‘[a]s long as nation states exist as political entities with their own 
agendas related to innovation it is useful to work with national systems as analytical 
objects’. This opinion is echoed by other authors (Freeman & Soete 1997) including 
Nelson (1993:18) who notes that some of the striking differences between the systems 
of countries ‘reside to a significant degree, in differences in national histories and 
cultures’. The rationale for studying innovation at a national level is further 
substantiated by the fact that national governments have a vested interest in promoting 
and supporting innovation due to its importance for economic growth and ensuring a 
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high national employment rate. In other words, whilst the implications of globalisation 
and, where applicable, devolution need to be understood in the area of innovation 
research, the nation state still remains a legitimate unit of analysis.   
Although it is important to be aware of the weaknesses of the NSI approach, it 
has nonetheless proved a particularly efficient concept for understanding the reasons 
for the differing innovative performance of countries. As Lankhuizen & Klein 
Woolthuis (2003) identify, the NSI approach helps to understand how innovation 
evolves and what the elements and framework conditions are that determine and affect 
innovation and economic development. In other words, it ‘offers a ‘richer picture’ of 
reality compared to mainstream growth models’ (Lankhuizen & Klein Woolthuis 
2003:12). Similarly, for Suurna & Kattel (2010:647) it ‘provides a necessary roof above 
the aspects related to different actors in innovation, innovation policy and policy-
making processes and hence provides necessary structural coherence’. Arguably the 
conceptual framework of the NSI approach is most effective, and is the method in 
which it is applied to this study, when used as a ‘focusing device’ (Lundvall 1992), with 
which the researcher can decide how and where to channel their research.  
 
National culture and innovation 
In spite of its frequent usage in both academic and everyday contexts, the 
concept of culture is markedly nebulous and agreeing on a precise definition has proven 
particularly challenging. Offering perhaps one of the most comprehensive definitions, 
Morris et al. (1994:70) define national culture as  
‘a learned, socially transmitted set of behavioural standards. It is held, 
expressed, and shared by individuals through their personal values, norms, 
activities, cognitive processes, interpretation of symbols, feelings, ideas, 
reactions and morals’.  
The importance of national culture is significant because, as noted by Senge (2006:8), it 
affects the way in which ‘we understand the world and how we take action’. In fact, 
national culture is argued to be more influential in how we process data, draw 
conclusions, and decide upon our actions than age, race, gender, religion, education or 
occupation (Livermore 2011; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 2012).  
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Various studies have been undertaken in order to investigate the impact of 
national culture on innovation performance (inter alia Gerhart & Fang 2005; Hofstede 
1980; Hofstede 2001; Jones & Davis 2000; Newman & Nollen 1996; Shane 1992). One of 
the earliest significant studies was conducted by Hofstede (1980) whose landmark 
study of fifty countries and three regions has served as a frame of reference for many 
later studies. Hofstede initially identified four, and subsequently five, dimensions of 
culture; power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity-femininity and long versus short-term orientation. These dimensions, it is 
claimed, interact with factors linked with the NSI, such as quality of governance and 
openness which, in turn, impact on a country’s ability to innovate. The resulting 
conclusion is that national culture does indeed have an impact on a country’s 
innovation capacity.  For example, a study of the relationship between culture and 
innovation in European countries (Kaasa & Vadi 2008), which was based on the 
aforementioned cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede, suggests that regions with 
lower than average power distance, uncertainty avoidance, family-related collectivism 
and masculinity exhibit higher patenting intensity.  
With regard to Central and Eastern European countries, Kolman et al. (2003) 
conducted a study of national cultures in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia during the pre-accession period in order to gain some insight into the national 
cultures of these countries. The study serves as something of a benchmark against 
which changes, which were expected as a result of intensive social, political and 
economic interactions with other European countries, can be measured. Results found 
that not only were there significant cultural differences between (a) Western and (b) 
Central and Eastern European countries, but also amongst the Central and Eastern 
European countries themselves. Of particular note were the striking differences 
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia which was particularly surprising given that 
they had been united within one nation for many decades1. The results of this study 
offer a strong warning against the tendency to group together countries with 
geographical or historical commonalities (such as ex-Soviet states) into a culturally 
homogenous collective. Based on the argument that national culture affects innovation 
capacity, therefore, it could be expected that cultural differences between Central and 
                                                             
1 In fact, data suggest that the Czech culture is closer to the German and Austrian culture than to the 
Slovak culture (Hofstede 2001).  
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Eastern European countries would lead to divergent experiences in their innovation 
systems and performances.  
 
2.3) Varieties of Capitalism 
An introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
There have been several studies (Featherstone et al. 2012; Menz 2005) 
conducted integrating the seemingly disparate VoC framework with that of 
Europeanisation. In fact, Featherstone et al. (2012) argue that it is even necessary for 
researchers of Europeanisation to learn from other approaches, such as VoC, in order to 
explain the varying responses of Member States to external pressures, namely those 
exerted by the EU. Incorporating the VoC framework into a study of the Lisbon 
Agenda, they suggested, could help to explain the resilience or inertia of Member States 
towards the EU’s guidelines. Instead of conflicting, ‘the two frames are more 
complementary than competing, as both aim to explain the differential effect of an 
external stimulus for domestic adaptation(…)Thus, essentially, the VoC offers a new set 
of ‘intervening variables’ for Europeanisation, while Europeanisation offers an 
additional ‘external pressure’ for the VoC’ (Featherstone et al. 2012:67). A 
corresponding claim has been voiced by Menz (2005) who contends that powerful 
interest groups, such as trade unions and employer organisations, which play an 
important role in the divergent VoC typologies, do significantly impact on national 
attempts of coping with EU-led market liberalisation. In other words, these studies 
suggest that the Europeanisation and VoC frameworks can be used to complement one 
another and thereby enrich the findings of research.  
 Furthermore, given that the literature on VoC directly relates to the study of 
innovation, its theoretical implications must therefore be considered in the course of 
this research. Although not a new area of research – for example Schonfield conducted 
a study on the differences between Western capitalist nations as early as 1965 – the 
VoC approach which was developed at the beginning of the 2000s has had a huge 
impact on studies of comparative political economy. It has even been ‘heralded as the 
most important recent theoretical innovation in the comparative social sciences both 
by its critics and more sympathetic commentators’ (Hancké 2001:5). Indeed the 
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quantity of publications responding to and expanding on the ideas proposed in the 
original VoC study (Hall & Soskice 2001) is testament to its significance.  
 Recent history has been characterised by processes of globalisation, 
Europeanisation and shifting macro-economic paradigms which led many to believe 
that advanced political economies would inevitably be forced to converge along neo-
liberal lines. The conclusion was that ‘the deregulating neo-liberal political-economic 
model would ultimately trump the more coordinated and frequently more socially 
orientated continental European and South-East Asian economic development models’ 
(Hancké 2001:1). Hall & Soskice (2001), however, proposed a very different argument 
claiming that not only were economies not converging on the neo-liberal economic 
model, but that political-economic models were in fact diverging as a result of 
globalisation, as countries sought to maximise their comparative advantage. Their 
approach suggested that one political-economic model was not necessarily better than 
another but that different models could result in distinct comparative institutional 
advantages.  
 Hall and Soskice (2001) built on previous studies of models of capitalism, 
particularly Albert's (1993) research which had identified key differences between what 
he termed Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland models of capitalism. A significant deviation 
from much of the previous work, however, was Hall and Soskice’s use of 
microeconomic foundations in order to understand and explain macroeconomic theory. 
Their analysis centred on the firm and the way in which firms coordinate their 
endeavours with other actors within that nation’s political economy. More specifically, 
they focused on the way in which firms overcome the coordination problems they face 
in five spheres of their strategic environment; (1) industrial relations, (2) vocational 
training and education, (3) corporate governance, (4) inter-firm relations and (5) 
employees. The solution to these coordination issues, they argue, lies in the historically 
formed institutional frameworks. Emerging from this analysis are two ideal-type forms 
of institutional equilibria, liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), which sit at either end of a continuum along which other nations 
can be arrayed. 
 In developing their LME-CME dichotomy, Hall and Soskice (2001) highlighted 
national differences in the three main markets to which firms are exposed; product, 
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labour and capital. An example of this can clearly be seen in Germany, claimed to be the 
country which most conforms to the CME ideal type, whose labour market is 
characterised by long-term employment and collective wage negotiation between 
employers’ associations and trade unions.  This is juxtaposed with the more flexible 
labour market of the US, Germany’s LME counterpart, which is typically associated 
with a more ‘hire and fire’ type of arrangement. A similar contrast can be observed in  
their capital market arrangements. Whilst the former has traditionally relied on capital 
provision organised through banks (even despite the recent contribution of 
international investors, the relations between banks and firms has remained highly 
coordinated (Hancké et al. 2007:5)), the latter depends on capital provided through a 
dispersed shareholder system. According to Hall and Soskice, the peculiarities of these 
capital and, particularly, labour markets have a direct impact on the products in which 
companies will chose to specialise. From this perspective, a clear link can be seen 
between labour, capital and product markets.  
This relates directly to Hall & Soskice's (2001:18-19) concept of institutional 
complementarities in which ‘nations with a particular type of coordination in one 
sphere should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well’. The 
notion of institutional complementarity has also been considerably applied and 
explored in studies of NSIs (Coriat & Weinstein 2009; Lundvall 1992). According to 
the VoC approach, firms in LMEs coordinate their activities primarily through 
hierarchical and competitive market arrangements which are characterised by arms-
length relations, formal contracting and supply and demand price signalling (Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hall & Gingerich 2004). As a result, labour markets in these countries are 
fluid and employees are therefore encouraged to develop ‘switchable assets’ which can 
be used in different companies. This is complemented by a corporate governance 
system which focuses on short-term incentive contracts. Companies in these countries 
typically have easy access to stock market finance for which they are expected to 
produce significant returns quickly. Hall & Soskice (2001:39) argue that, due to 
institutional complementarity, companies in these countries will tend to pursue radical 
innovations in sectors ranging from bio-technology, semi-conductors, software and 
advertising to corporate finance.   
Whilst market conditions do play a part in CMEs, firms here depend also on 
non-market forms of coordination such as extensive relational or incomplete 
38 
 
contracting, network monitoring and collaborative rather than competitive 
relationships. Due to a tradition of long-term employment, employees are encouraged 
to develop ‘specific skills’ or ‘co-specific skills’, the values of which can be realised with 
the active cooperation of others. These economies are characterised by bank or credit-
based financial systems and banks and other financial actors have historically had a 
strong oversight role on firms (Casper 2010:351). As a result of long-term strategies, 
rule-bound behaviour and the close ties between firms and banks, firms in CMEs are 
more likely to focus on incremental innovation particularly in capital goods industries, 
machine tools and equipment of all kinds (Hall & Soskice 2001:39). 
 Innovation plays a key part in Hall & Soskice's (2001:37) theory of institutional 
comparative advantage according to which ‘the institutional structure of a particular 
political economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of 
activities’. Rather than random geographic agglomeration, the rational responses of 
firms to the institutional framework will result in national patterns of specialisation in 
activities and products. Firms will seek to retain capitalist diversity between nations as 
it provides them with their comparative advantage which, it is argued, rather than 
being undermined, is actually being strengthened by globalisation. It is claimed, 
therefore, that ‘[s]ince FDI will flow to locations rich in either specific or co-specific 
assets, depending on the sector or firm-specific requirements that investors are 
searching for, globalisation will reinforce comparative institutional advantage’ (Hancké 
et al. 2007:6).  
 
A critique of Varieties of Capitalism 
 Given the theoretical importance of the VoC literature to this research, it is 
important to be aware of some of the main criticisms of this approach. There are two 
main groups of critics, the first of whom question one of Hall and Soskice’s core 
arguments, namely that institutional divergence is taking place in advanced capitalist 
economies. The argument of these critics centres around the notion that ‘the more 
capitalist economies at different stages of development become integrated in one world 
market, the more competition, the driver of innovation, will impose institutional 
convergence’ (Hancké 2001:6). They claim that, as growth becomes intensive rather 
than extensive, a coordinated system will slow down the pace of adjustment and 
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therefore these countries will ultimately have to liberalise their economies. Proponents 
of this position include Eichengreen (2007), Friedman (2000) and Phelps (2006) and it 
has also been utilised by politicians in the United States, United Kingdom, European 
Commission, OECD and IMF, amongst others (see Hancké 2001).  
 The second group of critics broadly accept that divergent forms of capitalism 
exist but express concerns with elements of the original VoC study. There are several 
strands to this group of critics. The first strand raises concerns about the use of the 
firm, which is at the centre of the VoC analysis, almost to the exclusion of other actors, 
particularly labour and the state. As Hancké (2001:8) notes: 
‘While very few critics fundamentally disagree with the idea of paying 
attention to the strategic choices of firms and business more generally, most of 
them would argue that the conditions under which firms operate, and 
especially the nature of the state, the role of labour law and collective 
bargaining, and the institutionalized power of labour unions, are as crucial in 
understanding the modern capitalist world and the choices that capitalists 
make.’ 
Bringing the state and labour back into the analysis has been considered paramount in 
the work of this group of VoC critics. 
 Within this group of critics, a second strand of criticism highlights some 
weaknesses in the key building blocks of the VoC framework, particularly institutional 
complementarity and institutional competitive advantage. For example, Amable 
(2004:10) claims that institutions represent ‘a compromise resulting from the social 
conflict originating in the heterogeneity of interest among [various] agents’. This would 
suggest that institutional complementarity reflects not only an economic function, as 
implied by the original VoC study, but one which is also social and political. In other 
words, these critics argue that in order for the notion of institutional 
complementarities to work in a broader, political economic sense, social and political 
considerations need to be taken into account (Morgan & Kubo 2005). The notion of 
comparative institutional advantage has also been questioned in a study by Herrigel 
and Wittike (2005) which found that the US and Germany, opposites on the VoC 
classification scale, were in fact following similar strategies in certain manufacturing 
firms.  
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 A further issue with the notion of institutional complementarity results from its 
inherent connection to the concept of path dependency (discussed in Chapter 3). 
Whilst institutional complementarities can explain ‘on-path’ change, in the form of 
continued diversity, it offers little explanation for fundamental, or ‘off-path’, change. In 
other words, the concept of institutional complementarity is unavoidably opposed to 
the idea of radical change.  However, observations in advanced capitalist economies 
suggest that profound institutional changes can occur without exogenous shock and 
thereby draw attention to the limits of path dependency and, consequently, 
institutional complementarity. As a result, some have argued for the possibility of 
change to be reintroduced into the theory of path dependency (Crouch & Farrell 2004; 
Thelen 2003).  
 A third strand of criticism stems from the lack of diversity in the VoC approach, 
questioning whether variety is in fact missing in the original VoC concept. The binary 
LME-CME classification adopted in the VoC approach risks presenting countries that 
do not conform to either of these, including countries with a strong state influence such 
as France and the Mediterranean countries, as being somehow anomalous or deviant. 
Indeed, further studies have identified cases which do not conform to the LME-CME 
typologies, such as a Mediterranean Market Economy (Hall & Gingerich 2004) and a 
Dependent Market Economy (in some Central and Eastern European countries) (Nölke 
& Vliegenhart 2009), to name but a few. Still others have developed entirely different 
classification systems such as the ‘National Business Systems’ (Morgan 2005; Whitley 
1999) and ‘Social Systems of Production’ (Amable 2004; Crouch et al. 2005). 
 Related to this strand of criticism is the argument that, not only does the VoC 
approach not offer sufficient variety in its binary classifications, but that these 
classifications do not adequately capture the differences between countries which 
allegedly fall into the same category. For example, according to the VoC literature, both 
Germany and Japan are classified as CMEs. Yet, in spite of the fact that their corporate 
government arrangements produce similar outcomes, they differ considerably in terms 
of the institutional system on which they are based and the historical forces which 
shaped them (Yamamura & Streeck 2003). Critics have argued that by placing 
Germany and Japan into the same classification, insufficient attention is drawn to the 
differences between the structures and their political economies. Similar arguments 
have also been made about the inability of the VoC framework to account for the 
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differences between LMEs (Cheffins 2002). In addition, using a comparison of the pre- 
and post-Thatcher eras in the United Kingdom, authors have argued that the VoC 
model is unable to explain changes which can occur within an LME over time (Howell 
2003). 
 
Varieties of Capitalism and Central and Eastern Europe 
The lack of variety in Hall & Soskice's (2001) categorisations represents a 
significant problem in terms of classifying the types of capitalism present in post-
communist Central and Eastern European countries. In this respect, one of the major 
limitations of the VoC approach is that it focuses on, and can only really be applied to, 
the advanced economies of the US and Western Europe. As Bohle & Greskovits 
(2012:11) note, ‘to assume that these models can be readily applied to less developed 
market societies seems far too much of a stretch’. Expressing their reservations about 
the applicability of the VoC approach to Central and Eastern European countries, these 
same authors also highlight the importance of the timing of these countries transition 
period and, more specifically, the impact of globalisation. These countries found 
themselves contending with a considerably different global economy than Western 
European countries had in the period after World War II. Therefore, the role of 
international and transnational factors and actors need more consideration in Eastern 
and Central Europe than is provided by the original VoC framework.  
There, have nonetheless, been some attempts to classify Central and Eastern 
European capitalisms according to the LME-CME typologies (Cernat 2002; Crowley 
2005; Lane 2005; McMenamin 2004). Slovenia, for example, has been identified as a 
CME whilst Estonia, it has been argued, possess the traits of an LME (Buchen 2007; 
Feldmann 2006). Some authors, on the other hand, have suggested the existence of a 
hybrid variety of capitalism which combines features of both LMEs and CMEs 
(Iankova 2002; King & Sznajder 2006). Recognising some of the limitations of applying 
the VoC approach to Central and Eastern European countries, Nölke & Vliegenhart 
(2009) also expanded the VoC model by adding a third classification to the original 
study, namely the Dependent Market Economy (DME). Focusing their study on the 
four Visegrád countries, the Czech Republic Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, 
they found that the LME-CME categorisation could not adequately describe the variety 
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of capitalism in these countries as it did not allow for consideration of the impact of 
external dependency, a central characteristic of the region. They argue that the 
competitive advantage of DMEs comes from the assembly and production of relatively 
complex and durable goods. ‘These competitive advantages are based on institutional 
complementarities between skilled, but cheap, labor; the transfer of technological 
innovations within transnational enterprises; and the provision of capital via foreign 
direct investment (FDI)’ (Nölke & Vliegenhart 2009:672). By incorporating 
transnational influences, especially that of MNEs, and introducing a new 
categorisation, Nölke and Vliegenhart managed to overcome, to a certain extent, the 
previously mentioned drawbacks of applying the VoC approach to the Visegrád Four. 
Nölke & Vliegenhart (2009:674) note that whilst DMEs can successfully compete in 
world markets for a certain period of time, their long-term prospect looks uncertain as 
‘their comparative advantages are constantly being threatened by countries located 
further to the east’.  
 Whilst recognising its merits, Bohle & Greskovits (2012) have not been 
convinced that expanding the VoC concept to include a DME classification 
satisfactorily encapsulates the key elements which define the diversity of capitalism 
within the Central and Eastern European countries. For them, a crucial element was 
still missing and ‘[a]ny meaningful conceptualization of the new configurations must 
therefore include propositions about transformative political agents and their interplay 
with transnational and supranational actors’ (Bohle & Greskovits 2012:12). Bohle and 
Greskovits apply a Polanyian-based theoretical framework, which recognises the 
inherent tension between the interests of the economic, social and political domains, in 
order to distinguish the varieties of capitalism present in Central and Eastern European 
countries. Their study uncovers three ‘regime’ types which result from a combination of 
historical legacies and the decisions of elites during the transition period: neoliberal 
(the Baltic States), embedded neoliberal (the Visegrád 4) and neocorporatist 
(Slovenia). Slovenia’s status as the sole neocorporatist representative highlights the 
increasing movement towards forms of neoliberal, or even pure neoliberal, regimes 
witnessed since the end of the 1990s (Bohle & Greskovits 2012:268).  
In terms of a theoretical framework, Bluhm et al. (2014) recognise the advantage 
of the Polanyian approach but they also highlight its limitations such as its market 
centeredness and its view of institutions as mainly external constraints on self-
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regulating markets. On this basis, they refuse to reject the VoC approach entirely. In 
fact, Bluhm et al. (2014) cautiously apply the notion of a DME, aware of a major 
weakness of this approach in overstressing the role of foreign investors and giving 
insufficient attention to the influence of domestic actors. Moreover, in the case of this 
research the DME approach does have some considerable merits, particularly the 
positioning of MNEs at the core of its framework. Whilst aware of its limitations, it is 
due to its suitability in achieving the aims of this study that the DME framework has 
been selected as the reference point with which to conduct this investigation. Indeed, it 
is important to keep in mind that VoC is not an end point but, as Hall & Soskice 
(2001:68) themselves suggested, an invitation to a ‘fruitful interchange among scholars 
interested in many kinds of issues in economic, industrial relations, social policy 
making, political science, business, and the law’. By placing emphasis on the role of 
national institutions as well as foreign actors in order to explain differing national 
experiences, the DME approach both complements and contributes to the study of 
NSIs and Europeanisation. 
 
2.4) Hypotheses  
This chapter has hilighted some of the key concepts which will frame the direction 
of this research. Furthermore, the review of the bodies of literature on Innovation, 
Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanisation has underlined the sustained importance 
of national institutions, both in their informal and formal sense. The idea that 
‘instutions matter’ is hardly a new concept; it has long been a matter of discussion 
amongst political economists. The growing body of literature on systems of innovation 
and Europeanisation has begun adding more evidence in support of this argument. 
However, it is not only the signifcance of institutions that this chapter has hilighted, 
but also that of agency. Indeed, to a large extent, these two elements are intirnsically 
linked. As Amable (2000:3-4) notes, ‘a link is provided between the role of history-
dependent institutions and individual behaviour since instituional arrangements define 
the incentive framework in which agents take decisions’. The review of this literature 
has drawn attention to the consideration that needs to be given to the role of 
institutions and agency in order to answer the questions of this study.  
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Based on the survey of this literature and with the research aims discussed in the 
previous chapter in mind, the following three central hypotheses have been developed 
for testing through the course of this study. Whilst Hypothesis 1 directly addresses the 
core question of this research, Hypotheses 2 and 3 have been framed as reverse 
hypotheses in order to rigorously test and challenge Hypothesis 1.  
1. The EU’s innovation agenda, currently being driven by Horizon 2020 and 
the Smart Specialisation Strategy, will have a strong impact in terms of 
promoting innovation, encouraging the development of innovation 
strategies and influencing the direction of these strategies in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary.   
1. The extent to which the EU is able to influence the national innovation 
systems of the Czech Republic and Hungary will be strongly influenced by 
the compatibility, or lack thereof, between the demands and objectives of 
the EU and the Czech and Hungarian national institutions (both formal and 
informal). 
 
2. Given the economic dependence on foreign firms in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the response of the Czech and Hungarian national governments to 
the pressures of Europeanisation will be heavily mediated by the needs and 
expectations of these foreign actors.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has undertaken to provide a thorough analysis of previous research 
and literature related to this study. In doing so, it has highlighted areas on which there 
is academic difference and also several areas which would benefit from further research 
contribution. This discussion has also sought to draw together the three areas of 
Innovation, Europeanisaiton and Varieties of Capitalism and to demonstrate their 
related relevance in answering the questions at the centre of this study. Additionally, 
this review has enabled the construction of a number of hypotheses which this thesis 
will seek to investigate. This does of course denote several methodological 
considerations which will be addressed in detail in the following chapter.  
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3) Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 As has been highlighted in the previous chapter, since the latter part of the 20th 
century, ensuring economic stability and growth through innovation has begun to be 
viewed as an issue of critical importance to the EU. The financial and economic crises 
which began in 2008 have exposed severe weaknesses in some EU economies and 
added additional urgency to this task. As a result, the EU is attempting to play an 
increasing in role in the funding of innovation-related projects and the development of 
national innovation policies. The extent to which the EU is succeeding at influencing 
the NSIs of these Member States in practice, is at the core of this study. In order to 
address the questions of this research, an appropriate methodology has been followed 
which is described in the following four sections. The first section identifies the 
conceptual framework on which this research is focused. The theoretical approach 
with which this research is undertaken is discussed in the second section. The third 
section explains the research design including the case study selection. Finally, the 
methods used for data collection and analyses are described in the third section.  
 
3.1) Conceptual Framework 
In order to test the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter, and in turn meet 
the aims of this study, a conceptual framework has been devised which is informed by 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Three main concepts have been identified and 
their selection for this study justified; National Systems of Innovation, Dependent 
Market Economies and a top-down approach to Europeanisation. The discussion of 
these concepts has also helped to identify various variables on which to focus this 
research. The following conceptual framework has been developed using these 
variables (Figure 1). The variables included in the conceptual framework are by no 
means exhaustive, rather they have been selected from the plethora of options due to 
their suitability and, most importantly, their necessity in answering the questions at 
the core of this thesis. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This conceptual framework provides a simplfied overview of the direction of 
impact of the various variables which were identified in the previous chapter as having 
a singifcant influence on the innovation peformance of NSIs. Furthermore, it highlights 
the interaction between (a) Europeanisation and NSI variables and (b) NSI and DME 
variables. For example, the EU’s innovation policy is expected to have considerable 
impact on the innovation policy of the respective national governments. National 
governments, in turn, would also be expected to signifcantly impact upon the role of 
MNEs within that country. Equally, the demands of MNEs would be expected to have 
a notable impact on the direction of governemnt policy. Of course, there are likely to be 
some notable complexities within these relationships. This conceptual framework 
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serves as a useful reference point with which to investigate these finer points in more 
detail. 
 
3.2) Research approach 
The review of the literature carried out in Chapter 2 highlighted the importance 
which has been placed on the role of institutions in the literature on Innovation, 
Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanisation. The significance of institutions has long 
been recognised; indeed, until the 1950s, political science was largely dominated by 
institutionalism. Political scientists focused on, for example, ‘comparing executives and 
legislatures, or parties and electoral systems, across countries and over time’ (Lowndes 
& Roberts 2013:1). The ‘old institutionalism’ received criticism for its largely 
descriptive nature, its tendency to make assumptions about what constituted a ‘good 
political system’ and its bias towards only the formal instructions, rules and procedures 
(Hodgson 1993). Consequently, with the behaviourist turn in the post-World War II 
era and its shift away from the state and towards a more society-centred focus, its 
popularity began to wane. However, in the early 1980s, institutionalism witnessed 
something of a revival, or a second phase, which has been termed the ‘new 
institutionalism’ which was based on the premise that the ‘organisation of political life 
makes a difference’ (March & Olsen 1984:747). This reflected a gradual and diverse 
reintroduction of institutions into a large body of theories, such as behaviourism, 
pluralism, Marxism and neorealism, in which institutions had originally been absent or, 
at best, peripheral. In contrast to the more input-weighted political analysis of 
behaviourism and rational choice theorists, new institutionalists attempted to bring 
the state back into the centre their analysis. As Lowndes & Roberts (2013:6) note the 
‘basic argument is that institutions do matter, and that they matter more than anything 
else that could be used to explain political decisions’.  
Not strictly a single theory, new institutionalism is a set of approaches which, 
though each approach views institutions in a different way, draw out the manner in 
which institutions impact on political processes. Whilst building on the earlier work of 
old institutionalism, new institutionalism departs in two notable ways (Lowndes & 
Roberts 2013:2). Firstly, instead of returning to the descriptive and atheoretical style of 
an earlier generation of institutionalists, the new institutionalists developed a more 
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expansive definition of their subject matter which includes informal conventions as 
well as formal rules. Secondly, the new institutionalists operate within more explicit, 
albeit arguably diverse, theoretical frameworks. In contrast to the grand theories of 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism is described as a 
middle-range theory and is being applied increasingly often, and with growing success, 
to the study of the EU as a polity and to European integration as a process. Lowndes & 
Roberts (2013:3) argue that new institutionalist theory ‘provides a good set of 
conceptual tools for analysing contemporary governance precisely because it does not 
equate institutions with organizations, nor assume that politics is determined by 
formal structures and frameworks alone’. Its most important benefit, however, is that it 
underlines the ‘double life’ of institutions, in which institutions constrain actors, but 
are also human creations (Grafstein 1988:517-518). 
As new institutionalism has gained popularity, so too have the number of new 
institutionalist variants increased. There are now at least nine different strands of new 
institutionalism; constructivist or discursive institutionalism, empirical 
institutionalism, feminist institutionalism, historical institutionalism, international 
institutionalism, network institutionalism, normative institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.  The majority of writers, however, 
agree that the debate is dominated by the three main strands of rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalisms. The development and distinctiveness of 
each these three strands, and their relevance to this research, will now be considered in 
more detail.  
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
 Rational Choice Institutionalism developed from the field of Rational Choice 
Theory. Rational choice institutionalists argue that actors are rational and strategic 
individualists who calculate the costs and benefits of the decisions they make.  For 
rational choice institutionalists, actors are assumed to be selfish, utility maximising 
individuals. Accordingly, actors make decisions which will maximise their personal or 
individual gain. Institutions are thought to be important because they frame the 
individual’s strategic behaviour by shaping the preferences they pursue. The emphasis 
placed on rational calculation suggests that institutions are not just an important cause 
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of behaviour but are, in fact, also an effect of behaviour. It is argued that ‘institutions 
are constructed by individual actors for rational purposes and that individual actors 
engage in changing and shaping institutional environments to suit their goals’ (Bell 
2002:6). As will be discussed later, this contrasts considerably with the other two 
principal strands of new institutionalism. 
 In their seminal work, Hall & Taylor (1996) identify several advantages of the 
rational choice institutionalist approach. Firstly, rational choice institutionalism is able 
to more precisely elucidate the relationship between institutions and behaviour and has 
developed a highly generalizable set of concepts which enable systematic theory 
building.  Rational choice analysts can also ‘incorporate into their analyses a much 
more extensive appreciation for the role that human intentionality plays in the 
determination of political outcomes, in the form of strategic calculation’ (Hall & Taylor 
1996:18).  However, rational choice institutionalists have received some criticism for the 
‘relatively thin theory of human rationality’ (Hall & Taylor 1996:18) on which their 
arguments are based. Several critics have questioned the notion that actors are always 
driven by motives which are based solely on maximising personal gain and have 
criticised the use of relatively simplistic behavioural assumptions (Hodgson 2012).  A 
final advantage of this approach is its value in explaining the continued existence of 
institutions as, according to rational choice institutionalists, the survival of an 
institution depends on the benefits it can deliver to the actors with which it is 
associated. On the other hand, rational choice institutionalism is much more limited as 
a framework for explaining the origins of institutions. 
 
Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
 The second strand of new institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, 
developed from the old institutionalist influence in organisation theory. In contrast to 
rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism does not view actors as 
self-interested, rational decision makers but rather it considers human beings to be 
fundamentally social beings. For sociological institutionalists, actors are not strategic 
utility maximisers, rather they are habitual satisificers who act by following a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 2011). This implies that rather than making decisions 
by asking what is to be gained, individuals base their decisions on what should be done 
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or what would be most appropriate. For sociological institutionalists, ‘institutions 
frame the way in which people see their world and are not just rules within which they 
try to work’ (Sven Steinmo 2008:126).  According to Lowndes & Roberts (2013:30-32) 
sociological institutionalism is based on three related ideas. Firstly, human action is 
strongly dependent on the social context in which it takes place. Secondly, these 
contexts are usually heavily institutionalised. Finally, these institutions also operate at 
a sub-conscious level and, therefore, effectively act as a taken for granted ‘cultural 
infrastructure’ in society.  In this respect, the sociological approach ‘breaks down the 
conceptual divide between ‘institutions’ and ‘culture’’ (Hall & Taylor 1996:14). 
 One of the advantages of the sociological approach is that it may be able to 
better explain the relationship between institutions and actions which are not highly 
instrumental and cannot be well-modelled by rational choice theory. For example, 
sociologists ‘tell us that even a highly instrumental actor may be choosing strategies 
(and rivals) from culturally-specific repertoires, thereby identifying additional respects 
in which the institutional environment may affect the strategies that actors choose’ 
(Hall & Taylor 1996:19). By emphasising the role played by social legitimacy, 
sociological institutionalism also helps explain why many social and political 
institutions continue to persist despite their apparent inefficiencies. On the other hand, 
sociological institutionalism has been criticised for focusing too much on macro-level 
processes at the expense of the actors involved within these processes. Some have 
argued that sociological institutionalists do not afford sufficient attention to the power 
struggles between actors with competing interests and the impact of this on 
institutional creation or reform (Hall & Taylor 1996).  
 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
 Historical institutionalism developed in response to the group theories of 
politics and structural-functionalism which were prominent in political science during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Historical institutionalists stand somewhere between the 
sociological institutionalists and the rational choice institutionalists in their belief that 
human beings can be norm-abiding rule followers as well as self-interested rational 
actors. ‘How one behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on the 
rules…What a HI scholar wants to know is why a certain choice was made and/or why 
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a certain outcome occurred’ (Sven Steinmo 2008:126). Hall & Taylor (1996:7-8) divide 
historical institutionalists into two categories, those that follow the calculus approach 
and those that follow the cultural approach.  They suggest that, ‘those who follow a 
calculus approach focus on those aspects of human behaviour that are instrumental and 
based on strategic calculation’, whilst those who follow a cultural approach stress ‘the 
degree to which behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual’s 
worldview’ (Hall & Taylor 1996:7). There has been considerable debate about the 
possibility of historical institutionalists working within both a calculus and a cultural 
approach (Hall & Taylor 1996).  
 Historical institutionalism has been criticised due to the fact that radical change 
can be observed at times which cannot be explained with the use of historical 
institutionalist concepts. It has also received criticism for not having developed a 
sufficiently sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour 
(Hall & Taylor 1996:17). Historical institutionalism has, however, received considerable 
attention and has been fruitfully applied to various studies. As Lowndes & Roberts 
(2013:38) note, the ‘Varieties of Capitalism school is a good example of the historical 
institutionalists concern with collecting comparative data on how institutions 
associated with the same policy problems have developed in different ways across 
different countries, and the extent of their stability over time’. Much of the work 
conducted from a historical institutionalist approach consists of cross-national 
comparisons of public policy which, typically, emphasise the impact of national 
political institutions structuring relations among legislators, organised interests, the 
electorate and the judiciary. 
 
Relevance to this research 
Given how important the role of historical development is to this research, the 
historical institutionalist approach has been selected for this study as it offers the most 
useful tools with which to understand why certain decisions were made and why a 
particular outcome was produced. Historical institutionalism is distinct from other 
social science approaches due to ‘its attention to real world empirical questions, its 
historical orientation and its attention to the ways in which institutions structure and 
shape political behaviour and outcomes’ (Steinmo 2008:150). By focusing on 
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institutions over a longer period of time, as opposed to placing emphasis on 
personalities or confining the scope of the research to a brief snapshot in time, studies 
from a historical institutionalist perspective are able to provide more comprehensive 
and accurate answers to the big questions. It is for these reasons that historical 
institutionalism is particularly appropriate for this research.  
The historical institutionalist approach has often been taken for granted in 
studies of Europeanisation as it was seen as implicitly built into the ‘misfit’ hypothesis 
of the Europeanisation literature (discussed in Chapter 2) since the ‘central claim made 
was that existing institutional paths are “sticky” and resistant to change’ (Mastenbroek 
& Kaeding 2006:4). However, a number of more recent studies have (Graziano 2012; 
Mendez et al. 2008) have paid closer attention to the historical intuitionalist approach 
by historically reconstructing the fit-misfit relation. The basic assumption of these 
studies is that in cases of misfit, ‘the “stickiness” of institutional path can only be 
challenged when the adaptational pressure of the EU are particularly strong’ 
(Dabrowski & Graziano 2016:81). In other words, institutional paths will only be 
altered if the EU’s policies are especially binding.  
With regard to this research, it is important that any study undertaken from a 
historical institutionalist approach gives careful consideration to both elements from 
which its name is derived. Firstly, ‘historical institutionalists take history seriously – as 
something much more than instances located in the past’ (Pierson & Skocpol 
2002:700). This is because (a) political events happen within a historical context and 
this, in turn, has a direct consequence on decisions or events, (b) actors or agents learn 
from previous events and (c) expectations are moulded by the past (Steinmo 2008:164-
166). The second key element of historical institutionalism is the institutions 
themselves which Hall (1986:19) defines as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, 
and standard operating practices that structure the relationships between individuals 
in various units of the polity and economy’. Nonetheless, although a historical 
intuitionalist approach draws attention to the role of institutions, both formal and 
informal, it does not do so to the exclusion of other factors, such as socioeconomic 
development and the diffusion of ideas (Hall & Taylor 1996:10). 
There are several well-recognised key concepts within the historical 
institutionalist approach which require highlighting due, in particular, to their 
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relevance to this study: path dependency, positive feedback loops and critical junctures. 
A lengthy but thorough definition of path dependency is provided by Levi (1997:28) 
who writes that:  
‘once a country has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. 
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. 
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same 
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is 
possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if 
the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she 
tends to follow.’  
In other words, after actors have ventured some distance down one path, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to change and, as a consequence, the original path becomes yet 
more dominant. Reversing course may become so difficult that political alternatives 
which were at one point possible may become irretrievably lost. Arguments about path 
dependency are particularly useful as they can ‘help us to understand the powerful 
inertial ‘stickiness’ that characterizes many aspects of political development’ (Pierson 
2004:11). 
 Linked to the notion of path dependency is that of positive feedback loops, 
which Farrall et al. (2014:7) describe as the ‘phenomenon whereby each successive step 
along a path produces consequences which help to sustain the path in question’. 
Positive feedback loops, sometimes also referred to as increasing returns, create 
incentives for actors to continue along the same path with potentially high costs if they 
were to deviate. In other words, each step down a particular path increases the 
probability of further steps along the same path being taken because ‘the relative 
benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over 
time’ (Pierson 2000:252). Positive feedback loops are well-recognised as an intrinsic 
part, or even source, of path dependency. 
 Also of crucial importance to the historical institutionalist approach and to the 
concept of path dependency is the role of critical junctures. Critical junctures are 
described as ‘the moments when institutional arrangements are placed on particular 
pathways which are difficult to subsequently alter or change’ (Farrall et al. 2014:14). 
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The moments are rare and are often the starting point for the path dependent process 
described above. Critical junctures are particularly important because it is during these 
periods that actors are able to actualise significant change. Whilst critical junctures can 
occur relatively suddenly, they can also emerge slowly as a result of an accumulation of 
events. It should be noted, however, that ‘whilst a particular historical moment may 
create a critical juncture, it does not mean that all institutions will be affected’ (Farrall 
et al. 2014:6).  Indeed, is possible for some institutions to remain unaffected despite 
widespread change taking place throughout the rest of the system.   
Of course this is not an exhaustive list of the concepts promoted by historical 
institutionalists. In fact, given the diversity amongst historical institutionalist 
approaches, it is hardly surprising that there is much debate about which key concepts 
to include, how to define them and how to operationalise them when conducting 
research. A full discussion on these different views could fill several chapters by itself. 
The aim of this section has been to highlight the advantages of using a historical 
institutionalist approach for this study and to draw attention to the key elements of the 
historical institutionalist approach that can help to focus this research.  The decision to 
conduct this research using a historical institutionalist approach presents a number of 
research design considerations which will now be discussed in more detail.  
 
3.3) Research design  
This study is conducted using a comparative research design, a method which is 
frequently used not only in the fields of comparative politics, international relations, 
public policy and developmental politics but is also often employed by historical 
institutionalists  (Immergut & Anderson 2008; Steinmo & Thelen 1992). Whilst 
comparison is an implicit part of everyday life – ‘to compare is to be human’ (Landman 
2003:4) – comparative politics has moved away from implicit comparisons towards 
explicit ways of comparing political systems and related processes. As Keman (2014:48) 
notes, the ‘major modern development in comparative politics is in linking theory to 
evidence by means of comparative methods’.  One of the advantages of comparative 
politics is that researchers are able to identify causal variables which, without the use 
of a comparison, could not have been deduced. 
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Landman (2003:5-10) identifies four main reasons for researchers to undertake a 
comparative study; contextual description, classification, hypothesis-testing and 
prediction. Comparative research can provide rich, contextual description which 
‘allows political scientists to know what other countries are like’ (Landman 2003:4). By 
observing similarities and differences between the cases under study, the researcher is 
able to organise the data through a process of classification. The ‘types’, ‘classes’ or 
‘categories’ which result from this, can then serve as ‘building blocks’ for theory 
development. It also allows for hypothesis-testing which can either reinforce the 
validity of explanatory theories or eliminate rival explanations. Finally, comparative 
research can make possible some degree of prediction ‘about the likely outcomes in 
other countries not included in the original study, or outcomes in the future given the 
presence of certain antecedent factors and conditions’ (Landman 2003:4). 
Within the field of comparative research, a distinction can be made between 
case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches both of which are legitimate and can be 
the most appropriate depending on the aims of the research. According to della Porta 
(2008:198) ‘[v]ariable-oriented studies mainly aim at establishing generalized 
relationships between variables, while case-oriented research seeks to understand 
complex units. Whereas variable-oriented research uses statistical comparison to build 
law-like propositions, the case-oriented strategy aims at the in-depth understanding of 
a context or, in other words, searches for the ‘causes-of-effects’’. Given that the aim of 
this research is to gain a better understanding of the factors influencing the innovation 
policies of the selected countries, this research uses a case-based approach. Rather than 
focusing on generalisation, this research requires a detailed understanding about a 
complex unity, which can only be obtained with a case-study strategy.  There are, 
following on from this, several other research design considerations which require 
highlighting.  
The choice of case-oriented versus variable-oriented research is directly linked 
to the research method. Within the comparative framework, three main types of 
research method have been distinguished; large-N, small-N and single-N. Although it 
may seem incongruous for a single-N, or case study, to be considered comparative, there 
is a considerable amount of comparison that can take place within one case, such as 
between regions of a country or between different periods of time. All three methods 
have distinct advantages and limitations, indeed ‘[t]here is often thought to be a trade-
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off between the in-depth, intensive knowledge derived from the study of a small 
number of cases, on the one hand, and the extensive, cross-case knowledge based on the 
study of a large number of cases, on the other’ (Halperin & Heath 2012:172). Whereas 
the small-N, which is typically anywhere between 2 and 20 cases, or single-N study 
may be able to function at a lower level of abstraction and potentially enhance the 
validity of the concepts under study,  these studies also sacrifice the ability to make 
broad empirical generalisations. Conversely, large-N studies, which are typically based 
on quantitative data, may be able to observe a strong statistical relation and allow for 
robust inferences but, in exchange, they work at a higher level of abstraction and a 
lower level of complexity. Whilst large-N studies are typically variable-oriented, small-
N studies and single-N studies more frequently use a case-oriented approach.  
In addition to considering the objectives of the research and the type of design 
which could most effectively allow for these to be met, other factors which play a 
significant role include time, cost and availability of data. If, for example, the 
information is readily available and at minimal cost, it may be possible, and even 
advantageous, for the researcher to conduct a large-N study. Whereas, if the research 
requires in-depth information which is harder and more time-consuming to collect, it 
may only be possible to include one or a few case studies. Having considered the aims of 
this research and the resources and time available, this research was conducted with a 
small-N research design using qualitative data. A small-N study was selected as it 
allows for a more in-depth, richer picture which would be able to provide the data 
necessary for answering the questions of this research. The total number of countries 
selected was two as this was considered a feasible number for obtaining sufficiently 
detailed data given the time and financial resource constraints.  
Whilst there are many recognised advantages of using a comparative research 
method, there are also several limitations which need to be recognised. These include; 
too many variables and too few countries, establishing equivalence, selection bias, 
spuriousness, ecological and individualist fallacies and value bias. This research has 
been conducted using a case-oriented, small-N approach and ‘comparing few countries 
involves significant and intentional choices, any one of which may limit the inferences 
made possible’ (Landman 2003:81).  The issue of too many variables and too few 
countries, or ‘too many inferences and not enough observations’ (King et al. 1994:119), is 
of particular concern for small-N research. ‘This problem arises when more factors of 
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explanation for the observed outcome have been identified than there are countries (or 
observations) in the study, leading to what is called indeterminate research design’  
(Landman 2003:30). This means that the outcome becomes open to several different 
explanations since it is not possible to control for the impact of all operational variables 
on the dependent variable with the number of cases available. Selection bias is also a 
significant issue when comparing few countries. This arises from the intentional choice 
of countries as opposed to random selection ‘as well as the use of historical accounts 
and sources that favour the particular theoretical position of the comparativist’ 
(Landman 2003:36).  
A final consideration for comparative research is whether to adopt a ‘most 
similar systems design’ (MSSD) or a ‘most different systems design’ (MDSD). It is 
claimed that a most similar design system or, if using Mill’s definitions, ‘method of 
difference’, works particularly well for research within area studies, such as the area of 
Europe. ‘Whether it is common history, language, religion, politics or culture, 
researchers working in area studies are essentially employing a most similar systems 
design, and the focus on countries from these regions effectively controls for those 
features that are common to them whilst looking for those features that are not’ 
(Landman 2003:71). A MSSD facilitates the ceteris paribus rule or, in other words, reduces 
the number of disturbing variables to be kept under control. It has also been recognised 
(Przeworski & Teune 1970) that the MSSD is particularly useful for identifying the 
features that are different amongst otherwise relatively similar structures. Some of the 
disadvantages of a MSSD are that it cannot be used to go beyond middle-range theories 
and that there is still a risk of overdetermination as variables may intervene for which it 
is not possible to control. This implies that the contexts of the compared situations are 
never similar enough and the researcher must still be aware of the contextual variables 
which could not be kept constant (De la Porta 2008:215). Whilst aware of these 
concerns, this research, as discussed in the following section, is conducted using an 
MSSD approach. 
 
Case study selection for this research  
The remit of this research was that it should focus on one or more of the 
Visegrád states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic). The 
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Czech Republic and Hungary were selected for comparison for several reasons. Firstly, 
there are many similarities between the Czech Republic and Hungary. For example, 
both countries share a recent history having been part of the Soviet bloc and both 
acceded to the EU in the same year, 2004. The Czech Republic and Hungary have 
comparable population sizes, 10.5 million and 9.9 million respectively (The World Bank 
2016). Both countries also have a relatively strong university tradition, including the 
prestigious Charles University in Prague and Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, a 
factor which has been recognised as necessary for a strong NSI. Furthermore, since the 
transition to capitalism, both countries have attracted considerable amounts of FDI and 
their economies have witnessed a rapid development. In fact, FDI has been so 
significant that, in 2017, inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP was 78.3% in the 
Czech Republic and 74,5% Hungary (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2018a; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2018b). 
 However, in spite of these similarities, there are a number of notable differences 
between the Czech Republic and Hungary according to several measurements of their 
innovative performance. For example, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 
produced by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum 2016; World 
Economic Forum 2006), Hungary is still in transition from an efficiency-driven 
economy to an innovation-driven economy and has been for over a decade. The Czech 
Republic, on the other hand, has been categorised as innovation-driven since the 2008-
2009 report (World Economic Forum 2008). The fact that a number of differences are 
beginning to emerge despite the similarities of the Czech and Hungarian systems 
presents something of a paradoxical situation. Again this reinforces the advantages of 
using a MSSD as this will allow for the factors which can explain these observed 
differences to be identified.   
On the other hand the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), a tool which is 
produced by the EU in order to examine and illustrate the innovative performance of 
EU Member States, suggests that the Czech Republic and Hungary, who are both 
classed as ‘Moderate Innovators’, are quite close in terms of their overall innovation 
performance (European Commission 2015a). The EIS uses quantitative data gathered 
from Eurostat, OECD, United Nations, CWTS (Thompson Reuters), Science-Metrix 
(Scopus) and the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market. There are 8 
‘dimensions’ used in order to capture the overall performance of Member States; (1) 
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human resources, (2) open, excellent research systems, (3) finance and support, (4) 
firm investments, (5) linkages and entrepreneurship, (6) intellectual assets, (7) 
innovators, (8) economic effects. In spite of the overall performance of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary being quite similar, the Czech Republic has consistently ranked 
higher than Hungary in all dimensions except that of ‘economic effects’. 
Some initial investigation into these two countries suggests that there are a 
number of similarities, such as recent history, geographical location and population 
size. This offers a considerable advantage for this research as it helps to reduce the 
number of disturbing variables. However, there are also a number of differences which 
are gradually becoming more pronounced. This offers the opportunity for this study to 
probe these differences, to question how far-reaching these differences really are, to 
identify the explanatory variables and to analyse the impact these differences are 
currently having on the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. 
 
3.4) Data collection and analysis 
Data collection 
There are two main stages to this research. Firstly, due to the fact that this 
research is conducted using an historical institutionalist approach, and given how 
important the role of history is to historical institutionalism, the first stage of this 
research is to trace the key historical developments in the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. 
The focus for this section is on two significantly distinct time periods; (1) the 
communist period (pre 1989) and (2) the transition period (1989-2004). This section of 
the study is mainly based on qualitative secondary data, consisting primarily of 
publications by key authors within the field. There are also a number of studies by the 
OECD and various other organisations which are incorporated in order to add more 
breadth to this historical discussion. In addition, statistical data from the OECD and 
Eurostat are included where possible.    
  The second section of this study investigates the development of the Czech 
and Hungarian NSIs since their accession to the EU in 2004. Data for this section are 
gathered from three main sources; (1) elite interviews, (2) documentary data and (3) 
statistical data. By incorporating a variety of data sources, this allows for a significant 
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amount of triangulation or, in other words, the ‘observation of the research from (at 
least) two different points’ (Uwe Flick 2004:178). Triangulation is a technique 
frequently employed in qualitative research in order to increase the credibility and 
validity of the results. Data on the innovation performance of both countries have been 
collected from the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Competitiveness Reports’ and, 
especially, the previously mentioned European Innovation Scoreboards. Although there 
have been some criticisms of the EIS (Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2015), it does, 
nonetheless, provide a relatively detailed annual analysis of the innovation performance 
of EU Member States. Whilst care should be taken in interpreting these results, the EIS 
does provide some very useful data especially if used to measure any significant changes 
within or between countries, specifically those with comparable histories or at similar 
stages of economic development.  
Interviews form a large and important part of the data gathering for the second 
section of this research. The majority of the interviews were carried out during three 
field trips to Prague (21st to 25th November 2016), Budapest and Szeged (25th November 
to 2nd December 2016) and Brussels (30th January to 3rd February 2017). The interviews 
used a semi-structured format which meant that, unlike the rigorous question and 
answer style of a structured interview, the interviews were able to be led more by the 
responses of the interviewees and to follow-up on areas of interest which the 
interviewees had themselves brought to attention. The participants contacted were 
selected due to their involvement in or knowledge of the innovation policies in the 
selected countries. A contact at CZELO (the Czech Liaison Office for Research, 
Development and Innovation based in Brussels) kindly provided a long list of contacts 
in all relevant research institutes, universities and government departments in the 
Czech Republic. This research is also grateful for the assistance of a contact at the 
European Commission who provided a detailed list of potential contacts in Hungary. In 
addition, a number of participants were identified using a snowballing technique. 
Many interviewees were very helpful at suggesting, and even arranging, interviews with 
other specialists within the field.  
In order obtain different perspectives and for reasons of validity, a wide variety 
of actors from universities, research institutes, government and business was sought. In 
total, 30 interviews were carried out. The response rate from businesses was 
particularly low and the response from Hungarian participants was lower than that of 
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Czech participants. As a result, more interviews were carried out with Czech 
participants (17) than Hungarian participants (11).  Interviews were conducted with 
government officials (12), academics (5), business leaders (5), research institute 
specialists (4), EU officials (2), an investment specialist and a policy analyst. 
Participants were initially contacted by letter which included a ‘Project Information 
Sheet’ with brief details about the research. This was then followed up by an e-mail and 
later a telephone call if necessary. In preparation for the interview, an interview 
schedule was drawn up which included questions on core areas for comparison and 
was adapted for each participant to cover their area of expertise. (For a full list of the 
interviews and an example interview schedule, see Appendix.) In order to ensure that 
the questions were valid to the research, the interview schedule was discussed with the 
supervisory team before commencing the field work. All of the interviews were 
recorded and later transcribed. 
 The total number of interviews includes a number of telephone and video 
interviews (9 in total), most of which were conducted prior to undertaking the field 
research. This was particularly advantageous as not only did it allow participants to be 
interviewed with whom meeting may not have been possible, for reasons such as 
limited resources in terms of time and/or budget, but it also enabled a better 
preparation for the interviews conducted during the field trips themselves. Telephone 
interviews have long been a method of gathering data, especially, in the social sciences. 
Video interviews are also increasing in popularity especially as both hardware and 
software become cheaper and more widely used. A considerable disadvantage of video 
interviews is that it can restrict the participants to those who have access to the 
necessary technology and peaks in network traffic can cause a dramatic slowdown or 
break in transmission. Although the former of these concerns was not problematic for 
this research, there were several instances of poor connection and also a couple of 
occasions when the recording software failed to function and/or there were problems 
with the quality of the recording. Notes made during the interviews were able to 
correct this issue to a certain extent but, unfortunately, this did result in direct quotes 
not being possible for two of the interviews.  
In terms of documentary and statistical data, there were a number of published 
reports by the OECD and the EU which were particularly informative. A ‘Peer Review 
of the Hungarian Research and Innovation System’ and ‘Pre Peer Review of the 
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Hungarian Research and Innovation System’ conducted by the EU (European 
Commission 2016; European Commission 2015b) which had involved a number of elite 
interviews provided some correction for the, previously mentioned, lower number of 
interviews with Hungarian participants. Various national publications and policy 
documents, produced by government departments and research institutes, also 
provided a significant amount of documentary data. As regards statistical data, 
Eurostat and the OECD had a considerable amount of data relating to the topic of this 
research such as R&D spending, graduate numbers and FDI.  
 
Data analysis 
The interview data were analysed using a qualitative content analysis approach. 
Content analysis has a long history in research and has developed considerably since its 
use as a tool for analysis in mainly quantitative research. ‘Research using qualitative 
content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with 
attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text’ (Hsieh & Shannon 
2005:1278). Qualitative content analysis can be applied to a variety of texts including 
data which have been obtained from interviews, narrative responses and focus groups 
and also print media such as articles, books or manuals. It should be noted that the 
focus for qualitative content analysis is not on ‘counting words’ but it goes much 
further by ‘examining language intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of 
text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar meanings’ (Hsieh & 
Shannon 2005:1278). The goal of content analysis is ‘to provide knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study’ (Downe-Wamboldt 1992:314). 
In practice, this meant that after gathering the data they were systematically 
coded according to relevant concepts, themes, events and examples. Once the data had 
been coded, all of the excerpts that had been coded with the same label were then 
sorted into a single computer file in order for the data to be compared and analysed. For 
example, all the data gathered in interviews and published documents related to the 
Smart Specialisation Strategy were arranged in a single file and subcategorised into the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the EU. The data were then further categorised into 
those which related to the development of the Smart Specialisation Strategy and those 
which related to its implementation. The data were logically ordered, for example, in 
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this instance data were organised according to the advantages and disadvantages of 
Smart Specialisation. Once this had been completed, the data from the three 
subcategories could be contrasted, compared and analysed. 
 
Reliability, validity and ethics 
The issues of reliability, validity and ethics are extremely important in social 
science research. Reliability refers to the fact that the ‘data are dependable, 
trustworthy, unfailing, sure, authentic, genuine, reputable. Consistency is the main 
measure of reliability’ (Pierce 2008:83). As already mentioned, in order to overcome this 
issue, the technique of triangulation was used where possible. Not only did combining 
elite interviews, documentary data and statistical data help in terms of ensuring the 
reliability of the research but it also meant that any gaps or inconsistencies in the data 
could be identified and further investigated.  
 Validity refers to how relevant data is to answering the research question, 
which can be difficult for researchers of political science who often ‘have to use best 
available information whose validity may be weak’ (Pierce 2008:83). Ensuring validity 
in any research, both quantitative and qualitative, can be challenging and Babbie 
(2013:193) argues that ‘[u]ltimately, social researchers should look both to their 
colleagues and to their subjects as sources of agreement on the most useful meaning and 
measurements of the concepts they study’. In order to secure the validity of these data, 
the input of the author’s supervisory team was invaluable. Considerable time was spent 
reviewing the conceptual framework and the interview schedules and discussing their 
appropriateness for addressing the questions at the core of this research. The initial 
interviews were treated as pilot interviews and adaptations were made to the interview 
schedules; for example, some of the initial questions had been too broad and had not 
been able to elicit the more specific responses which were required, in order to ensure 
the validity of the data gathered. 
Ethical considerations were taken very seriously during the course of this 
research. Burnham et al. (2004:253) identify five main ethical principles which were 
carefully adhered to during this research; (a) avoidance of harm, (b) avoidance of 
deception, (c) privacy of individuals, (d) confidentiality and (e) consent. Prior to 
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conducting any research, ethical approval was sought and granted from Cardiff 
University’s School of Modern Languages Ethics Committee. In the letter and 
accompanying ‘Project Information Sheet’ sent to participants, it was made clear that 
data they provided would be held anonymously and that they had the right to 
withdraw from the research at any point if they chose not to continue with their role. 
This point was also verbally reinforced before conducting the interviews. Participants 
were requested to sign a ‘Research Ethics Consent From for Confidential Data’ before 
commencing the interview. All transcripts have been anonymised accordingly. The 
transcripts were securely stored on a password protected computer.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has sought to describe the method with which this research has 
been conducted and to justify the methodological decisions which were made. Using 
qualitative data, gathered through semi structured interviews and documentary 
evidence, this research uses a MSSD to identify the explanatory variables for the 
observed differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary, which have occurred 
in spite of their similar systems. Some of the weaknesses of the methods chosen and 
problems encountered have also been identified. By being aware of these issues, they 
can be factored into the analysis and discussion of the research findings. In addition, 
this chapter has set out the conceptual framework which will serve as the reference 
point for the following chapters. The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted the 
importance of institutions for understanding political developments and, therefore, an 
institutionalist approach, specifically historical institutionalism, has been identified as 
the most appropriate theoretical approach with which to conduct this research. Before 
the main research findings can be presented (Chapters 5 and 6), the following chapter 
provides a targeted overview of the development of the independent variable of this 
research, the EU’s Innovation Policy.  
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4) Innovation Policy and the EU 
 
Introduction 
 As the Czech Republic and Hungary undertook the task of transitioning to 
democratic market economies and, later, that of downloading the acquis communautaire 
and meeting the requirements for EU membership, a considerable developmental gap 
existed between their NSIs and those of the older EU Member States. In order to 
achieve the EU’s goal of becoming the world’s leading knowledge-based economy, 
therefore, an important target for the EU has been to reduce the disparity between old 
and new Member States. To gain a better understanding of how influential the EU has 
been at doing this in practice, this section looks in detail at the independent variable of 
this research, namely the EU’s strategy for developing the innovation capacity of its 
Member States. For the Czech Republic and Hungary, two distinct phases can be 
identified – pre- and post-accession – and this chapter aims to highlight how the 
dynamics between the EU and these countries have developed as they progressed from 
candidate status to officially becoming EU Member States. In doing so, attention is 
drawn to how the tools with which the EU can encourage Europeanisation have 
changed and how this has affected the EU’s ability to influence the domestic decision-
making processes of these two Member States. In short, this chapter prevents a broad 
overview of how the EU’s innovation policy approach and accompanying policy tools 
are intended to work, Chapters 5 and 6 will then look at how this compares with the 
observed experiences of the Czech Republic and Hungary. This section is divided into 
three timeframes, the first of which focuses on the pre-accession period (1989-2004) 
and considers the overall role of the EU in the Central and Eastern European candidate 
countries during this time. In addition, this section highlights the main instruments 
used by the EU to promote Europeanisation and the specific aspects of the accession 
preparations which affected the development of these countries’ NSIs. Sections two 
and three consider how the EU’s innovation policy has developed since by analysing the 
objectives and instruments of the Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s latest policy approach, 
Horizon 2020, respectively.  
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4.1) Pre-Accession  
Although the Czech Republic and Hungary did  not officially become members 
of the EU until 2004, the EU’s involvement in these countries had in fact begun much 
earlier and notably so through the ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring 
their Economies’ (Phare) programme which was launched in 1989. Initially aimed at 
only Hungary and Poland, and later extended to include twelve other Central and 
Eastern European countries – including, from 1990, the Czech Republic – Phare was a 
financial instrument designed to assist these countries with their transition to a 
decentralised liberal democratic system. The Phare programme was reformed 
considerably during the 1990s strengthening the influence of the EU and changing the 
support away from transition issues and economic restructuring towards assistance for 
the accession process, prioritising institution building and investment support 
(European Parliament 1998).  Indeed, by the time these countries were preparing to 
fulfil the requirements of the acquis coummunautarie – the body of common rights and 
obligations binding all Member States together and the adoption of which has become 
institutionalised as the EU’s ‘classical method of enlargement’ (Preston 1997) – Phare 
had become an instrument which was primarily aimed at supporting this process.   
Conditionality – namely the linking of perceived benefits to the fulfilment of 
certain conditions – formed an important part of the EU’s approach towards accession 
for Central and Eastern European candidate countries. In fact, from as early as 1988, 
when the EU negotiated trade agreements with Central and Eastern European 
countries, the EU had already begun to attach conditions to aid, trade and political 
relations (Smith 1997). By making funding and technical assistance conditional on 
meeting the aims of the generally neo-liberal agenda that the EU put forward, the Phare 
programme provided the EU with a significant lever with which to influence the 
Central and Eastern European countries. Additionally, the use of suspension clauses in 
agreements made between the EU and the candidate countries – in which discussions 
could be suspended if a candidate country was judged not to have met certain criteria – 
is a further example of the use of accession conditionality. As discussion on EU 
membership for a number of Central and Eastern European countries gained 
momentum, the EU formulated, and later modified, the most extensive accession 
conditions to date (discussed below). Or, in the words of Dimitrova (2002:175), having 
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invited the Central and European countries to join, the EU subsequently created ‘an 
ever more elaborate web of conditions and criteria to evaluate their readiness to do so’. 
In an attempt ‘to minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically 
unstable and economically burdensome, and to ensure that the countries joining were 
ready to meet at the EU rules, with only minimal and temporary exceptions’ (Grabbe 
2002:251), three conditions were established at the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993 (European Council 1993): 
1.) Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities. 
2.) Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union.  
3.) Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.  
Not only were the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ more extensive than the accession 
requirements applied to previous candidate countries (Grabbe 2006), but they also 
represented a notable shift in terms of the EU’s role in the accession process. As noted 
by Janse (2019:47), the main significance of the Copenhagen European Council was not 
the criteria themselves but the decision of the EU to ‘actively monitor and steer the 
manner in which candidates prepared themselves for membership’. As political and 
economic conditions feature prominently in the Copenhagen criteria, the EU effectively 
established a position with which it could attempt to influence decisions being made 
about the politico-economic trajectory of these Central and Eastern European countries 
during the post-communist transition period. The Copenhagen criteria were followed 
by the formal launch of the ‘pre-accession strategy’ at the Essen European Council in 
1994, which aimed ‘to provide a route plan for the associated countries as they prepare 
for accession’ (European Council, 1994:4).  
A subsequent important development resulted from the Luxembourg European 
Council in 1997 and the establishment of a ‘reinforced’ pre-accession strategy, which 
was designed to ensure that applicant countries adopt as much of the aquis communatiare 
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as possible before accession. A key instrument for achieving this was the ‘Accession  
Partnerships’, which  ‘set out the priorities to be tackled in preparation for membership 
and the framework for all pre-accession assistance’ (European Commission 2000a:3). 
They were intended to make conditionality stricter and considerably increased the 
involvement of the EU in domestic policy-making, both in comparison to the EU’s 
previous role in Central and Eastern European Countries and also relative to its role in 
the existing Member States. In line with this, and as previously mentioned, the focus 
and conditions of the Phare programme were reoriented towards assisting candidate 
countries in their adoption of EU legislation and policies. At this point in time, 
conditionality for Phare, which had previously been demand-driven and dependent on 
meeting very general economic and political objectives, became more strongly driven by 
the Commission with funding specifically aimed at meeting the priorities set out in the 
Accession Partnerships (Grabbe 2006). 
 By 1999, the EU judged that all the Central and Eastern European candidates 
had met sufficient requirements in order for negotiations on the acquis communautaire – 
which had been broken down into 31 chapters including  a chapter on ‘Science and 
research’ (Chapter 17) – to be started at the Helsinki European Council that year. In 
terms of innovation, the acquis communautaire in the field of science and research did not 
require any transposition into the national legal order. However, in order to ensure the 
successful implementation of the acquis in this domain, especially the implementation of 
the Research and Technological Development (RTD) Framework Programmes, it was 
stated, somewhat vaguely, that ‘future Member States need to have appropriate 
capacities in the field of RTD’ (European Commission 2005:81). After successful 
completion of the negotiations and ratification of the accession treaties, ten of the 
candidate countries, including the Czech Republic and Hungary, joined the EU in 
2004. 
It has been argued (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2008; Sedelmeier 2011) that it 
was during this pre-accession period that the EU was able to have the most significant 
impact on the institutional arrangements and policies of the then candidate countries. 
What is particularly notable about this period, as identified by Grabbe (2006), is the 
number of influential mechanisms available to the EU to promote Europeanisation: (1) 
gate-keeping (access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process), (2) 
models (provision of legislative and institutional templates), (3) benchmarking and 
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monitoring, (4) money (aid and technical assistance) and (5) advice and twinning. 
According to Grabbe’s analysis, the EU’s most effective conditionality tool was that of 
gate-keeping, which meant that a country’s ability to gain candidate status or reach the 
next stage of negotiations was dependent on that particular country meeting a number 
of specific conditions. A clear example of this in practice, and the first instance in 
which this form of conditionality was explicitly applied, is the exclusion of Slovakia 
from the first round of negotiations in 1997 on the basis that the country was judged 
not to have met the necessary democracy criteria. The introduction of the Accession 
Partnerships provided an additional conditionality tool through which the EU could 
determine the policy priorities which had to be implemented and a timeframe – short-
term (within a year) and medium-term (5 years) – for doing so. 
As well as being a Europeanisation mechanism in its own right, as countries 
progressed through the accession process and moved into an increasingly closer 
relationship with the EU, gate-keeping also provided a coercive tool to reinforce other 
mechanisms such as, firstly, the provision of legislative and institutional templates and, 
secondly, the practice of  benchmarking and monitoring candidates’ progress. Through 
a process of both ‘vertical harmonisation’ – in which there is an adaptational pressure 
to conform to EU policy models – and ‘horizontal harmonisation’ – ‘the diffusion of 
ideas and discourses about the notion of good policy and good practice’ (Radaelli 2003) 
– candidate countries were expected to transfer EU policies and institutional models 
into the domestic arena. In practice this meant that, in addition to the compulsory 
downloading of EU models, applicant countries were also ‘encouraged to comply 
closely with minimalist directives and non-compulsory directives, in order to convince 
reluctant Member States that they will be good partners in sensitive policy areas’ 
(Grabbe 2003:313). An example of this, which relates to innovation, is the invitation for 
candidate countries to shadow the Lisbon process (discussed below), in spite of it not 
officially being part of the acquis communautaire. Through benchmarking and monitoring, 
the EU was able to influence candidate countries by providing examples of best 
practice that the applicants could seek to emulate and by assessing the progress that 
countries were making in the relevant policy areas.    
With regard to financial assistance, during this period the EU became the 
largest external source of aid for Central and Eastern European countries and provided 
funding not only administered through the European Commission but also through 
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bilateral programmes with individual Member States. As already discussed, the Phare 
programme became the EU’s main funding channel and, as the candidate countries 
moved through the accession process, its conditions were adapted to reflect the 
changing priorities of the EU. By the end of the 1990s, a sizeable proportion of Phare 
funding was redirected towards institution building in order to assist candidate 
countries in their efforts to develop the capacity required to implement EU legislation 
and participate in EU policies. An important part of institution-building, as set out in 
the 1998 Annual Report for Phare (European Commission 2000b), was the concept of 
twinning in which EU practitioners, known as Pre-Accession Advisors, were seconded 
to the institutions in the candidate countries responsible for implementing the acquis 
communautaire. In other words, through its twinning programme, the EU was able to 
open up a direct line into policy-making structures in the applicant countries. Although 
this represented a clear mechanism for EU influence, it has received criticism due to the 
fact that, firstly, advisors tended to focus more on standards and technical issues rather 
than overall institutional models or policy direction and, secondly, for the advice 
lacking a consistent European model and instead being strongly influenced by the 
background of the individual Pre-Accession Advisor (Grabbe 2006).  
  In terms of the impact of this pre-accession time frame on the innovation 
systems of the Central and Eastern European countries, there are several areas which 
require highlighting. The first of these areas relates to the development of 
administrative capacity in Central and Eastern European countries which, as accession 
discussions progressed, received increasing attention from the EU. The disbursement 
and absorption of the Phare programme highlighted issues with the administrative 
capacities of the Central and Eastern European candidate countries and the perceived 
limited progress in developing these capacities raised questions about their 
administrative preparedness (Verheijen 2000:15). Having identified weak 
administrative capacity in the candidate countries as an obstacle to the downloading of 
the acquis communautaire, the Madrid European Council in 1995, stipulated that the 
Central and Eastern European countries would need to adjust their administrative 
structures in order to prepare for enlargement on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria 
and in the context of the pre-accession strategy defined in Essen. Following on from 
this, in 1997, the Commission published ‘Agenda 2000’ which ‘set forth administrative 
reform not as a supplementary task, but as a necessary condition for accession, 
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seemingly on a par with the first three Copenhagen criteria’ (Dimitrova 2002:178). The 
main areas which candidate countries needed to address as identified by the EU are 
shown in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Areas of public administration to be addressed by Central and Eastern 
European candidate countries 
 The development of an impartial and professional administration (based on a 
civil service law). 
 The development of a training system. 
 Adequate policy development and policy coordination capacities. 
 An effective accountability system (with particular emphasis on the system of 
Internal and External Financial Control) 
 The extent to which special structures and procedures have been put in place to 
manage EU affairs. 
 
(Source: Verheijen 2000:16) 
 
The impact of the EU’s conditions on the development of administrative 
capacity in Central and Eastern European countries have been highly debated. For 
example, a report published by the World Bank in 2006 (World Bank 2006), two years 
after the first Eastern enlargement, found that there was considerable variation in terms 
of the performance of the new Member States. With ongoing concerns in most Central 
and Eastern European countries about, firstly, weak strategic planning and policy 
coordination and, secondly, even a regression in the creation of a professional merit-
based administration, the report concluded that the ‘results of the study were not 
encouraging’ (World Bank 2006:v). Explanation for this variation in performance has 
been provided by theories related to the ongoing influence of post-communist legacies, 
domestic opposition, the lack of a single EU model of administration and the 
inconsistent application of conditionality (Sedelmeier 2011:22). Nonetheless, 
notwithstanding these observations, what did happen was that Central and Eastern 
European countries became engaged in a transition from a centralised public 
administration system based on egalitarian principles to one that has adjusted to a 
market-oriented environment, deconcentration and decentralisation. Pridham 
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(2005:129) argues that the EU played an important role in this as it ‘certainly hastened 
such reform and gave it a visibility it would not otherwise have achieved as well as 
providing some legitimation for such change’.   
A second aspect of this time-frame which had an impact on innovation relates 
to the economic and industrial elements which formed Point 2 of the Copenhagen 
criteria (above). Indeed, it has been suggested that the ‘EU affects economic governance 
to a very large degree owing to its huge regulatory agenda for CEE [Central and Eastern 
Europe] connected with compliance with Single Market norms’ (Grabbe 2003:320). 
The EU insisted that candidate countries needed to achieve a certain level of 
competitiveness by the time of accession to enable them to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the Single Market. In order for these countries to be 
successful in their application for EU membership, therefore, industrial adjustment was 
seen as one of the key areas in which urgent attention was required. Of particular 
importance was the EU’s industrial policy which combined instruments from a number 
of Community policies, and included both those related to the operation of markets 
(product specification and market access, trade policy, state aid and competition 
policy) as well as measures related to industry’s capacity to adapt to change (such as 
stable macro-economic environment, technology and training) (European Parliament 
1999). With regard to innovation, the introduction of competition policy was also seen 
as not only an essential part of a market economy but also, by promoting competition 
between firms, vital for fostering innovation and increasing economic efficiency. From a 
business perspective, harmonisation with EU regulations had a significant impact in 
the areas of environmental regulation, health and safety requirements, employment 
legislation and single market standards covering individual product specification. 
Implementing these new regulations – which usually demanded higher 
standards in, for example, health, safety and environmental protection – often required 
significant investment by companies in Central and Eastern Europe. This meant that 
Central and Eastern European industry ‘was forced to modernize their products and 
production facilities rather drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with bigger 
players with greater economies of scale, or close down altogether’ (Tiits et al. 2008: 76-
77). As a result, it has been argued (Havlik et al. 2001) that, in terms of innovation, that 
the adoption of the acquis communautaire was a much more substantial driver of the 
modernisation of industry in Central and Eastern European countries than the direct 
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efforts towards promoting innovation during the 1990s. The significance of this is that 
it marked ‘the first step in CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] towards actively 
managing economic policy and thus innovation and industrial restructuring in a 
distinctly different manner from the previous period where the free market and 
external forces were seen as key drivers of change’ (Kattel et al. 2009:22). In other 
words, meeting the economic aspect of the Copenhagen criteria required a significant 
change of approach towards industrial-related policies in Central and Eastern 
European countries and one which, thanks in part to the EU’s conditionality 
requirements, could be strongly influenced by the EU’s agenda.  
 
4.2) Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) 
 On becoming EU Member States, a significant change took place with regards 
to the dynamics of the relationship between the EU and the now new Member States. 
The pre-accession period had been one characterised by power asymmetry, in which 
the candidate countries had been expected to download the EU’s policies, policies 
which had been designed by the EU and which the candidate countries had not played 
a role in formulating. Additionally, the pre-accession period was one in which 
conditionality – an instrument which was at that time especially powerful owing to the 
attraction of EU membership to these countries – played an important role in 
promoting Europeanisation. After accession, however, these new Member States not 
only had a role in contributing to decisions on EU policies – or, in other words, 
uploading their policy preferences – but also, as the reward of membership was no 
longer a lever with which to influence decision-making and policy direction, the EU’s 
ability to use conditionality to encourage certain outcomes became a much more 
limited tool (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2008).  
 With regard to innovation, the time at which these Central and Eastern 
European countries were undertaking accession negotiations coincided with a period 
of notable development in the EU’s approach towards innovation policy. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, in 2000, the EU devised the Lisbon Strategy which aimed to make the EU 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world (European 
Parliament 2000). The primary incentive was to assist the EU in improving its 
economic performance relative to its main competitors, especially the United States 
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and, with this aim in mind, research and innovation formed the cornerstones of the 
Strategy. Although the Lisbon concept included  a strong integrationist element 
(discussed below), as noted by James (2012:10), it ‘should not simply be seen as a 
further step in Europe’s internal integration process; rather it represents the most 
recent external expression of Europe’s desire to catchup with the rest of the world’. The 
impetus for doing this was a view that the EU lacked R&D investment, had a low 
ability to turn knowledge into innovation, and was fragmented when it comes to 
supporting and framing knowledge generation and innovation (European Parliament 
2000). 
The Lisbon Strategy’s approach to innovation contrasted with the way in which 
the EU had addressed innovation until then as it began to view innovation more in the 
context of a system, rather than the previous linear approach which had focused almost 
exclusively on research as the main source of innovation (European Parliament 2016a). 
In March 2003, the Commission published an update of its vision for innovation in the 
context of the Lisbon Strategy which stated that the innovation process should be 
viewed as ‘complex interactions between individuals, organisations and their operating 
environment’ and noted that ‘innovation policies must extend their focus beyond the 
link with research’ (European Commission 2003:4-5). By including a wide range of 
policy areas – Single Market, competition, regional policy, taxation policy, labour 
market, education and training standards, intellectual property rights and sectoral 
policies like environmental policy – the communication also began to draw attention 
towards the ubiquitous nature of innovation policy. Furthermore, the challenges of 
enlargement were identified with the communication noting that the legacies of the 
centrally-planned economies had left their mark on the economic, institutional, 
educational and social frameworks of the Central and Eastern Europe countries and 
acknowledging that strengthening their innovation capacity would need a considered 
policy response by the EU (European Commission 2003:11).  
An indication of just how significantly innovation rose on the EU’s policy 
agenda can be seen in the increase in allocated funding that took place during the 
Lisbon period. The 7th Framework Programme which ran from 2007-2013, a period 
overlapping the end of Lisbon and the beginning of the superseding strategy, received a 
budget allocation of €50.5 billion which, if taken as a yearly average, represented €7.21 
billion per year. This was a considerable increase from the previous Framework 
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Programme (FP6 2002-2006) which, with a budget of €19.3 billion over 5 years, 
worked out at an annual average of €3.86 billion (Reillon 2005). Providing extra 
funding, however, was just one of the measures taken in order to achieve the goals of 
the Lisbon Strategy. Another notable initiative was the establishment of the European 
Research Area (ERA) which was intended to address the scattered research landscape 
that existed between EU Member States prior to the Lisbon Strategy. The aim of ERA 
was to provide a unified research area which was open to the world and would enable 
the free circulation of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology. The main 
objectives of the initiative were to boost Europe’s competitiveness, to improve the 
coordination of research activities on national and European level, to develop human 
resources and to increase the attractiveness of European research to the best 
researchers from all over the world (European Commission 2000a). In order to 
encourage national policies to align with the EU’s agenda, the Lisbon Strategy also set 
out a number of common indicators, most notably the ambitious goal of spending 3% of 
GDP on R&D by 2010.  
 However, these developments only represent one part of the Lisbon project. 
Indeed, as noted by Papadimitriou (2012:2, emphasis in original), the significance of the 
Lisbon Strategy ‘rests as much on what it has aimed to achieve as on how its targets have 
been pursued’. Under the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC), discussed in Chapter 
2, the EU pioneered new modes of governance that enabled not only the participation 
of a wider range of stakeholders in the policy process but also allowed the EU to enter 
into policy areas that were not explicitly part of the EU’s area of jurisdiction. Or, in 
other words, ‘the flexibility of the OMC was a key factor behind the broad level of 
support for Lisbon to include policy areas that had hitherto been considered politically 
too sensitive for exposure to EU scrutiny’ (Copeland 2012:231). With an emphasis on 
non-legally binding tools such as benchmarking and sharing of best practice, the Lisbon 
Strategy relied heavily on voluntarism, peer pressure and naming and shaming for its 
implementation. This marked ‘a major departure from the legalism of the community 
method that had shaped the development of the Single European Market (SEM) and 
other major EU policy initiatives’ (James 2012:10). In this respect, it was clearly 
recognition of the democratic deficit that had resulted from the functionalist approach 
to integration that the EU had pursued until then.  
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Rather than producing EU legislation, the OMC is ‘a method of soft governance 
which aims to spread best practice and achieve convergence towards EU goals in those 
policy areas which fall under the partial or full competence of Member States’ (Prpic 
2014:1). The European Council is usually the first to set policy direction but as binding 
rules cannot be used, this type of governance relies on other mechanisms to achieve its 
aims. These mechanisms include establishing guidelines, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators, benchmarks, national and regional targets and the use of periodic 
evaluations and peer reviews. During the Lisbon timeframe, a number of measures were 
established to provide benchmarking and reporting data on the NSIs of Member States, 
including Trendchart, the European Innovation Scoreboard, the Community 
Innovation Survey, commissioned studies and the Community Research and 
Development Information Service (CORDIS). Furthermore, the later period of the 
Lisbon Strategy witnessed the introduction of National Reform Programmes (NRPs) in 
which Member States were expected to report on progress in their national innovation 
policy and improvements in its governance.  
Although, by its very name, the OMC emphasised the role of coordination, the 
governance architecture of the Lisbon Strategy should not simply be seen as a 
transition from harmonisation to coordination, or hard to soft law. Indeed, as noted by 
Smismans (2011), owing to the complexity of the relationship between these different 
approaches, it is important to avoid viewing them as opposing instruments. He argues 
that under the Lisbon Strategy, harmonisation remained a key policy instrument and 
that the ideational repertoire of the Lisbon Strategy had a notable effect on the nature 
of EU law. Rather than replacing harmonisation, coordination was ‘the key 
organizational component of the Lisbon architecture’ (Smismans 2011:520). As part of 
his analysis, Smismans draws attention to different discursive uses of the concept of 
coordination, identifying four main dimensions. Firstly, ‘member state coordination’ 
under Lisbon implied that the Member States were the competent level of government 
with a supplementary role for the EU, in the form of providing guidance. Secondly, 
‘vertical actor coordination’ refers to the decentralised approach in which different 
levels of government – EU, Member States, regional and local – were expected to be 
actively involved through various forms of partnership. ‘Dual partnership coordination’ 
emphasised the need for the objectives to be tackled in a dual partnership between the 
EU and the Members States. Finally, ‘horizontal policy coordination’ involved the 
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grouping of different policies and policy areas in order to achieve a broad set of 
objectives. This latter dimension, included not only the horizontal coordination of 
policy but also the coordination of instruments, especially the Structural Funds 
(discussed below). 
Following a disappointing start for the Lisbon Strategy, ‘the Commission 
conceded that nationally based efforts and their coordination did not result in the 
dynamic growth as expected’ (Edler 2012:171). In order to identify the cause of this, a 
mid-term report was carried out which provided a rather damning overview of the lack 
of progress made since 2000. The so-called ‘Kok Report’ claimed that the slow progress 
was due to ‘an overloaded agenda, poor communication and conflicting priorities’ as 
well as a lack of determined political action (Kok 2004:6). In response to this, in 2005 
the Lisbon Strategy was relaunched (Lisbon II) in an attempt to strengthen the internal 
governance of the Strategy and enhance Member State engagement. In order to achieve 
this, the Commission (a) developed larger new initiatives at the EU level, (b) shifted its 
policies to be more holistic and demand-driven, (c) integrated innovation policy with 
aspects of the ERA and (d) broadened the OMC-like approaches of learning, 
benchmarking and reporting (Edler 2012:171) 
A key aspect of delivering this revised Lisbon Strategy was that the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy and its instruments – primarily the Structural Funds – were, following 
the advice of the Kok Report, adapted to closely mirror the Lisbon priorities. This 
included a requirement for Member States to set targets on the percentage of Structural 
Funds that would be spent on Lisbon objectives (European Commission 2005). The 
aim of the Cohesion Policy is to tackle the problem of regional disparity by promoting 
economic, social and territorial cohesion and, as such, the majority of Cohesion Policy 
funding is concentrated on less developed European countries and regions. Through the 
cohesion programmes, €86.4 billion was allocated for investment in knowledge and 
innovation between 2007 and 2013 (European Commission 2018a) with a particular 
focus on improving the innovation capacity of businesses, encouraging the 
dissemination, use and design of technologies and promoting a more flexible workforce. 
For Central and Eastern European countries, the introduction of the EU’s Structural 
Funds after accession represented an important tool with which the EU could assert its 
influence in these new Member States. Although, as discussed in the previous section, 
the EU had begun to offer financial assistance to these countries through the Phare 
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programme from 1989, this was a much more limited amount than that which is 
provided through the Structural Funds.  
Nonetheless, despite the efforts made by the revised Lisbon Strategy, structural 
difficulties and economic disparities within the EU continued to exist and were 
compounded by the financial and economic crises which began in 2008. Indeed, with 
its focus on coordination and its attempt to align all EU Member States behind a grand 
design of policy direction and purpose, from the outset the Lisbon Strategy faced 
enormous challenges of complexity and country diversity. Whilst the Lisbon Strategy 
has played a significant role in drawing attention to the importance of innovation as a 
source of economic development and international competitiveness, it was arguably 
overambitious and there is much debate about how impactful the Strategy has been in 
practice (Kaiser & Prange 2005). In fact, it has been suggested that the Lisbon Strategy 
may one day even ‘come to symbolise the EU’s ‘lost decade’’ (Copeland 2012:236), a 
period in which the EU failed to realise the economic reforms which could have created 
the foundations for future growth and prosperity. Indeed, the Lisbon Strategy fell short 
on nearly all targets, the most notable being the target to increase spending on R&D to 
3% of GDP. Member States, in practice, recorded an average increase from 1.8% to only 
1.9% between 2000 and 2010 (Eurostat 2018e).  
 
4.3) Horizon 2020 (2010-2020) 
 In response to the financial and economic crises, in 2010 the Lisbon Strategy 
was superseded by Europe 2020, the EU’s agenda for growth and jobs for the current 
decade. The priorities of Europe 2020 are to encourage smart growth (as a result of 
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation), sustainable growth (by 
promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy) and 
inclusive growth (through fostering a high-employment economy delivering social, 
economic and territorial cohesion).  The implementation of these reforms are supported 
by seven flagship initiatives: (1) innovation union, (2) youth on the move, (3) digital 
agenda for Europe, (4) resource-efficient Europe, (5) an industrialisation policy for the 
globalisation era, (6) an agenda for new skills and jobs and (7) European platform 
against poverty. Although the Innovation Union is the most directly linked to 
innovation, others, such as the digital agenda, the agenda for new skills and jobs, the 
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resource-efficient agenda and the industrialisation policy for the globalisation era are 
also closely connected to the EU’s goal towards economic growth and innovative 
excellence.   
 The EU states that the Innovation Union ‘aims to improve conditions and 
access to finance for research and innovation in Europe so that innovative ideas can be 
turned into products and services that create growth and jobs’ (European Commission 
2010a). The Innovation Union plan contains over thirty action points, with three 
specific aims: 
1.) To make Europe into a world-class science performer. 
2.) To remove obstacles to innovation, like expensive patenting, market 
fragmentation, slow standard-setting and skills shortages, which currently 
prevent ideas getting quickly to market.  
3.) To revolutionise the way public and private sectors work together, notably 
through Innovation Partnerships between European institutions, national and 
regional authorities and businesses. 
The financial instrument which provides for the implementation of the Innovation 
Union is known as Horizon 2020. Running from 2014 to 2020, it is the EU’s 8th 
Framework Programme for research and the first to integrate research and innovation. 
With €74.8 billion of funding available (Reillon 2005), Horizon 2020 is the EU’s 
biggest research and innovation programme to date. Horizon 2020, it is claimed, 
‘promises more breakthroughs, discoveries and world-firsts by taking great ideas from 
the lab to the market’ (European Commission 2018c). Horizon 2020 was supposed to 
represent a break from previous Framework Programmes, as exemplified by the 
decision to give it a unique name rather than the sequential numerical naming of the 
previous seven Framework Programmes. Although it is still too early to assess how 
successful Horizon 2020 has been at achieving these goals, the financial investment 
being made is a clear demonstration of the EU’s ongoing commitment to developing the 
innovation capacity of its Member States.   
In spite of the fact that, on the face of it, the goals of Europe 2020 are similar to 
those of the Lisbon Strategy, they are considered to be ‘more targeted, actualised and 
defined in a more operational and less pompous way’ (Van Iersel 2011:153). The Lisbon 
Strategy was seen as an overburdened ‘laundry list’ of actions that made it too broad 
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and led to difficulty prioritising measures. Europe 2020, by comparison, focuses on a 
limited number of areas and targets that underpin the main objectives of the strategy. 
This has been achieved by streamlining the headline targets (see Table 3), introducing 
the seven flagship initiatives (discussed above) and reducing the number of guidelines 
(the so-called Integrated Guidelines). Member States are expected to translate these 
EU headlines into national targets and report annually to the European Commission on 
the progress achieved and on the challenges encountered through the European 
Semester mechanism (discussed below).   
 
Table 3: Five headline targets of Europe 2020 
1.) Increasing the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 to at least 75%. 
2.) Increasing combined public and private investment in R&D to 3% of GDP. 
3.) Climate change and energy targets: 
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 
levels. 
 Increasing the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 
20%. 
 Moving towards a 20% increase in energy efficiency. 
4.) Reducing school drop-out rates to less than 10% and increasing the share of the 
population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary education to at least 40%. 
5.) Lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion. 
(Source: European Commission 2011b) 
 
 In terms of the governance of innovation policy at EU level, this appears to be a 
somewhat complex arrangement. The DG which is directly responsible for carrying out 
the EU’s policies on research and innovation is DG RTD (Research and Innovation). 
Other DGs which also play a significant role include DG COMP (Competition), DG 
EAC (Education and Culture) and DG REGIO (Regional and Urban Policy). This is, 
however, not an exhaustive list and, in fact, up to 18 DGs have been identified as having 
some role in innovation-related polices in the EU (Granieri & Renda 2012:80). It was 
noted in expert interviews conducted as part of this research that the governance 
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structure was confusing and that it also made it difficult to compile strategic 
documents which would meet the demands of the various DGs (Government Official 1 
2016; Government Official 4 2016). To add to this complexity, there are also so many 
innovation-related budget instruments (Table 4) that it has become difficult for 
companies wishing to receive funding to know where to go. The problems caused by 
the ongoing fragmentation of institutional competences across DGs and the many 
different funding instruments under Horizon 2020 have been noted by Granieri & 
Renda (2012). An example of this fragmentation is provided by the eco-innovation 
support with is managed by DG ENV (Environment) under the resource-efficient 
Europe initiative but whose funding is managed by DG ENTR (Enterprise and 
Industry) under the Innovation Union initiative. Granieri and Renda (2012:117) argue 
that considerable simplification of the system is required in order to prevent valuable 
resources from being wasted and to achieve the EU’s ambitious innovation-related 
goals. 
Although a continuation with Lisbon can be seen in regards to the substance of 
Europe 2020, notable change has occurred to way in which the EU’s latest strategy is 
governed. Importantly, in contrast to the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 includes a 
reinforced role for the Commission and more transparency and commitment is required 
from Member States. An important tool in this respect is the NRPs which were initially 
developed as part of Lisbon II and which, under Europe 2020, form the central 
mechanism for national reporting on domestic action to achieve the EU’s targets. What 
is especially important is that ‘Member States are requested to enter into dialogue with 
the European Commission in setting the specific national contributions to meeting EU-
level targets, thus avoiding the risk of poor performing states freeriding on the better 
performance of others’ (Armstrong 2012:225). Through doing so, this strengthens the 
role of the Commission and, in turn, represents a move away from horizontal 
multilateral coordination, which was a key feature of the Lisbon approach, towards a 
more vertical and bilateral approach to increasing domestic policy effort (Zeitlin 2008). 
In order to ensure that the Member States are actually delivering on their 
commitments, the monitoring role of the Commission has become better defined, more 
systematic and better organised under Horizon 2020 (Van Iersel 2011:153). 
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Table 4: EU innovation-related budget instruments 
Programme Funding Objective 
Programmes fully dedicated to supporting R&I activities 
Horizon 2020 €79.4 billion Research projects 
Programmes including funds for R&I activities 
Cohesion Policy 
€110 billion (out 
of €352 billion) 
National/regional programmes 
Galileo €7.1 billion Satellite navigation system 
Copernicus €4.3 billion Earth observation programme 
Programmes connected to R&I activities 
CEF (Connecting Europe 
Facility) 
€27.4 billion Energy, telecom and transport 
Erasmus+ €14.7 billion 
Support for education, 
training, youth and sport 
LIFE (Environment and climate 
action) 
€3.5 billion Environment 
COSME (Europe’s programme 
for SMEs) 
€2.3 billion Finance for SMEs 
(Source: European Commission 2018a) 
 
The new strategy also represents a more holistic approach by addressing 
microeconomic issues, through the previously discussed Flagship Initiatives, as well as 
macroeconomic issues. In terms of macroeconomic governance, the key architectural 
development is the introduction of the European Semester which is the main tool with 
which the EU can monitor national progress on economic and fiscal policies. Born out 
of a perceived need for stronger economic governance and better policy coordination 
between EU Member States, the European Semester refers to the 6-month period at the 
beginning of the year during which time Member States are expected to align their 
budgetary and economic policies with the objectives and rules agreed at EU level. 
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Starting with the publication of the Annual Growth Survey in January, which sets the 
basis for building a common understanding about the priorities for action at EU and 
national levels, by April the Member States are required to submit their NRPs together 
with their Stability and/or Convergence Programmes for assessment by the EU. After 
evaluation of these programmes, the EU provides each country with so-called ‘Country 
Specific Recommendations’ which are expected to be taken into account in budgetary 
and policy decisions. Through this system, the European Semester provides the 
Commission with a tool with which it can annually monitor and influence the direction 
of policy-making in its Member States.   
In terms of the tools being used under Europe 2020, an important development 
has taken place in the EU’s approach towards Cohesion Policy. As shown in Table 4, 
between 2014 and 2020, €352 billion has been set aside for Cohesion Policy in order to 
address the diverse development needs of the EU regions and, of this, €110 billion has 
been dedicated towards research and innovation activities. As part of the latest reforms 
to the Cohesion Policy, and in keeping with the aims of Europe 2020, the EU 
announced that the development of a Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart-
Specialisation (RIS3) would, from 2013, become an ex-ante conditionality for 
investment from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the EU’s fund 
aimed at reducing regional disparity within Member States. The RIS3 approach 
‘combines industrial, educational and innovation policies to suggest that countries or 
regions select a limited number of priority areas for knowledge-based investments, 
focusing their strengths and comparative advantages’ (OECD 2018c). It supposedly 
embraces a broad view of innovation and would theoretically, in that respect, suggest 
an improvement on the EU’s previous policies which were criticised for being too 
narrow and linear in their approach. (See Table 5 for the key elements of the RIS3 
approach.) A Smart Specialisation Platform provides guidance material, access to 
relevant data in order to inform strategy formation and help train policy-makers. (The 
Czech and Hungarian experiences of and responses to the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy approach are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.) 
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Table 5: Key elements of Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart 
Specialisation  
 
 Smart-specialisation is a place-based approach, meaning that it builds on the assets 
and resources available to regions and Member States and on their specific socio-
economic challenges in order to identify unique opportunities for development and 
growth. 
 To have a strategy means to make choices for investment. Member States and 
regions ought to support only a limited number of well-identified priorities for 
knowledge-based investments and/or clusters. 
 Setting priorities should not be a top-down picking the winner process. It should 
be an inclusive process of stakeholders’ involvement centred on ‘entrepreneurial 
discovery’ that is an interactive process in which market forces  and the private 
sector are discovering and producing information about new activities, and the 
government assesses the outcomes and empowers those actors most capable of 
realising this potential. 
 The strategy should embrace a broad view of innovation, supporting technological 
as well as practice-based and social innovation. This would allow each region and 
Member State to shape policy choices according to their unique socio-economic 
conditions. 
 Finally, a good strategy must include a sound monitoring and evaluation system as 
well as a revision mechanism for updating strategic choices. 
(Source: Gianelle et al. 2016:114) 
 
In addition, under Europe 2020, the EU has further expanded its collection of 
soft policy tools. For example, as part of the Innovation Union initiative, a Policy 
Support Facility (PSF) has been introduced which provides practical support to 
countries through peer reviews, mutual learning exercises and specific support to 
countries. The PSF, it is claimed, ‘replies to the strong need to offer more customer-
oriented services to support evidence-based policy making’  (Research and Innovation 
Observatory 2018). As Hungary was one of the first countries to make use of the peer 
review option offered via the PSF, the Hungarian experience of this is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. Furthermore, in terms of qualitative indicators, the EU continues to 
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develop and expand on the tools it uses to monitor the innovation performance of 
Member States including, amongst others, the previously mentioned European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (RIS), the 
Innobarometer, the Business Innovation Observatory and the Key Enabling 
Technologies (KETs) Observatory. 
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has highlighted the key developments in both the relationship 
between the EU and the countries under study as well as the changes in the EU’s 
approach towards innovation policy since these countries became EU Member States. 
In theory, the Copenhagen criteria provided the EU with an unprecedented amount of 
influence in the decision-making and institution building process of these Central and 
Eastern European countries as they transitioned to democratic market economies. The 
pre-accession period was characterised by power asymmetry in which the EU, thanks 
in large part to the attraction of EU membership, had a number of powerful tools with 
which to promote Europeanisation in the candidate countries. In terms of innovation, 
the requirement to download the acquis communautaire and incorporate the EU’s 
competition and industrial policies into the domestic arena can be seen as having a 
direct impact on these countries NSIs by promoting competition and increasing 
industrial standards.   
Whilst the pre-accession period gave the EU a fairly commanding position in 
the candidate countries, the Commission’s role under the Lisbon Strategy was more of 
providing supplementary guidance. Although the Lisbon Strategy was very innovative 
in terms of developing a method of soft governance – the Open Method of Coordination 
– which enabled the EU to enter into policy areas that were officially controlled by 
Member States’ national governments, the Lisbon Strategy largely failed to actualise the 
intended economic development. Europe 2020, which by strengthening the role of the 
Commission and streamlining the number of aims, has attempted to overcome the main 
weaknesses of the Lisbon Strategy. What has been particularly noticeable about both 
Lisbon and Europe 2020 is how the EU has not only continued to develop its soft policy 
tools but also how it has proceeded to link the provision of financial aid ever closer to 
the condition of adopting the EU’s aims and priorities. This has been shown to have 
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occurred firstly in the Phare programme and in more recent years with the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy and the introduction of an ex-ante conditionality – the development of 
a Smart Specialisation Strategy – in order to receive ERDF funding. This development 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.  
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5) Czech Republic 
 
Introduction 
Claiming to be one of the ten most industrialised countries in the world prior to 
World War II (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2018), 
Czechoslovakia, as it was then, has an impressive industrial record. However, the 
communist period resulted in a huge restructuring of the industrial and research 
environment which had many negative consequences and, even since returning to a 
market economy, the Czech Republic has struggled to recapture much of the success it 
formerly enjoyed. In spite of the EU’s attempts to support the advancement of the 
Czech NSI and to improve its innovation performance, this research suggests that a 
number of historical legacies together with the Czech Republic’s economic structure 
are preventing the EU from having a more significant impact. In order to gain a 
thorough understanding of the situation, this chapter begins by looking at the 
historical development of the Czech NSI over three timeframes: (1) pre-1989, (2) the 
transition period and (3) post-accession to the EU. This section also considers the role 
of FDI and assesses whether any clear progress in the Czech Republic’s innovation 
performance can be identified since becoming an EU Member State. The second part of 
this chapter considers the role of the EU in influencing the development of the Czech 
NSI. Using the theoretical framework constructed in Chapter 3, this section goes on to 
discuss how the existence of several areas of misfit can explain why the EU has not 
been able to exert a greater influence.  
 
5.1) Development of the Czech NSI  
Pre-1989 
Due to the fact that the model inherited from the USSR greatly affected the 
research and innovation systems of Central and Eastern European countries, 
understanding the key elements of the Soviet research and innovation system is 
important in explaining the development of the Czech NSI (and also Hungarian NSI in 
the following chapter). This is not to suggest that all Soviet bloc countries should be 
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considered as a homogenous group. Indeed, differences in each country’s history greatly 
affected the initial conditions at the time of downloading the Soviet research model 
and, subsequently, political and economic developments during the communist period 
also had an impact on the way in which the Soviet model was implemented over time. 
There is, however, a ‘common structural heritage in the research systems of Central and 
Eastern Europe rooted in the shared past’ (Balázs et al. 1995:615) – a basic template 
which transformed the NSIs of Central and Eastern European countries, albeit not with 
uniform results. What this section aims to do, therefore, is highlight the main 
commonalities of the Soviet research model transposed onto Central and Eastern 
European countries and to draw attention to the specifics of the Czech experience 
including any significant changes which occurred between the earlier and later 
communist period. This will help to identify key Soviet-related characteristics of the 
Czech NSI with which the country entered the post-Soviet transition period. 
Science played a significant role in the ideology and politics of socialist 
societies. Indeed, the ‘scientific-technical revolution’ was seen as an important 
condition for not only the development of socialism but also as the main area of 
competition between capitalism and socialism. Additionally, there was a political 
expectation that science would be capable of solving problems in all areas of society 
(Meske 2004). It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that during the communist era 
there was considerable awareness regarding the importance of investing in tangible and 
intangible assets in order to achieve ideological goals as well as the ambitious growth 
objectives of the government of the USSR. In fact, according to Freeman’s (2006:15) 
calculations, the USSR actually committed a higher ratio of gross domestic expenditure 
to research and development (GERD) to GDP than even the USA. This has led to the 
conclusion that ‘whatever the problems may have been with respect to the post-war 
growth of the East European economies, they were not problems of sheer lack of 
quantitative investment, whether in tangible or intangible capital’ (Freeman 2006:16). 
Notwithstanding this sizable economic commitment to R&D, it should be 
noted that the communist research systems where somewhat skewed owing to the 
absolute priority afforded to military R&D and military production. Although there is 
some difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics for these countries during this period, it 
has been estimated that up to three quarters of the total R&D was conducted directly 
for military objectives (Freeman 2006:19). The military to civilian technology spin-off 
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argument which has been promoted by military and space agencies in the US and other 
OECD countries in defence of their large R&D expenditures, has received considerable 
resistance from economists who argue that ‘very few technologies have proceeded 
effortlessly from defence conception to commercial application’ (Alic et al. 1992:9). In 
the case of the USSR, it has been suggested (von Hirschhausen & Bitzer 2000:17) that 
the lack of spin-offs was even more pronounced due to the high level of secrecy 
surrounding the research results of military R&D. In purely economic terms, the 
burden of military expenditure was considerable, especially considering the weak 
position of the USSR’s economy at the time. Moreover, the high ratio of investment in 
military R&D resulted in a much smaller proportion of R&D funding being available to 
the development of research within other scientific fields. 
In terms of the institutional structure of the research system, given the high 
importance attached to science and research, Soviet politicians were keen to control 
and manage this sphere as effectively as possible (Meske 2004). In part because of this, 
science became integrated into national planning and ‘R&D was directed 
administratively by the centre and subordinated to centrally defined economic goals’ 
(OECD 1992:14). Most R&D organisations came under the control of the federal bodies 
(state commissions and ministries) and were financed by the state, based on the 
requirements of the National Economic Plan. The politically-governed Soviet approach 
followed a linear model of innovation (see Chapter 2) in which each link was 
institutionally separate – training, basic research, applied research, development and 
production – resulting in a highly fragmented system. Indeed, as noted by Balázs et al. 
(1995), the institutional complex developed in the USSR and introduced in Central and 
Eastern European countries followed the general principles of central planning: 
specialisation, rationalisation and centralisation. The Soviet model divided research and 
innovation into three sectors – (1) academies, (2) universities and (3) an industrial or 
‘branch’ sector – each of which had a distinct function and were markedly separated 
from one another.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the importance placed on science, the 
communist period witnessed a huge increase in the number of research personnel in 
Czechoslovakia from about 14,000 in 1951 to around 198,000 by 1988 (OECD 1992:15). 
Due to the abolition of private ownership when Czechoslovakia became part of the 
Soviet bloc in 1948, R&D became part of the state sector and the research system 
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underwent a sizeable reorganisation. Firstly, in accordance with the Soviet model, basic 
research became concentrated mainly in the research institutes of the Academies of 
Sciences. In Czechoslovakia, these were the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences which 
was founded in 1952 and the Slovak Academy of Sciences founded in 1953. These 
Academies were hierarchically structured and, as by law the coordination of all basic 
research was under their responsibility, they enjoyed a privileged position in the 
Czechoslovak research system (Provazník et al. 1998:28). A combination of learned 
society and system of research institutes, the Academies constituted an important part 
of the Czech research system (OECD 1992). The Academies covered all scientific fields 
and, as well as conducting research, they also played a notable role in training 
scientists. For example, during the 1980s, the Czechoslovak and Slovak Academies 
trained an annual average of about 1,500 postgraduate students (OECD 1992:63). 
The creation of the Academy research institutes significantly weakened the 
research activities of universities whose role within the national research system 
essentially became confined to teaching, particularly in the initial communist period. 
During the communist era, Czechoslovak universities witnessed a sizeable increase in 
the number of students, rising from 45,200 in 1950 to 167,395 in 1985, with almost 50% 
of students in engineering and agriculture and a much lower share in the natural 
sciences and humanities. This increase, however, was not matched with a 
corresponding rise in the number of university teachers (OECD 1992:54-55). Due to the 
reorganisation of the research system, many scientists actually left the universities in 
order to join the Academy research institutes. The equipment in universities was 
significantly inferior to the Academy research institutes and this, together with few 
incentives to engage in research and heavy university teaching loads, ‘weakened the 
link between research and teaching in a number of areas’ (OECD 1992:15). Although a 
marginal amount of university research did continue, the university research sector 
during the communist period occupied a relatively weak position within the 
Czechoslovak research system.   
Despite the universities and Academy research institutes being legally, 
organisationally and financially separate, some attempts were made to foster 
cooperation between the sectors through, for example, conducting joint research 
projects, Academy scientists teaching and lecturing part-time at universities and some 
university teachers carrying out research in Academy institutes. This cooperation ‘was 
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primarily facilitated by good informal contacts and communication among scientists 
from both research sectors’ (OECD 1992:58). In other words, although the universities 
and Academies were technically separate, they were not, in practice, completely 
isolated from one another. However, whilst by the end of the communist period there 
was some, albeit still limited, cooperation between the Czechoslovak universities and 
Academies, the links between universities and industry, by contrast, were not well 
developed (Müller 1995).  
With regard to applied research, the link between this field of research and 
production was notably weakened at the beginning of the 1950s with the introduction 
of a network of industrial research institutes. These institutes were controlled by 
branch ministries and operated according to the plan for the firms of each particular 
branch. As a result, industrial research became ‘institutionally separate from the 
enterprises which, according to the tenets of central planning were simply operational 
units whose sole role was to execute production plans’ (Balázs et al. 1995:616). The role 
of the firm was effectively limited to that of a production unit with very little, if any, 
internal research or innovation-related activities. Much like university research had 
suffered after the establishment of the Academy research institutes, so too in-house 
R&D was damaged by the expansion of the industrial research institutes. Although 
some effort was later made to improve the link between research and production in the 
second half of the 1980s, this was impeded by the monopolistic structure of the 
economy, with production dominated by few, large enterprises with little interest in 
innovation (OECD 1992:15). It has been argued (Balázs et al. 1995) that this 
institutional heritage was responsible even in the post-Soviet transition period for the 
small amount of in-house R&D in Central and Eastern European countries.   
However, regarding in-house research, some notable differences have been 
observed in the Czechoslovak system. As the centralist system came under pressure in 
Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and 1980s, two significant changes took place in the 
research system.   
‘First, enterprises were allowed to retain 2% of turnover to spend on R&D, 
thereby creating a new ‘R&D Fund’; this was a sort of R&D subsidy. Second, 
enterprises were allowed to form groupings or ‘combinates’ which enabled the 
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concentration of enterprises’ economic power and enhanced technology-based 
networking between companies’ (Müller 1995:808). 
Shifting power to the enterprises represented something of a decentring process 
although, without removing the administrative, social and regional structures and 
expectations, the ability of enterprises to pursue economic goals still remained limited. 
It also led to a reorientation in the sectors performing research and, by the end of the 
1980s, to some recovery in the in-house research and technological capacities of the 
enterprises, which had previously been weakened by centralisation practices. Thus, 
Müller (2004) argues that by the beginning of the transition period, in-house industrial 
R&D potential in Czechoslovakia was increasing and the industrial R&D system had 
moved closer to the Western model and quite different from that of the former Soviet 
Union.  
 In addition to the formal institutional changes that resulted from the 
implementation of the Soviet research model, a report by the OECD (OECD 1992) on 
the state of the Czechoslovak R&D system at the beginning of the transition period 
also draws attention to another important legacy of the communist period, namely the 
public attitude towards science and technology. As all institutions were controlled by 
the political apparatus and society had limited ability to assess them, the traditional 
forms of interaction between science, technology and society became undermined. 
Science became discredited because it was part of the bureaucratic system and, as a 
result, ‘a good deal of hostility developed towards science and technology, as well as to 
‘official experts’ in general’ (OECD 1992:75). This situation was confounded by the 
selection of research personnel who were often rewarded based on their political and 
ideological allegiance rather than their scientific achievements and, conversely, many 
capable intellectuals were removed from their positions. As science and technology was 
so closely linked with politics and political cadres, the OECD report (OECD 1992:120) 
uncovered a strong distrust amongst the general public, and even ridicule, of the notion 
of a positive, future-oriented policy in this area.  
The issue of distrust, or at least lack of trust, was not confined just to science 
and technology policy. The Soviet system had caused the public to feel alienated from 
the political institutions and had led to a general lack of trust in most public officials 
and institutions. For example, a survey carried out in Czechoslovakia by the Institute 
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for Research of Public Opinion in 1988 (cited in Millar & Wolchik 1994:19) showed 
that only a small percent of people, 14% and 24% respectively, were willing to serve as 
local level officials or members of local government commissions. Reasons given for this 
lack of interest included low evaluations of the effectiveness of local governments and 
of citizens’ possibilities to influence politics, as well as previous negative experience 
with local government. These findings ‘further reflect the negative assessments of local-
level officials and institutions’ (Millar & Wolchik 1994:19). Not only does this highlight 
the feeling of division between the public and the political arena but it also suggests 
that the negative perception of politics had, for many, become a deterrent to working in 
a (local) governmental or official role. In addition, the perception that corruption was 
an intractable part of politics had a serious effect on the levels of trust between society 
and the state. 
Moreover, political trust – the support of citizens for political institutions such 
as government and parliament – is important for not only a wide range of political and 
economic outcomes (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2011:9), but recent research has also 
suggested that there is strong correlation between satisfaction with political 
governance, on the one hand, and (generalised) social trust on the other (Newton 2007; 
Sztompka 2000; Zmerli & Newton 2008). Social and political trust, in other words, are 
closely related and mutually supportive. Indeed, it is not just low levels of political trust 
but also social trust which are widely acknowledged as being legacies of the communist 
regime in Central and Eastern European countries (Kornai & Rose-Ackerman 2004; 
Rose-Ackerman 2001). As stated by Gibney (1997:95) ‘[o]ne of the hallmarks of 
communist rule…was the perversion of civic society. In place of a sense of community, 
these ‘societies’ were instead marked by a mutual distrust between the state and its 
people, and between the people themselves’. The networks of secret police led to 
general public fear and distrust and the post-regime revelations of spying by friends, 
colleagues, family and spouses created a rational basis for political and social distrust, 
both during and after the communist period. Indeed, the scarcity, or lack, of trust has 
been seen as a major obstacle to the establishment of effective democracy and market 
economy in the Czech and Slovak Republics (Musil 1992). 
 In short, at the end of the communist period, the Czechoslovak R&D system 
had grown considerably in terms of the number of researchers and was characterised by 
a high degree of separation between the various sectors – the research institutes of the 
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Academies, the universities and the industrial institutes. Although some cooperation 
did take place, notably between the universities and the institutes of the Academies, 
the various sectors remained financially and organisationally separate. Universities had 
predominantly become teaching institutions and university research had been severely 
weakened by the establishment of the research institutes of the Academies which 
dominated the field of basic research. The role of R&D within companies, which had 
been significantly weakened in the initial part of the communist period, gradually 
became re-established after a decentring process benefiting the enterprises that began 
in the 1970s. Nonetheless, as the Czech and Slovak Republics undertook their 
transitions to democratic market economies, they did so with a significant amount of 
inherited lack of political and social trust. 
 
Transition period  
 Having described the backdrop against which Central and Eastern European 
countries entered the transition period to a liberal democracy and market economy, 
this section looks more closely at the transition time period with a focus of the 
particularities of the Czech experience. The situation in the Central and Eastern 
European countries is somewhat unique due to the fact that these countries had to 
manage their transitions whilst adapting to the opportunities and pressures which 
resulted from globalisation. Whilst the collapse of the communist regime provided the 
possibility for political, economic and social reform, it also resulted in some significant 
challenges. These endeavours were made additionally difficult by the fact that 
‘[p]articularly after the Berlin Wall, most countries saw deep dives in their growth 
rates and in industry as well as service-sector value added’ (Kattel et al. 2009:11). In 
fact, some analysts have found that it took almost a decade for most of these countries 
to even regain the growth and development levels of 1990 (Tiits et al. 2008). According 
to the World Bank and IMF, factors accounting for this recovery and growth were 
initial conditions, macroeconomic policies and structural reforms (IMF 2000). These 
efficiency gains are considered more short-term benefits as opposed to the long-term 
opportunities associated with research and innovation. 
With regard to the specific experience of the Czech Republic during the 
transition period, this was initially affected by the fact that until the late 1980s 
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Czechoslovakia had retained a very orthodox version of the socialist economic system. 
Despite formally committing itself to the introduction of perestroika, the actual 
commitment in terms of action was slow and minimal. Czechoslovakia remained one of 
the most centralised economies with only 1.2% of the population employed in the 
private sector in 1989 (Hanousek et al. 2004:2) and not even partial reforms towards 
economic liberalisation were implemented until after the fall of communism. The state 
continued to be omnipresent and omnipotent and private entrepreneurial activity, a 
factor which is considered vital to improving a country’s innovative capacity, was 
essentially absent. When the transition period officially began in 1989, the level of 
political freedom was negligible and that of economic liberalisation, non-existent. Like 
other Central and Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic underwent a rapid 
and extensive process of privatisation during the transition period. In fact, according to 
the World Bank (World Bank 2002:6), the private sector share of GDP in the Czech 
Republic grew from 12% in 1990 to 80% in 1999 which was even higher than the private 
sector share in Western capitalist countries (up to 65%) (Rodríguez 2011:2). 
 The transition strategy pursued by the newly elected government was one of 
shock therapy and rapid change with most of the reforms being introduced in 1991. The 
first stage of privatisation was completed in 1990-1991 and a second was launched in 
1994 after the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics. The dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993 slightly postponed 
economic recovery (Fidrmuc et al. 2002) although, on the whole, the experience was 
less negative for the Czech Republic which inherited better economic structures than 
its Slovak neighbour. The Czech Republic, for example, had a strong tourism industry, 
centred on Prague, and a number of SMEs which were already trading reasonably well 
with EU countries. Furthermore, much like its neighbours, Germany and Austria, 
engineering has been an area of considerable strength in the industrial development of 
the Czech Republic and has traditionally been the backbone of the Czech economy 
(Rammer et al. 2007:5). The Slovak Republic, on the other hand, inherited ‘a relatively 
unattractive industrial structure made of large industries such as steel, armaments, and 
chemicals that could not trade successfully in the competing markets of the EU’ 
(Koyame-Marsh 2011:74). These many reforms in combination with the disbanding of 
the Comecon and the related loss of foreign markets for Czechoslovak products, caused 
a notable decline in output and led to a predicted transition recession in the early 1990s. 
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Growth gradually increased again until the beginning of 1997 when the Czech Republic 
witnessed a dramatic slow-down necessitating the introduction of ‘a new package of 
economic measures, including further stabilisation measures as well as a number of 
structural reforms designed to eliminate the systematic and institutional shortcomings 
of the Czech economy’ (European Commission 2014a).  
Along with the radical transformation of the economy, the transition period also 
saw the introduction of a new research system which was ‘based on the principles of 
scientific freedom, institutional autonomy, pluralism of funding sources and 
competition’ (Müller 2004:1998). There was considerable debate about whether the 
transformation should be ‘organised’ and ‘politically governed’ or whether it should 
follow a spontaneous evolutionary process, carried out on the basis of natural selection 
(Müller 2004; Provazník et al. 1998). The latter option eventually won the support of 
state authorities along with the majority of the scientific community and so a 
transformation took place which was not centrally directed and differed according to 
the conditions in each particular R&D institution (Provazník et al. 1998:26). The 
approval of three acts – the Academy of Sciences Act, the Governmental Support for 
Scientific Activities and Technology Development Act and the Higher Education Act – 
created the basis for the abolition of central planning and management of science and 
research and of direct state intervention into the activities of research institutions. An 
expert advisory governmental board comprised of scientists and researchers – the 
Council for Science and Technologies – was established in 1991, offering advice on how 
R&D should be coordinated at the executive level. 
 Arnold (2011) has distinguished two distinct periods during the transition 
period. The first, from 1990 to 1998, involved institutional readjustment and during this 
time the Czech Government ‘was strongly averse to central planning so budget 
responsibility for the R&D system was decentralised to the ministries and the 
Academy’ Arnold (2011:ii). This decision was, in part, due to the profound mistrust of 
governmental planning and quantitative goal setting. The second period, from 1998 to 
2003, is represented by the Czech Republic implementing measures in preparation for 
EU membership. During this period, the government started to move away from 
unconditional funding towards institutional funding based on plans called ‘research 
intentions’ which connected government support for research to specific objectives. 
This period was characterised by a focus on R&D as opposed to innovation, the latter 
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only receiving policy attention after EU accession (see below). The first ‘National 
Research and Development Policy of the Czech Republic’ was established in 2000 
which aimed to improve the coordination of research activities, stressed the importance 
of evaluation of R&D results and identified the need to restructure state R&D 
administration in order to improve its efficiency (Arnold 2011:16).  
An important initial consequence of the reforms to the Czech research system 
was a sizeable reduction in its size as shown by the decrease in R&D funding and 
employment, as shown in Table 6 below. Although, as the transition period progressed, 
funding for R&D was gradually restored, thanks in part to a resolution by subsequent 
governments to increase public support for R&D (Müller 2004), the number of R&D 
staff remained much lower than it had been at the end of the communist period. In 
terms of the R&D funding system, the first steps towards competitive funding were 
made by the creation of the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences which was soon 
replaced by the Science Foundation of the Czech Republic, also known as the Grant 
Agency of the Czech Republic (GA CR), in 1992. GA CR is an independent public 
organisation supporting and distributing funds for basic research in the Czech 
Republic through calls for proposals and public competition. It was also intended that 
GA CR would encourage trans-sectoral research projects although, in practice, the 
cooperation between some sectors, especially the academy and industry sectors, 
remained weak (Müller 1995). Ministries, state agencies and the Academy were all 
allocated an R&D budget which resulted in a complex funding system involving 
twenty funding bodies. A lack of coordination led to fragmentation of R&D support 
with programmes being launched with unclear, and often overlapping, objectives 
(Arnold 2011). 
With regard to the various research sectors, the role, and even the existence of 
the Academy – which after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was re-established as the 
Czech Academy of Sciences (CAS) – came under much questioning after 1989. Instead 
of abolishing CAS altogether, ‘the opinion won that it was possible to convert the 
Academy into a modern institution of non-university research which in size, level and 
organisational ways will produce a performance comparable with the analogous 
scientific centres in western democracies’ (Provazník et al. 1998:28). The Academy 
retained its independence but lost its privileged position as the coordinator of all basic 
research and was transformed into a democratic organisation. A system of independent 
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peer reviews was adopted, with input from foreign scientists, leading to the evaluation 
of the Academy research institutes and personnel based on their scientific merit and 
level of performance. Poor performance in some areas resulted in a sizeable reduction in 
the number of research centres and staff. In fact, by 1994, the number of Academy 
personnel was almost half what it had been in 1989 (Müller 2004:201). Nonetheless, in 
spite of this, CAS still remained the main public research performer in the Czech 
Republic.  
 
Table 6: R&D expenditure and R&D staff in the Czech Republic 1989-2003 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total R&D 
Expenditure 
(Million CZK) 
21,420 12,415 15,211 14,499 9,750 12,983 13,982 
Total R&D Staff  137,927 105,916 76,487 57,227 40,214 38,752 47,455 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
16,264 19,477 22,865 23,646 26,487 28,337 29,552 32,247 
49,921 52,245 51,198 52,716 53,506 51,939 53,695 55,699 
(Sources: Eurostat 2018c and Müller 2004) 
 
As part of the transformation, the Academy research institutes adopted a 
funding model combining institutional funding with competitive-project funding, to 
the extent that gaining project funding became crucial to the survival of some research 
institutes (Müller 2004; Provazník et al. 1998). A large part of the success of the 
Academy sector was due its ability to gain international grants, scholarships and 
contracts and to integrate into the international scientific community. The transition 
period also witnessed a significant increase in cooperation between the Academy 
research institutes and the universities, to the point that reference could even be made 
to ‘an emerging coherent research system integrating in a natural manner university 
education and basic research’ (Provazník et al. 1998:30). By contrast, the Academy’s 
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involvement in solving the problems of industry remained very poor. In spite of an 
increase in the number of mission-oriented projects carried out by the Academy, 
‘industry did not consolidate the research results sufficiently to absorb and utilise them 
in business’ (Provazník et al. 1998:30). 
 In terms of university research, one of the goals for the transformation of the 
Czech university sector was to improve both the quantity and quality of its research. 
Having been significantly eroded during the communist period, university research 
began to witness an improvement during the transition period with research 
accounting for from one third of a university teacher’s time to as much as 50-70% in 
top-level university research centres by the late 1990s (Provazník et al. 1998:31). In spite 
of this positive development, there were a number of factors which constrained 
universities and prevented them from making even greater improvement in their 
research capacities. These included a shortage of funding, a heavy teaching commitment 
and the fact that, in some cases, laboratory and computing equipment remained 
significantly inferior to that in the Academy research institutes. Another issue noted by 
Müller (2004:815) was ‘the decline in the number of students wanting to take science 
and engineering and the high demand for education in other subjects (such as business, 
economics, law, humanities and arts)’. Although, cooperation during this period with 
the Academies increased, links between universities and industry witnessed something 
of a decline with contract research stagnating or decreasing (Provazník et al. 1998:31). 
 Perhaps the greatest transformation, however, took place within the previously 
overstaffed and inefficient industrial sector, the majority of this change happening as 
result of privatisation and the corresponding alteration in the sources of funding for 
industrial research. In 1991, industrial research institutes were transformed into state 
limited companies and subsequently, after two waves of voucher privatisation, the 
majority were transformed into joint stock companies. In terms of their funding, 
already by 1996, 90% of their funding came from private funds which marked a hugely 
significant break from the reliance on state funding characteristic of the communist 
period. The number of employees in the industrial science sector decreased 
considerably, indeed by 1996 it had dropped to about one third of the 1990 figure 
(Müller 2004:202). Privatisation led to a decrease in research activities or even the 
closure of entire research branches, which was largely blamed on a lack of demand for 
R&D from industry. A negative outcome of the significant decline in R&D was that it 
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led to the ‘total disappearance of industrial R&D potential in some fields and branches’ 
(Müller 2004:204). A more positive development, however, was the growing awareness 
by researchers of the economic, commercial and financial aspects of their research. In 
other words, the gap which used to separate the researcher from the user or customer 
of the research results, typical of the communist period, began to be bridged (Provazník 
et al. 1998:34).  
In a discussion on the development of the Czech NSI, Lengyel & Cadil (2009) 
have identified two distinct periods in the 1990s. They argue that in ‘the first half of the 
decade, government efforts focused on ‘research’ with an emphasis on re-structuring 
the relationship between public research institutes and increasing the R&D capacities 
of universities’ (Lengyel & Cadil 2009:180). During this period there was minimal 
government financial support for business innovation. In the second half of the decade, 
the Czech government reoriented its effort by increasing public funding for industrial 
R&D and introducing a new set of incentives to attract more FDI in response to, 
amongst other reasons, persistent difficulties in restructuring domestic firms, 
underfunding of industrial R&D and relatively low levels of FDI. With regard to 
domestic industrial research, this existed mainly in the larger enterprises as SMEs, by 
comparison, had ‘no interest in promoting research, even if they actively utilized the 
professional expertise of the individual scientists and engineers’ (Müller 1995:813). In 
terms of FDI, towards the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic was receiving 
considerably higher amounts of FDI than it had at the start of the decade (see Figure 2). 
It is claimed (Benacek 2010:24) that, in spite of the economic slump, 1997-1999 was a 
highly successful period for the development of industrial policies in which 
CzechInvest – established in 1992 as the Investment and Business development Agency 
– played a significant role. The Czech economy gradually earned credibility among 
foreign investors and the investment incentives offered by CzechInvest encouraged a 
boom in foreign investment. In terms of innovation, this was particularly significant as 
‘[i]nvestors realized, once they could handle simple projects in the Czech Republic, 
that there was state support for much more sophisticated ventures’ (Benacek 2010:24). 
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Figure 2: Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the Czech Republic          
1993-2003 (Million US$) 
 
(Source: OECD 2013) 
 
FDI has clearly played a vital role in the economic development strategy of the 
Czech Republic and ‘R&D expenditures of foreign-owned firms have become an 
important factor of the innovation system development since the beginning for the 
1990s’ (Lengyel 2012:78). However, the long-term effect of FDI has become a 
considerably contentious issue. Whilst, on the one hand, in some cases the outcome has 
been positive, for example, the acquisition of the Czech automotive manufacturer 
Škoda by the German group Volkswagen led to an expansion and internationalisation  
of local clusters of car part suppliers. On the other, it has been argued (Kosová 2010) 
that there are instances where local firms have been ‘crowded out’ by the presence of 
MNEs. This has led to the suggestion of a ‘dual economy’ in which indigenous 
businesses struggle to compete with the standards of foreign companies (Aide à la 
Décision Economique 1999). In addition, spillovers have been found to have been 
limited to vertical linkages, whereby the technology is absorbed by local clients or 
suppliers and technological benefit is gained only by upstream and downstream 
industries (Javorcik 2004; Stancik 2007). Conversely, horizontal spillover, the spillover 
of technology to domestic competitors within the same industry, has been found to be 
negligible, or, completely non-existent.  
In an analysis of Central and Eastern countries, Kadeřábková (2006) has noted 
that, whilst some notable catch-up did occur during the 1990s, there was a critical 
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weakness regarding the particular method of catch-up. According to her analysis, the 
‘development of technology and skill-intensive industries in these countries has been, 
in fact, mostly based on the qualitatively less demanding segments like assembly 
operations with overall low R&D intensity and a high share of blue-collar workers’ 
(Kadeřábková 2006:145). Statistics (Kadeřábková 2006:153-154) suggest that there was 
at this time a notable discrepancy between the education level of the workforce, in 
which the group with medium formal education prevailed, and the skill level of the 
occupations available, which were predominantly low-skill occupations. This would 
suggest that a significant number of employees were overqualified for the job which 
they were performing and that their skill capability was not being fully utilised. 
Kadeřábková  (2006:145-146) argues that the problem with a catch-up based on low 
skill intensity industries is that it results in a lack of demand for highly skilled workers, 
which in turn reduces the incentive to invest in education and skills development. 
These countries can essentially become locked in a cycle of low skills, low technology 
intensity and weak innovative potential. Although the previously mentioned 
introduction of new technology and machinery has aided a technology catch-up, 
mastering the use of this equipment does not necessarily require a higher level of skill. 
Consequently, skills catch-up, a vital factor for improving innovative capacity, was 
considerably slower than technology catch-up during the transition period.  
Perhaps one of the most detrimental and long-term effects during the transition 
period was caused by the prevalence of corruption and the erosion of trust. Although 
the issue of corruption had deep roots from the communist era, the transition setting 
facilitated corruption due to three factors: ‘(i) the rewriting of an unprecedented 
volume of laws, regulations and policies; (ii) the extraordinary redistribution of wealth 
from the state to the private sector; and (iii) the virtual absence of institutions either 
within or external to the public sector that could effectively check the abuse of public 
office during the transition in many countries’ (Anderson et al. 2000:25). Corruption 
was a major issue which severely affected most Central and Eastern European countries 
during this timeframe as identified in a number of studies (Lízal and Kocenda 2001; 
Wallace & Latcheva 2006). In the Czech Republic, for example, in 1994 the head of the 
Czech privatisation agency was caught taking a bribe equivalent to around US$300,000 
in connection to the sale of a dairy (Holmes 1999). Corruption actually showed little 
improvement during the transition period, in fact it has even been suggested that a 
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decline took place (Jordan 2002). The Social Democrat-led government elected in 1998 
was done so on the basis of an anticorruption platform centring on a ‘Clean Hands’ 
campaign. The credibility of this programme, however, has been questioned as both the 
Social Democrat Party and its main opposition, the Civic Democrat Party, came under 
investigation for use of illegal funds, misuse of economic information and tax evasion 
(Lízal & Kocenda 2001).  
Ongoing issues of corruption at this time did little to improve trust which, as 
already discussed, was an inimical legacy of the communist period. The lack of trust 
observed during the transition period affected both (a) businesses and the public sector 
and (b) universities and businesses. Deterioration in the relationship between the 
former developed as a result of the weak law enforcement which was characteristic of 
the 1990s. ‘During this period, large quantities of privatized property were defrauded, 
often with the tacit consent of the privatizing authorities, to the extent that 
entrepreneurs began to mistrust the motivation for any public intervention’ (Blažek & 
Uhlíř 2007:879). Similar damage was done to the relationship between academics and 
businesses with many academics feeling mistrust towards entrepreneurs and a negative 
attitude toward collaboration with the business sector (Kadlec & Blažek 2015). (The 
issue of trust in the Czech NSI is discussed in more detail below.) 
 With regard to the development of any systematic science and technology or 
innovation policies, during this time period the Czech Republic did not produce any 
overarching innovation strategy or policy. Whilst there are difficulties in ascertaining 
exactly who or what the obstruction may have been, there are some general points 
which would undoubtedly have had an impact. Firstly, the Czech Republic witnessed a 
severe recession and a considerable lack of funds during the transition period. As a 
result, sufficient funding was simply not available for long term policies, such as 
innovation policy, which require either substantial investment projects, generous 
subsidies or both. Much of the attention of the Czech government initially had to be on 
short term policies including managing the growing rate of unemployment. Secondly, in 
some cases ‘a lack of knowledge about up-to-date policy principles and methods also 
poses a significant problem, and hence prevents the introduction of them’ (Havas 
1999:8). The transition was accompanied by huge systemic upheaval and there is 
inevitably a time lag between the introduction of a new system, the actors learning the 
new ‘ways of doing things’ and their understanding of how to adapt these new tools to 
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their specific situation. Thirdly, innovative activity was seen as the responsibility of the 
enterprise sector and the government actively refrained from extensive involvement 
(Rammer et al. 2007:5). Finally, ideological differences did not simply disappear and, in 
some situations, continued to hinder agreement and progress on a new way forward.  
 By the end of the transition period, the Czech research system had evidently 
witnessed a huge transformation. The Academy research institutes were stripped of 
their previously privileged position and university research began to see a revival. A 
new funding system was introduced which rewarded scientific achievements and 
promoted public competition. After privatisation, the industrial research sector was 
substantially reduced and the role of FDI both in terms of economic development and 
technology catch-up became increasingly important. Legacies from the communist 
period, nonetheless, continued to affect the development of the Czech research system 
during this timeframe. Notably, lack of trust continued to play a significant role, the 
negative view of central planning resulted in a reluctance on the part of government to 
play any significant role in the restructuring of the Czech research system and the 
division between the research and industry persisted due to the lack of cooperation 
between the public and private sectors. 
 
Post-accession to the EU 
 During the transition period, the Czech Government had focused its attention 
on the tasks of ensuring economic stability and transitioning to a liberal market 
economy and, as such, innovation had received very little political attention. In fact, 
innovation had primarily been seen as a responsibility of the business sector and, as 
discussed, the government had been cautious about the extent of its involvement. 
Consequently, it was not until 2004, and largely driven by the preparations for EU 
membership, that the Czech Republic produced its first document specifically 
dedicated to the task of promoting the Czech NSI, the ‘National Innovation Strategy of 
the Czech Republic’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2004). This marked a 
significant development as it was a clear attempt to recognise the importance of 
innovation for long-term economic development and to classify innovation as a top 
government priority. Moreover, the Strategy distinctly linked the role of innovation to 
achieving the ultimate goal of ‘the sustainable development of our society’ (Government 
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of the Czech Republic 2004:21). In order to improve the Czech NSI, the Strategy 
identified the need for conceptual and system changes relating to legislature, 
organisation, finance and politics which were seen as necessary to create an 
environment which would be more conducive to innovation.  
In addition to drawing attention to the importance of innovation, the Strategy 
aimed to ‘create conditions and lay the foundations for the formulation of the Czech 
Republic’s innovation policy’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2004:2). Indeed, the 
following year, 2005, the country introduced its first national innovation policy, the 
‘National Innovation Policy of the Czech Republic 2005-2010’ (Government of the 
Czech Republic 2005), which had been coordinated by the then Deputy Prime Minister 
for Research, Development and Human Resources together with the Ministry for 
Education, Youth and Sport (MEYS) and the Ministry for Industry and Trade (MIT). 
The Policy is clearly linked to the EU’s vision of innovation and it cites the use of a 
number of EU documents (Government of the Czech Republic 2005:11-12) in the 
preparation of the Policy. Furthermore, it uses the European Innovation Scoreboard, in 
which the performance of the Czech Republic is directly compared with other EU 
Member States, as a key source for identifying the weaknesses within the Czech NSI.  
Due to ongoing problems within the Czech NSI, in 2008 the Czech Government 
approved the ‘Reform of the Research, Development and Innovation System in the 
Czech Republic’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2008). The vision of this Reform 
was to ‘create an innovative environment through reforming the system of research, 
development and innovation in the Czech Republic in order to be held true that 
‘science makes knowledge from money, innovation makes money from knowledge’’ 
(Government of the Czech Republic 2008:1). There were several factors which had 
contributed to the decision to undertake this Reform, including (a) the low 
contribution of research, development and innovation to both economy and society, (b) 
the failing of the system to support research and innovation (including its inability to 
make use of the opportunities offered by EU funding in this area) and (c) the continued 
atomisation and fragmentation of the Czech research system. The Reform focused on 
reforming the governance of research and innovation and the responsibilities of the 
main players. This resulted in a much more centralised system both in terms of 
governance and funding.  (These new responsibilities are detailed in Table 7). 
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Table 7: Division of responsibilities within the Czech NSI 
 
Council for Research, Development and Innovation (CRDI) – An expert and 
advisory government body for research and innovation policy. 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) – The central administrative 
authority for R&D programmes in the public sector, particularly institutional funding 
for public universities. MEYS coordinates the EU Structural Funds through the 
Operational Programme Research and Development for Innovation and the Operational 
Programme Education for Competitiveness. 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) – Responsible for policies in the domain of 
business R&D and innovation. MIT coordinates the EU Structural Funds through 
Operational Programme Enterprise and Innovation. 
Technology Agency of the Czech Republic (TA CR) – Founded in 2009, TA CR 
provides competitive funding for applied research and experimental development. 
Czech Science Foundation (GA CR) – Provides funding for competitive grants in 
basic research. 
Czech Academy of Sciences ( CAS) – Consists of 54 formally independent public 
research institutes. CAS is a major funding provider and performer within the public 
research sector.  
(Source: Srholec 2013 6:7) 
 
A particularly significant outcome of the Reform was that, since 2010, the 
Council for Research, Development and Innovation (CRDI) has become the sole 
coordinating body within the field and the main government advisory body for 
innovation policy in the Czech Republic. The CRDI is composed of leading experts 
within the field and is headed by a member of government which, at the time of 
conducting the fieldwork for this research, was the Deputy Prime Minister for Science, 
Research and Innovation, Pavel Bělobrádek, who was supported by the Section for 
Science, Research and Innovation at the Office of the Government. In interviews 
(Academic 2, 2016; Government Official 1, 2016; Government Official 5, 2016) it became 
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evident that there is considerable tension between industrialists, businessmen and 
academics within the CRDI as to how the funds should be allocated. In fact, an 
international audit of research, development and innovation in the Czech Republic in 
2011 (Arnold 2011) found the newly expanded role of the CRDI and its extensive 
responsibilities – which include strategy development, monitoring, evaluation and 
decision-making on budget allocations – to have had negative ramifications. The CRDI 
has, in effect, been made into a quasi-Science Ministry but it is neither properly linked 
to the government nor the democratic process and, furthermore, lacks the human 
resources to be able to carry out all of these tasks. In addition, the increased role of the 
CRDI has led to a weakening in the capacities and authority of the Ministries, namely 
MEYS and MIT. The international audit concludes that rather than improve 
coordination within the system, the new role of the CRDI is in fact weakening the 
overall functioning of the governance structure for innovation in the Czech Republic. 
(The current structure of the Czech NSI is shown in Figure 3 below.) 
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Figure 3: Governance structure of innovation in the Czech Republic 
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In terms of the funding for research and innovation, the Czech Republic has 
witnessed a steady increased in the funding of R&D (see Figure 4). This increase in 
R&D expenditure has largely been driven by the availability of EU Structural Funds as 
well as an increase in business expenditure on R&D (both are discussed below). R&D 
expenditure in the higher education sector has increased notably and has even 
overtaken R&D in the government sector. In fact, whilst Academy research has 
remained fairly constant, the research being carried out in higher education has 
increased to such an extent that the universities have now overtaken the Academy in 
terms of the volume of research and publications (Arnold 2011).  Notwithstanding the 
improvements in university research, the historically weak links between public 
research and industry remain a considerable  problem within the Czech NSI (Shrolec & 
Sanchez-Martinez 2017). The reform carried out in 2008 sought to simplify the funding 
system and provide more results-based support in accordance with a ‘Performance 
Based Research Funding’ system. This so-called ‘Evaluation Method’ means that 
institutional funding is reallocated on an annual basis depending on the outputs from 
the previous five years. The Evaluation Method used by the Czech Republic has been 
strongly criticised for being too simplistic, stimulating opportunist behaviour and 
creating unstable funding conditions (Arnold 2011). Attempts have since been made to 
improve the evaluation system by including peer reviews as well as quantitative data. 
The success of this new method, however, is much debated (Shrolec & Sanchez-
Martinez 2017).    
 
Figure 4: Funding of R&D in the Czech Republic by sector of performance      
2004-2017 (%GDP) 
(Source: Eurostat 2018c) 
110 
 
With regard to more recent developments in the Czech Republic, the most 
notable is the introduction of the ‘National Smart Specialisation Strategy of the Czech 
Republic (National RIS3 Strategy)’ in 2016 (Government of the Czech Republic 2016). 
Smart Specialisation, it is claimed, ‘is currently probably the largest innovation 
experiment in the world’ (Radosevic & Stancova 2018:263) and has become a focus of 
the EU in recent years. The development of a ‘Research and Innovation Strategy for 
Smart Specialisation (RIS3)’ is presently a prerequisite to receive funding from the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The EU argues that linking the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy to the provision of funding will help to ensure a more efficient 
use of Structural Funds (European Commission 2014c). For the 2014-2020 period, the 
Czech Republic has been granted a total of €24.2 billion in European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESI) with the largest portion of the funding, €12.16 billion coming 
from the ERDF. It is expected that these funds will assist in boosting research and 
innovation in the Czech Republic and included in its targets are the provision of 3,510 
new full-time research employees and support for 260 enterprises to introduce new 
products to the market (European Commission 2016b). Given that the ERDF 
contributes over half of the total receipts of Structural Funds in the Czech Republic, 
this has presented a considerable incentive for the Czech Republic to produce an RIS3 
Strategy. 
Initiated in 2013 and coordinated by MEYS, the Czech Republic’s initial RIS3 
Strategy was approved by Government in December 2014. According to an academic 
(Academic 2, 2016) with in-depth knowledge of the situation, MEYS had been keen to 
take a lead in the development of the RIS3 Strategy in an attempt to assert its position 
due to ongoing competition between itself and MIT. Whilst MEYS played a key role in 
the development of the RIS3, the management of this Strategy was then transferred to 
the Section for Science, Research and Innovation at the Office of the Government from 
the beginning of January 2015. The initial RIS3 Strategy was assessed as not eligible by 
the European Commission which ‘applied complaints to the National RIS3 Strategy 
mostly in relation to the monitoring of objectives, interconnection of public budgets 
and the institutional arrangements’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2015:35). An 
updated National RIS3 Strategy was submitted to and accepted by the EU in 2016.  
In short, the period since EU accession has been one of significant change in 
terms of innovation policy and governance structure in the Czech Republic. With 
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regard to the former, preparing for EU membership prompted the Czech Republic to 
produce, firstly, a national innovation strategy and, subsequently, a national innovation 
policy.  The Reform in 2008 replaced the previously highly decentralised governance 
system with one which was much more centralised and with a significant amount of 
power in the hands of the CRDI. The channels of research funding, which had 
previously been delivered through numerous funding bodies, were also simplified with 
MEYS, MIT, CAS, GA CR and the newly established TA CR assuming responsibility 
for the distribution of funding. University research has continued to increase as has 
business R&D, thanks in a large part to the increase in R&D funding from foreign 
companies. In fact, as will be highlighted in the following section, it is the influx of FDI 
that has had one of the most significant recent effects on the development on the Czech 
NSI. 
  
The role of FDI 
The previous section highlighted the important role played by FDI in the 
development of the Czech economy since the transition period. According to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 2018), inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP in the Czech 
Republic increased from just 12.3% of GDP in 1995 to 78.3% in 2017. As can be seen in 
Figure 5, FDI has fluctuated slightly during the timeframe since EU accession and a 
decrease in FDI after the financial and economic crises of 2007-2008 can be observed. It 
is, however, not possible to ascertain from these data whether the crises were the direct 
cause of the decrease in investment from foreign companies. Interview participants 
(Government Official 4, 2016; Government Official 5, 2016; Investment Specialist 2016; 
Research Institute Specialist 3b, 2016) repeatedly claimed that the crises hit the Czech 
Republic later than in Western European countries and had a much less substantial 
impact. Nonetheless, a thorough investigation would be required to examine this 
matter further. 
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Figure 5: Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the Czech Republic         
2004-2018 (Million US$) 
 
(Source: OECD 2019) 
 
Drawn by the presence of skilled labour, inexpensive labour costs and its 
geographical advantage of being located at the heart of Central Europe, the Czech 
Republic has become an attractive choice for foreign investors. In fact, it has even been 
claimed (KPMG 2017) that the Czech Republic clearly stands out as the regional 
champion in terms of inflow of FDI. Although FDI initially comprised of mainly 
assembly-based work, especially in the automotive and electronics industry, the MNEs 
have over time diversified to include other sectors such as information technology, 
software development and shared-service centres (Guimon 2013:2). For example, a 
report by the Association of Business Services in the Czech Republic (ABSL) claims 
that the shared-services sector witnessed an impressive 16% increase in employment 
growth in 2016 and that the Czech Republic now ‘has one of the highest density of 
business service centres in the world’ (ABSL 2017:9). According to the study conducted 
by ABSL (ABSL 2017:9), although the prevalence of home-grown service centres is 
rapidly increasing, 79% of the shared service centres are currently still foreign owned. 
In interviews (Government Official 1 2016; Investment Specialist 2016), a key 
factor identified as enabling the Czech Republic to attract some of these more 
sophisticated investors was its accession to the EU, as complying with EU laws and 
regulations provided investors with more confidence about the security of their 
investment. This was described as a ‘breakthrough point’ as it was at this time that 
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innovation policy became more visible which, coupled with a greater focus on 
intensifying the investments in more knowledge intensive activities, presented the 
Czech Republic as an attractive location for conducting more complex activities, 
including those relating to R&D. Although interview participants (Government 
Official 4 2016; Government Official 5 2016; Investment Specialist 2016; Research 
Institute Specialist 3b 2016) claimed that the financial and economic crises had a 
slightly later and much lesser impact in the Czech Republic than in other Western 
European countries, it was noted that companies, both national and foreign-owned, do 
appear to be investing more in R&D since the crises. The data in Table 8 would appear 
to support this observation as by 2015 both private national enterprises and private 
foreign-controlled enterprises were investing sizeably more in R&D than they had 
prior to the crises.   
 There are two points which are especially striking about the data in Table 8. 
Firstly, the increase in Business Expenditure on R&D in the Czech Republic from 
private foreign-controlled enterprises has been particularly substantial. Although, in 
2005, private national companies and private foreign-controlled companies were 
spending a similar amount on R&D, a sizeable gap has now developed with foreign-
controlled companies in 2015 spending significantly more than their national 
counterparts. This would suggest that the role of MNEs, and the dependence of the 
Czech NSI on their contribution towards R&D expenditure, has become considerably 
greater. The gradual increase in R&D spending by foreign companies could be 
accounted for by the introduction of an R&D tax allowance in 2005. In fact, between 
2005 and 2016 the share of tax incentives in total government support more than 
doubled, from 20% in 2005 to 44% in 2016 (OECD 2019b). The second noticeable 
observation is that Business Expenditure on R&D in public enterprises has actually 
significantly decreased with a fall from 12% in 2005 to just 4% in 2015. What this could 
suggest is that rather than witnessing an improvement in public and private 
collaboration, the Czech Republic has actually witnessed a decline in this area. In fact, 
these data indicate that fragmentation within the Czech NSI, a legacy of the communist 
period in which the public and private sectors were strongly separated, is potentially 
becoming more exacerbated. Further analysis (below) provides some possible 
explanations for this observation. 
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Table 8: Business Expenditure on R&D in the Czech Republic 2005-2015         
(CZK Million) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Business 
Enterprise 
(Total) 
22,186 25,375 28,831 28,728 28,126 30,013 
Public 
Enterprises 
(% of total) 
2,673 
(12%) 
2,305 
(9%) 
2,975 
(10%) 
2,267 
(8%) 
2,121 
(8%) 
2,092 
(7%) 
Private 
National 
Enterprises 
(% of total) 
9,559 
(43%) 
10,352 
(41%) 
11,170 
(39%) 
9,789 
(34%) 
10,139 
(36%) 
12,931 
(43%) 
Private 
Foreign-
Controlled 
Enterprises 
(% of total) 
9,954 
(45%) 
12,719 
(50%) 
14,686 
(51%) 
16,673 
(58%) 
15,865 
(56%) 
14,989 
(50%) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
34,148 38,228 41,513 46,981 48,148 48,980 56,810 
1,969 
(6%) 
1,767 
(5%) 
1,927 
(5%) 
2,095 
(5%) 
2,114 
(4%) 
1,900 
(4%) 
2,448 
(4%) 
14,389 
(42%) 
16,129 
(42%) 
16,519 
(40%) 
18,055 
(38%) 
17,326 
(36%) 
15,674 
(32%) 
17,495 
(31%) 
17,790 
(52%) 
20,331 
(53%) 
23,067 
(55%) 
26,831 
(57%) 
28,707 
(60%) 
31,406 
(64%) 
36,867 
(65%) 
(Source: Czech Statistical Office 2018) 
 
It has been argued (Blažek & Uhlíř 2007) that the gradual change in the nature 
of investors in the Czech Republic had a significant impact on the overall design of 
Czech development policy. In order to attract, and then retain, FDI in more advanced 
technological fields, it was necessary for the Czech Republic to take measures to ensure 
that local companies could meet the supply needs of these MNEs. In other words, ‘the 
arrival of more sophisticated investors shifted the support requirements away from ‘the 
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traditional “hard” instruments such as provision of infrastructure in industrial zones to 
“soft” measures such as development of local subcontracting networks, development of 
clusters and thematic networks, support for collaborative links with universities and 
research centres, as well as support for local start-ups and innovative companies 
through business incubators’ (Blažek & Uhlíř 2007:877). These, so-called, ‘soft 
measures’ are consistent with some of the elements required for a successful NSI 
(discussed in Chapter 2) and represent a more innovation-driven approach towards 
policy-making.  
The investment and business development agency, CzechInvest, has played a 
key role in not only attracting FDI but also subsequently supporting the needs of the 
investors. For example, using funding from the EU, CzechInvest has since 2000 been 
running a ‘Supplier Development Programme’ which aims ‘to improve the ability of 
Czech suppliers to compete, to secure good local sources for current investors 
operating on the domestic market and to increase the attractiveness of the Czech 
Republic for new investors’ (CzechInvest 2009:4). In order to achieve this, the 
Programme undertook several steps including, firstly, compiling a database of Czech 
manufacturers which was made available to foreign investors. Starting initially with the 
electronics industry, it has since been expanded and now includes automotive, 
aerospace, electronics and electrical engineering, information and communication 
technology (ICT), healthcare and pharmaceuticals. Secondly, after identifying key 
suppliers, the Programme sought to promote linkages between MNEs and local firms 
by providing Czech companies with technical assistance and training support. This 
allowed the Czech companies to gain the information and skills which are necessary in 
order for them to meet the needs of the MNEs. By improving the standard of domestic 
suppliers and encouraging collaborative relationships between the domestic companies 
and MNEs, this, in turn, allowed the Czech Republic to not only attract FDI but also to 
retain it in the country (Guimon 2013:3-4). 
In terms of, for example, the ICT sector, many major IT companies have now set 
up offices in the Czech Republic including, Microsoft, Skype, NetSuite, SAP, Tieto, 
SolarWinds, Red Hat and IBM. These companies are not just manufacturing in the 
Czech Republic but are also carrying out some R&D. IBM, for example, was carrying 
out research on speech recognition technology from as early as the 1990s. Red Hat, a 
leading software company, set up an office in Brno, South Moravia in 2006 which has 
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gradually expanded and now represents one of the company’s main development 
centres. With regard to other industries, in the aerospace industry, GE Aviation has 
expanded its domestic R&D activities and is expected to increase its Czech 
engineering team to over 500 employees. Its Czech activities now cover areas in 
material engineering, strength testing and reliability engineering and in 2017 it 
conducted tests on a new state-of-the art engine as part of the fulfilment of an 
investment contract the company had earlier concluded with the Czech government 
(CzechInvest 2018). Also in 2017, the technology and engineering company Siemens 
announced that that it planned to significantly expand its R&D activities in the Czech 
Republic with the creation of a new development centre for electric motors and 
generators in Ostrava, Moravia-Silesia. 
Whilst these examples do show some positive developments with regard to 
foreign-controlled companies investing more in R&D in the Czech Republic, there are 
two important points related to FDI which require highlighting. Firstly, expert 
interviews (Government Official 5 2016; Investment Specialist 2016; Research Institute 
Specialist 3b 2016) and supplementary evidence (Arnold 2011; Shrolec & Sanchez-
Martinez 2017) suggest that, despite the fact that the amount foreign-controlled 
companies are investing in R&D is gradually increasing, the Czech Republic currently 
still remains largely dependent on assembly-based FDI. Although the Czech Republic 
has a high-share of the workforce employed in medium and high-tech manufacturing 
industries, especially the automotive and chemical industries, government documents 
repeatedly note that the Czech Republic hosts the low-value end of these industries 
which carry out little R&D (Government of the Czech Republic 2016a; Government of 
the Czech Republic 2016b). In fact, in terms of Business Expenditure on R&D as a 
whole, at 1.05% of GDP in 2015 the Czech Republic is still considerably behind the EU 
average of 1.31% of GDP and much further behind some of the top innovation 
performers such as Sweden (2.28%) and Germany (2%) (Eurostat 2018a).  
 The second point relates to where this R&D expenditure is being spent both in 
terms of the type of company and the stage of the value chain. In terms of the former, a 
higher proportion of the R&D performed by businesses in the Czech Republic is being 
carried out in small and medium sized enterprises, rather than large enterprises, than is 
typically observed in countries with a strong innovation performance. In 2015, only 
55.5% of Business Expenditure on R&D was accounted for by large companies with 
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more than 500 employees (Eurostat 2018b). It is suggested (Arnold 2011:10) that this 
figure for heavily industrialised, innovation-driven countries is between 70% and 84%. 
The percentage for the Czech Republic is clearly significantly lower than this, 
highlighting a stark contrast between itself and the more industrialised countries 
which are strongly driven by innovation. Concerning the stage of the value chain at 
which foreign-controlled companies are investing in R&D, it has been noted that 
although ‘foreign multinationals do increasingly perform R&D in the Czech Republic, 
this tends to relate to the late stages of value chains, so the locally performed R&D 
tends more towards experimental development than research’ (Arnold 2011:10). This 
finding is also supported in a recent Research and Innovation Observatory report 
(Shrolec & Sanchez-Martinez 2017). In other words, whilst, at first glance the increase 
in Business Expenditure on R&D from foreign-controlled companies seems a positive 
development, deeper analysis suggests that the situation in the Czech Republic is more 
complex and that some areas of concern remain.  
With regard to the impact of FDI on the Czech NSI, therefore, a nuanced 
picture is beginning to emerge. The direct impact of the steady increase in R&D 
spending by foreign-controlled enterprises on the research capacity and innovation 
performance of Czech NSI remains uncertain. Neither has this trend yet reversed the 
dominance of lower value added assembly-based manufacturing. Although interview 
participants (Government Official 5 2016; Investment Specialist 2016; Research 
Institute Specialist 3b 2016) expressed confidence that the Czech Republic is beginning 
to establish itself as a good location for more complex forms of R&D, at present there 
are insufficient data to support this assertion. Perhaps the most significant influences of 
these MNEs on the Czech NSI have been (1) changing the forms of support away from 
hard measures towards soft measures (as discussed above), (2) facilitating the 
integration of the Czech Republic into international networks, (3) encouraging the 
development of local suppliers, especially through the schemes such as those provided 
by CzechInvest and (4) engaging in various forms of education and training. With 
regard to the latter, in 2000, for example, Škoda founded the first company university in 
the Czech Republic, The Škoda Auto University. In addition to a variety of Bachelor 
and Masters Degrees as well as an MBA qualification (with plans to attain 
accreditation for Doctoral Degrees in the future), the University also has also 
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demonstrated a strong research capacity. For example, according to its database, the 
University produced 445 publications in 2017 (Škoda Auto University 2018). 
Whilst these observations would suggest that, overall, the presence of MNEs 
has had a positive effect on the Czech NSI, there have also been some negative 
consequences, particularly for local firms. According to a World Bank Survey, 29% of 
local firms reported losing market share as a result of FDI inflow and around 6-10% 
claimed to have lost employees to multinationals (Javorcik & Kaminski 2008). 
(Competition for labour was a concern frequently highlighted during interviews for 
this research and is discussed in more detail below). Nonetheless, it is argued that these 
problems have been ‘less acute than the direct and indirect positive effects of inward 
FDI, as evidenced by the country’s fast pace of industrial upgrading and economic 
growth’ (Guimon 2013:6). It is clear from the discussion in this chapter so far that since 
EU accession, FDI has continued to play an ever greater role in the Czech NSI and that 
MNEs have now become dominant actors within the Czech system. Together with the 
increase in government attention being afforded to innovation (as discussed 
previously), this has been a period of considerable change for the Czech NSI. Whether 
this development has led to any significant improvement in the Czech Republic’s 
overall innovation performance will be considered in the following section.   
 
Innovation performance of the Czech Republic 
In spite of the ongoing problems within the Czech NSI, the Czech Government 
has continued to produce a number of ambitious innovation-related targets. For 
example, the ‘Back to the Top: Strategy for International Competitiveness (2012-2020)’ 
(Government of the Czech Republic 2012a), aims to place the Czech Republic among 
the world’s elite top 20 most competitive nations by 2020. It includes ‘more than forty 
key measures and several hundred sub-measures that should create friendly conditions 
for creative business, innovation, and growth’ (Government of the Czech Republic 
2012:4). The Minister of Industry and Trade at the time, Martin Koucerek, claimed that 
the Strategy marked a turning point for the Czech Republic as it offered concrete 
objectives and an implementation plan as opposed to simply identifying weaknesses 
and problems which, he argues, has been the tendency in previous strategies (Vlček 
2011). Whilst, on the one hand, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 
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(World Economic Forum 2012; World Economic Forum 2017) the Czech Republic has 
shown signs of improvement and has increased its overall ranking from 39th in 2012 to 
31st in 2017, this, on the other hand, is still lower than its ranking in 2006 in which it 
was placed 29th (World Economic Forum 2006).  
Nonetheless, whilst the recent improvement in the Czech Republic’s ranking 
may suggest that some progress has taken place, improving the innovation environment 
in the Czech Republic is facing various challenges and frustration with the slow speed 
of progress was repeatedly expressed in expert interviews conducted during the course 
this research (Academic 2 2016; Business Leader 2 2016; Government Official 1 2016; 
Government Official 2 2016). According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), 
the Czech Republic has for some time been classified as a Moderate Innovator, a term 
which is used to define countries whose performance is between 50% and 90% of the 
EU average. However, although the Czech Republic’s ranking has improved (see Table 
9), its summary index score has actually steadily decreased which contrasts with an 
overall increase for the EU 28. In fact, according to the 2017 Scoreboard (European 
Commission 2017a), the Czech Republic’s performance has declined by 3.5% relative to 
that of the EU average in 2010.  
 
Table 9: The Czech Republic’s overall innovation ranking in the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) 2007-2017 
Year Ranking 
2017 13th (Moderate Innovator) 
2016 16th (Moderate Innovator) 
2015 14th (Moderate Innovator) 
2014 16th (Moderate Innovator) 
2013 18th (Moderate Innovator) 
2011 17th (Moderate Innovator) 
2010 17th (Moderate Innovator) 
2009 15th (Moderate Innovator) 
2008 15th (Moderate Innovator) 
2007 Moderate Innovator 
(Source: European Commission 2007-European Commission 2017a) 
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 Based on the dimensions of the Scoreboard (European Commission 2017a:44), 
areas in which the Czech Republic shows relative strengths are in ‘Firm investments’, 
‘Employment impacts’ and ‘Sales impacts’. The dimensions in which the Czech 
Republic is notably weak are ‘Intellectual assets’, ‘Linkages’ and ‘Innovators’. Areas in 
which the Czech Republic has shown significant improvement, and has either reached 
the EU average or is moving closer, are ‘Human resources’ (especially the number of 
people with a tertiary degree), ‘Attractive research systems’ (owing to a significant 
increase in international co-publications) and an ‘Innovation-friendly environment’. On 
the other hand, the Czech Republic has witnessed a very significant decrease in its 
score for ‘Finance and support’ (due to a sizeable decrease in venture capital 
expenditures) and also in the ‘Innovators’ dimension (owing to a decrease in the 
number of SMEs producing innovations). In other words, although some areas of 
improvement can be observed, there are still many areas in which the Czech Republic 
continues to lag significantly behind the EU and even some in which the Czech 
Republic has witnessed a clear decrease in its performance.    
The data from the Scoreboards suggest that in spite of the presence of MNEs, 
greater investment in R&D from foreign-controlled companies and national companies, 
as well as government attempts to support and develop the Czech NSI through ongoing 
policy measures, this has not yet resulted in a significant improvement in the Czech 
Republic’s innovation performance. In fact, in comparison with other EU countries, the 
Czech Republic’s performance has actually declined in recent years. Not only is the 
current trajectory concerning for the Czech Republic but it also weakens the ability of 
the EU to reach its goal of becoming the most competitive knowledge-based economy 
in the world. The following section looks at the steps the EU has taken to try and 
influence the development of the Czech NSI and identifies a number of mediating 
factors which are preventing the process of Europeanisation. 
 
5.2) The Europeanisation of the Czech NSI 
With regard to the EU, exactly how significant the EU’s influence has been in 
terms of its longevity, depth and how positive it has been is highly debated (Suurna & 
Kattel 2010). Interviews with various actors within the Czech NSI and additional data 
gathered for this study suggest that there are a number of embedded national 
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characteristics for which the EU’s innovation policy and directives are a poor fit and 
which are preventing the EU from being able to influence the Czech NSI more 
significantly. As a result, this is limiting the EU’s ability to assist the Czech Republic in 
producing a greater improvement in its innovation performance. The following sections 
look firstly at how the EU has tried to influence the Czech NSI and the outcomes that 
can be observed. The final section identifies a number of national specificities which 
have resulted from the Czech Republic’s historical legacies and its development 
strategy. This section looks at how these national specificities are mediating the 
process of Europeanisation and impeding the Czech Republic from achieving the EU’s 
ambitious innovation-related goals. The results indicate that in order for the EU to 
increase its impact, greater attention needs to be paid towards the role of historical and 
developmental legacies. 
 
The EU’s Innovation Policy and the Czech NSI 
 Chapter 4 traced the development of the EU’s involvement in the Czech 
Republic from the beginning of its transition period and drew particular attention to 
the use of conditionality in order to encourage Europeanisation. After the Czech 
Republic officially became an EU Member State, the introduction of the Structural 
Funds represented an important tool with which the EU could assert its influence. 
With regard to innovation, Suurna and Kattel (2010) claim that the Structural Funds 
had a considerable impact on innovation policy in many Central and Eastern European 
countries in terms of both content and implementation. They suggest that three 
similarities in the innovation policies of all Central and Eastern European countries can 
be identified. Firstly, these policies were formulated to a great extent as a result of EU 
pressure, secondly, innovation policy plans were often short term and, thirdly, the 
policy mix strongly reflected the priorities and objectives as defined in the EU 
programmes for R&D and innovation. This latter point is particularly significant as it 
resulted in a tendency in many of the emerging innovation policies to focus on high-
technology sectors, the commercialisation of university research and the introduction 
of technology parks to promote start-ups. These, and other similar initiatives 
encouraged by the EU, had the effect of promoting a ‘linear model’ of innovation by 
emphasising the science and technology component of the innovation environment.  
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Preparing for EU membership, and the need to comply with the EU’s heavily 
innovation-driven Lisbon agenda, was fundamental in raising political awareness about 
the importance of innovation for economic growth. As noted in the National Innovation 
Strategy of the Czech Republic in 2004, at this point it became clear that ‘[t]he Czech 
Republic will not be able to avoid handling issues of innovation, especially in 
connection with its accession to the EU’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2004:2). 
The EU’s vision for innovation features in every innovation policy document drafted 
since EU accession. For example, the ‘National Research, Development and Innovation 
Policy of the Czech Republic 2009-2015’ attempted to reflect ‘European documents 
setting out the EU’s current orientation and strategy for RDI [Research, Development 
and Innovation] and the building of a knowledge society’ (Government of the Czech 
Republic 2009:7). Included in the EU documents guiding this Policy is the revised 
Lisbon Strategy entitled ‘Working together for growth and jobs: A new start for the 
Lisbon Strategy’ (European Commission 2005). This EU communication, however, is a 
very vague document in which grand ideas and ambitious targets are stated without 
any clear advice as to how they can be achieved. Indeed, the extent to which it offers 
the Czech Republic, a country which at this point had minimal experience with 
devising innovation policies, any practical and implementable guidance is highly 
questionable.  
Regarding the influence of the EU, therefore, a mixed picture is beginning to 
emerge. Accession to the EU can clearly be seen to have an impact in three respects. 
Firstly, as noted by Blažek & Uhlíř (2000), pressure to comply with the aims of the 
EU’s innovation agenda drew attention to the importance of innovation, and an 
accompanying long-term strategy, and returned the topic of innovation to the forefront 
of political discussion, where it had for some time been absent. Indeed, it was only on 
acceding to the EU that the Czech Republic began to concentrate more governmental 
effort towards the task of promoting innovation as a source of economic growth. This 
can be seen by the introduction of the Czech Republic’s first national innovation 
strategy in 2004 (Government of the Czech Republic 2004) and subsequent policy in 
2005 (Government of the Czech Republic 2005), as well as the ongoing commitment to 
innovation policy since then (Government of the Czech Republic 2009a; Government 
of the Czech Republic 2016b; Government of the Czech Republic 2016a). 
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Secondly, in terms of the organisation of the Czech NSI, Radosevic & Lepori 
(2009) claim that Europeanisation had an impact on R&D systems of Central and 
Eastern European countries in a number of ways. With regard to the decision-making 
system, for example, Radosevic and Lepori suggest that Europeanisation in Central and 
Eastern Europe has been characterised by a decentralisation of the decision-making 
system. Whilst this was initially accurate for the Czech Republic, the reform in 2008 
did represent an attempt to reverse this trend and to recentralise the decision-making 
process albeit, as discussed below, with questionable results. Another characteristic of 
the Europeanisation of R&D systems, as claimed by Radosevic and Lepori, was that the 
management of R&D was externalised into agencies. This process had already begun to 
take place in the Czech Republic at the beginning of the transition period with the 
establishment of GA CR in 1992 and continued post-EU accession with the 
establishment of TA CR in 2009. Additionally, this was accompanied by a move 
towards an increase in competition-based funding and a reduction in the previously 
dominant institutional funding. This has certainly been the case for the Czech Republic 
which, following the 2008 Reform saw an increase in the share of project funding from 
44% in 2009 to 51% in 2014 (Shrolec & Sanchez-Martinez 2017:7). Following 
Radosevic and Lepori’s argument, therefore, the Europeanisation has indeed played a 
role in influencing the reorganisation of management and funding within the Czech 
NSI.  
The third influence of EU accession on the Czech NSI was in helping to increase 
the attractiveness of the Czech Republic as a location for foreign investors. In the 5 
years after EU accession, the Czech Republic witnessed a 42% rise in FDI, from 
US$27,543 million in 1999-2003 to US$38,989 million in 2004-2008 (OECD 2013). 
Whilst the Czech Republic was already an attractive location for foreign investment 
due to its location, quality labour force and labour costs, EU Membership, as noted by 
an investment specialist with expert knowledge of FDI (Investment Specialist 2016), 
helped to market the Czech Republic as a more secure location for investment. In 
instances where investors have been satisfied with the output of their investment, this 
has, to a certain extent, aided the Czech Republic in attracting more sophisticated 
forms of FDI, and not just the assembly-based FDI which was initially heavily 
dominant (Kadeřábková 2006). In turn, this led the Czech Republic to redirect its 
policy and support towards measures which would improve the local supply network, 
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such as the previously discussed efforts of CzechInvest, in order to accommodate the 
requirements of these new investors. In effect, therefore, it could be suggested that, in 
addition to the direct influence of EU accession on policy awareness and system 
reconfiguration, the EU also had an indirect influence (via the MNEs) on policy design 
in the Czech Republic. 
However, in terms of the ongoing influence of the EU, this research suggests 
that this experience has been much less significant. Although the policy documents 
produced by the Czech Republic supposedly reflect the EU’s priorities for innovation, 
the innovation performance data from Section 5.1 do not suggest that this had led to a 
measurable improvement in the Czech Republic’s innovation capacity. This raises an 
interesting paradox in which, on the one hand, the Czech Republic appears to be 
following the EU’s vision for a successful innovation performer yet, on the other hand, 
this is failing to produce the desired results. This research suggests that the EU’s 
inability to exert more notable influence is principally due to a poor fit between the 
EU’s innovation policy and goals and the Czech national institutions, both formal and 
informal. The historical overview of the Czech NSI has identified a number of specific 
features embedded in the Czech NSI, which have created path dependent responses. 
What this research indicates is that these legacies – which relate to the Czech 
Republic’s history and economic development stage – are mediating the process of 
Europeanisation and preventing the Czech Republic from closer convergence with the 
EU’s innovation goals. The principal legacies which have come to light during the 
course of the research relate to a reliance on FDI for economic development, lack of 
policy coordination, lack of trust, lack of entrepreneurialism and division between the 
university and private sector. This is not to suggest that this is an exhaustive list of the 
historical legacies affecting the Czech NSI, indeed future research may be able to 
elaborate further.  
   
Area of misfit 1: Dependency on foreign companies 
 The Czech Republic, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been characterised as a 
Dependent Market Economy (DME) due to the high importance of foreign capital to 
the country’s economic structure and development. In fact, according to an OECD 
report published in 2017 (OECD 2017a), inward investment in the Czech Republic 
125 
 
supported over one quarter of all private sector jobs and, moreover, it accounted for 
42% of the private sector’s value added. In terms of the Czech NSI, a similar picture of 
dependency is beginning to emerge. The expenditure of foreign-controlled companies 
on R&D has increased considerably and, in 2015, foreign companies contributed 60% of 
the total Business Expenditure on R&D (Czech Statistical Office 2018). In spite of the 
fact that, as previously discussed, there are signs this investment is being made at the 
later stages of the value chain and therefore its contribution is more experimental than 
research-based, MNEs have clearly become instrumental players in the Czech NSI. In 
other words, from a historical institutionalist viewpoint, it can be seen that a new path 
dependency, the dependence on foreign investors, has developed. In fact, the 
dependency on FDI can itself be traced back to communist legacies as economic 
weakness, particularly in the private sector, and inefficiencies were exposed during the 
transition period. The inherited weak private sector, together with the lack of public 
funds, necessitated the reliance on FDI for economic development and job creation. 
From the perspective of the Czech Republic, there are several potential 
weaknesses associated with its dependency on foreign investors. Firstly, there is the 
possibility that the companies may, at some point, choose to move their operations 
elsewhere, especially to a location with lower wage costs. Whilst the average cost of 
labour in the Czech Republic remains lower than in Western European countries, 
Czech labour cost has steadily been increasing.  In fact, between 2005 and 2017, the 
average annual wage in the Czech Republic rose by 24% from €20,415 to €25,372 
(OECD 2018a). Given that a considerable part of the Czech Republic’s current 
competitive advantage is based on low labour costs, this could potentially come under 
threat from countries further eastward where the labour cost remains, by comparison, 
significantly lower. Indeed, whilst none of the companies interviewed for this research 
were planning to do this, the director of one company (Business Leader 1 2016) did 
discuss having been encouraged to outsource to countries such as Romania and 
Moldova where they would be able to benefit from lower labour costs. As the majority 
of Business Expenditure on R&D is invested by foreign-controlled enterprises, any 
such decision to relocate their activities and investment could have very negative 
consequences for the Czech NSI. 
  The second point relating to the Czech dependency on foreign companies 
concerns its impact on the development of the NSI. A government official (Government 
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Official 4 2016) with expertise in the field of innovation noted that MNEs have become 
so powerful that it is difficult for the government to influence their activities in order to 
better integrate them into the Czech NSI. It has been argued (Radosevic & Stankova 
2018) that because FDI has often been directed to areas which are unrelated to 
domestic innovation capacities, this is resulting in a structurally weak innovation 
environment. In fact, what appears to have happened in the Czech Republic is that a 
dual innovation system has developed consisting of, on the one hand, FDI-centred 
innovation and, on the other, R&D-based innovation. What makes these systems 
distinct is that ‘FDI-oriented innovation systems are largely downstream or production 
oriented, while R&D-based clusters of new technology-based firms are upstream-
oriented providers of knowledge-intensive services for local firms’ (Radosevic & 
Stankova 2018:266). As a result of the poor integration between the systems, this 
dualistic pattern is leading to a key structural weakness within the Czech NSI. 
Finally, due to the fact that FDI has principally been in low positions of the 
value chain using less-skilled labour, in some cases there has, as a result, been a 
‘deskilling of the workforce due to the predominant use of less-skilled workers for 
routine tasks with minimal knowledge requirements’ (Government of the Czech 
Republic 2016a:17). Indeed, according to an OECD survey (OECD 2018c), by far the 
majority of jobs in 2012 required only low or medium qualifications, 16.3% and 59.8% 
respectively, with just 21.5% of jobs requiring a high qualification. A highly-skilled 
workforce, however, is an essential component of a successful NSI so the Czech 
Republic’s current trajectory, which has resulted from its dependency on FDI, is an area 
of notable concern. In summary, although the influx of FDI has played an important 
role in developing the Czech economy, it has also created a situation in which (a) the 
Czech Republic is vulnerable due to its dependency on FDI, (b) the existence of a dual 
innovation system is weakening the innovation environment and (c) the country lacks 
the high-skilled jobs which are necessary for developing the Czech NSI, improving its 
innovation performance and ensuring long-term economic growth.     
This path dependency, the dependence of the Czech NSI on foreign firms, has 
created a very specific economic structure in the Czech Republic and one which, in 
terms of innovation policy, requires a policy approach that addresses the resulting 
challenges. This issue, however, is not emphasised in the EU’s innovation policy which 
raises questions about its appropriateness of fit for a DME, such as the Czech Republic. 
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For example, a recent study of the EU’s latest policy approach the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy, by Radosevic & Stankova (2018) identified a number of weaknesses specific 
to countries with a similar economic structure to the Czech Republic. Their study 
notes that Central and Eastern European Member States require endogenous 
knowledge and technology building to be coupled with international knowledge and 
production networks. ‘Yet, internationalisation does not seem to be a crucial 
component in the design and development of Research and Innovation Strategies for 
Smart Specialisation (RIS3), which are at odds with the strong dependence of the EU 
New Member States (EU-13) on FDI and global value chains’ (Radosevic & Stankova 
2018:263). Even though the EU guidelines for Smart Specialisation Strategies 
(European Commission 2012) do include an internationalisation element, this focuses 
mainly around upstream activities, mainly R&D activities, rather than downstream 
activities related to global value chains. Nonetheless, the core part of the Czech 
Republic’s technology upgrading is the transition from production to technology 
capability rather than innovation activities related to R&D (Radosevic & Stankova 
2018). 
 Radosevic & Stankova (2018) argue that although the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy approach offers many opportunities, in order for it to produce the desired 
outcomes in countries with a high FDI dependency, there needs to be greater emphasis 
on internationalisation in terms of learning from MNEs and using this knowledge to 
leverage local capabilities. As a DME with a weak institutional set-up, integrating FDI 
to produce positive long-term outcomes is a considerable challenge for the Czech NSI 
at present and one which requires strong policy action. The EU’s Smart Specialisation 
Strategy approach, in its current format, fails to sufficiently recognise or accommodate 
one of the main characteristics of the Czech political economic structure, namely its 
dependence on FDI. Whilst the EU’s Smart Specialisation Strategy approach may be 
very effective in countries with more developed innovation systems and different 
politico-economic structures, such as the German-style Coordinated Market Economy 
(CME), experts interviewed throughout the course of this research (Academic 2 2016; 
Government Official 1 2016; Research Institute Specialist 1 2016; Research Institute 
Specialist 3a 2016) argued that it does not currently respond to the specific needs of a 
DME, such as the Czech Republic.  
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Area of misfit 2: Public management of NSI 
Path dependent historical legacies have had a significant effect on the capacity 
of the state to manage and develop the Czech NSI, a problem which relates to (a) the 
management and funding of the Czech NSI and (b) policy-making expertise. With 
regard to the former, having inherited a highly centralised and compartmentalised 
governance system from the communist period, the Czech Government was reluctant 
to play a significant role during the post-Soviet transition period and instead the Czech 
research system underwent a strong decentralisation process. The absence of an 
overseeing body has, since then, led to issues of fragmentation in the state 
administration of research and innovation, as has been noted by external actors and 
foreign evaluators (Arnold 2011; OECD 2016c) and has even been recognised in recent 
Czech policy documents (Government of the Czech Republic 2016b). Despite attempts 
to recentralise, to a certain extent, the governance structure during the 2008 Reform, 
problems relating to innovation governance in the Czech Republic remain a major 
concern and one which was frequently highlighted during interviews (Government 
Official 1 2016; Government Official 2 2016; Policy Analyst 2016; Research Institute 
Specialist 3b 2016). In fact, the 2017 RIO Report (Shrolec & Sanchez-Martinez 2017) 
claimed that fragmentation and lack of coordination, was one of the main challenges for 
Czech innovation policy-making.  
Although, due to the way in which innovation overlaps various policy areas, it is 
not unusual for several ministries to be involved in overseeing innovation-related 
policies, the issue of fragmentation does nonetheless seem to be particularly 
problematic in the Czech Republic. A concise explanation of the problem is that: 
‘[t]he system of management and financing of research, development and 
innovation is fragmented, insufficiently strategy-driven and its coordination 
mechanisms are missing or function poorly, which hampers effective 
cooperation between individual members of the system’ (Government of the 
Czech Republic 2016b:5).  
This report links the issue of fragmentation to the unclear definition of the powers of 
individual administrative authorities and a tendency towards departmentalism. The 
situation is compounded by a lack of ministerial cooperation or collaboration due to 
considerable tension and competition between the ministries. In the words of an 
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interview participant with in-depth knowledge of the situation, ‘the system is very 
fragmented in the sense that everyone is in competition with everybody else’ (Academic 
2 2016). The lack of inter-ministerial cooperation in the Czech Republic was even 
emphasised in a report on sustainable governance in 2017 (Guasti et al. 2017). 
Interviews (Government Official 1 2016; Academic 2 2016) suggest that there are several 
personality clashes and that a toxic environment is being created which is not 
conducive to enabling cooperation between actors within the Czech NSI.    
At the time of conducting the field work for this research, the Section of the 
Deputy Prime Minister for Science, Research and Innovation was considered the main 
overseeing body for innovation policy in the Czech Republic but MEYS and MIT also 
were also playing key roles. However, interviews (Academic 1 2016; Government 
Official 1 2016; Research Institute Specialist 3a 2016) suggested that it was not entirely 
clear who, in practice, was responsible and for which tasks. Prior to the introduction of 
the Section of the Deputy Prime Minister for Science, Research and Innovation, the 
main actors were MEYS and MIT, and MIT, in fact, still manages the Operation 
Programmes of the EU Structural Funds. This has resulted in overlapping roles (with 
similar programmes being managed by more than one group), coordination problems 
and also fragmentation of funding. A report carried out by TA CR on the innovation 
capacity of the Czech Republic, entitled the INKA project, also noted that ‘there are 
more and more voices asking for streamlining the system of management of the research 
and innovation policy, including a clear definition of specific research priorities’ 
(Technology Agency of the Czech Republic 2016:23). 
The Czech Government has itself noted that the ‘shortcomings in the system of 
management of RDI are reflected, inter alia, in the increasing fragmentation and poor 
strategic orientation of the system of RDI funding’ (Government of the Czech Republic 
2016:23). A report by the OECD in 2016 drew particular attention to the issue of the 
fragmented governance of the Czech NSI. Firstly, with regard to management and 
funding, the report notes that, even after the 2008 Reform, there remain eleven 
ministries and bodies involved in funding research and innovation through seven types 
of financial support. The considerable number of bodies involved, in addition to there 
being initiatives at industry and regional levels, creates a fragmented system of support. 
In terms of public funding for R&D, there is considerable fragmentation in R&D 
between the universities and the Academy research institutes which is exacerbated by 
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the need to compete for research and institutional funding. In addition, whilst 
university funding is allocated though MEYS, the Academy has its own budget chapter. 
Secondly, regarding the innovation strategies themselves, there ‘are also overlaps 
between the different strategies (Innovation, SMEs and Exports) and the programmes 
put in place for their implementation’ (OECD 2016:36).This is, at least in part, driven by 
the fact that the public bodies involved each have their own specialisation along with a 
limited number of available financial instruments.  
The initial origin of the fragmented governance system can be traced back to the 
transition period in which the government was initially reluctant to play a leading role 
in the development of the Czech NSI. This was due to the negative perception of 
centralisation, itself a communist legacy, and consequently the governance of research 
and innovation became highly decentralised and, as it lacked an overall coordinating 
body, also fragmented. It is unclear why, despite attempts in the 2008 Reform to 
recentralise the governance of innovation, the fragmentation has remained a problem. 
An explanation for this could be provided by the role of agency and the preference of 
actors to retain legacies which are perceived to be in their best interest. An example of 
this has been provided by Radosevic and Lepori (2009) who, in a discussion on the 
reforming of the Academy systems in Central and Eastern European countries, argue 
that the path dependency inherent in keeping or reforming the Academies together 
with real political power of incumbents has limited the rate at which new incentives 
can induce reform. The issue of rivalry between actors within the governance system 
was repeatedly identified in interviews and, based on this, it could be suggested that 
actors are disincentivised to break with the current ‘ways of doing things’. This 
situation is conceivably exacerbated by issues related to lack of trust, discussed in the 
following section.   
Problems with the fragmentation of the governance structure could offer some 
explanation for one of the repeated concerns in interviews, namely the lack of policy 
implementation and the existence of an implementation gap. An international report 
also found that, whilst many strategic documents have been produced in the Czech 
Republic, only a small proportion of these documents, such as tertiary education 
reform, have been successfully implemented in practice (Szpor et al. 2014:31). In 
particular, interviews with experts highlighted worries that the fragmentation of the 
governance structure is affecting the implementation of the Czech Smart Specialisation 
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Strategy which, was already being seen as ‘dead and buried’ (Academic 2 2016). In the 
case of the Smart Specialisation Strategy, the implementation gap may have been 
exacerbated by problems relating to ownership. Whilst MEYS produced the document, 
the Section for Science, Research and Innovation at the Office of the Government then 
became technically responsible for its management. However, the National Innovation 
Platforms, which bring together representatives of business and the public sector in 
order to facilitate debate, are managed by MIT. This clearly leads to problems of 
fragmentation and causes confusion and ambiguity about who is actually responsible 
for delivering the Smart Specialisation Strategy in the Czech Republic. An academic 
with comprehensive knowledge of the Smart Specialisation Strategy (Academic 2 2016) 
expressed doubts about whether, without a clear owner of the Strategy, the necessary 
commitment, in terms of time and resources, for fulfilling the strategy will actually be 
made. 
In terms of policy-making expertise, the highly centralised nature of research 
and innovation policy-making decisions during the communist period meant that, on 
returning to a liberal market economy, the Czech Republic possessed very little policy-
making capacity within this field. The challenge of developing this policy expertise was 
made even greater by the lack of attractiveness historically associated with public 
sector professions, which is again a legacy of the communist period. Due to the huge 
responsibility and political pressure but poor remuneration, public administration is 
not seen as a particularly attractive career option and a high turnover of staff in this 
sector has, in reality, been problematic in many post-Soviet states (Liebert et al. 2017). 
In the Czech Republic, this issue was even more acute due to a lack of legislation 
providing civil servants with decent provisions. In fact, the Czech Republic was 
actually the last EU Member State not to have specific regulation of the Civil Service. 
The new Civil Service Act, which replaced an Act that was passed in 2002 but failed to 
become legally effective, only came into force on 1st January 2015 after the EU 
threatened stop the payment of Structural Funds. In other words, while the 
unattractiveness of public administration may have been a communist legacy, it was 
subsequently exacerbated by the lack of action aimed at improving the situation. The 
high turnover of employees of public administration has led to a number of problems 
including those of building the capacity necessary for the implementation and 
evaluation of research and innovation strategies (Srholec & Szkuta 2016:9). 
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Not only has the high turnover rate has also had an impact on the ability of the 
Czech Republic to build its policy-making knowledge and expertise, but it has also 
affected its capacity to distribute EU Structural Funds in a way which would maximise 
the investment. An expert interview participant (Academic 2 2016) described how the 
fluctuation of staff dealing with Structural Funds has led to a situation in which 
relatively inexperienced recent graduates have been given the responsibly of designing 
the calls for proposals. The quality of the calls published is particularly important 
because they ‘are the most important mechanism of implementation of the Structural 
Funds because there you decide what will be submitted and what will be supported’ 
(Academic 2 2016). The issue with the situation which has developed in the Czech 
Republic is that the civil servants designing these calls lack the experience and 
contextual knowledge which are required in order to develop calls of real strategic 
benefit and long-term feasibility. If the calls for proposals are weak, the benefit of the 
investment, in terms of improving the Czech Republic’s innovation performance and 
developing the Czech NSI, will be more limited.   
Furthermore, due to the need to spend the money within three years from the 
commitment of the funding, the construction of buildings, such as technology centres 
or science parks, proved an effective way for the Czech Republic, a country 
inexperienced at dealing with Structural Funds, to spend sizeable sums of money in a 
relatively short period of time. However, many of these technology centres or science 
parks have since failed or have not been able to reach initial expectations. In fact, it was 
noted repeatedly in interviews (Academic 2 2016; Government Official 1 2016; 
Government Official 5 2016; Research Institute Specialist 3a 2016) that the EU had 
perhaps been too generous and that less spending would arguably have been more 
helpful. Whilst research on the effectiveness of Structural Funds is conflicting, it has 
been suggested that, firstly, regions with poor governance systems are unable to make 
effective use of Structural Funds and, secondly, that Structural Funds have a maximum 
point after which returns begin to decline and additional funds do not lead to higher 
growth (Becker 2012). These findings would suggest that in the case of the Czech 
Republic, therefore, the previously highlighted weaknesses with the governance 
structure for innovation in the Czech Republic could be an impediment to the effective 
use Structural Funds in this policy area. As the phasing out period of the Structural 
Funds approaches, there is recognition in the Czech Republic that, without these 
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subsidies, even more projects will not be able to survive on the competitive open 
market.  
With regard to the EU’s latest innovation policy approach, interviews 
(Government Official 1 2016; Government Official 2 2016; Academic 2 2016) conducted 
for this research highlighted a number of potential issues about how well it fits the 
Czech Republic given its current problems of fragmentation and limited policy-making 
experience. As discussed in Chapter 4, since the initial Lisbon strategy, the first 
significant attempt by the EU to promote and encourage innovation, the EU’s approach 
towards innovation policy has changed considerably. Whilst the EU’s earlier 
innovation policy attempts were criticised for being too linear and one-size fits all  
(Reid 2011), interview participants (Government Official 1 2016; Government Official 3 
2016; Policy Analyst 2016) were also apprehensive about the more recent direction of 
the EU’s innovation policy. Of particular concern was the perceived lack of clarity in 
the EU’s current approach towards innovation policy with one participant, who had 
been heavily involved in regional policy-making decisions, noting that ‘it seemed much 
clearer what the Commission wanted in the late 1990s than what it wants nowadays’ 
(Government Official 1 2016).  
The EU’s most recent innovation policy approach, and especially the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy, allow for considerable room for the strategies to be tailored 
according to the national environment. However, given that innovation is still a 
relatively new policy area in the Czech Republic and that the country is in the process 
of gaining policy-making experience within this domain, it does raise questions about 
how well this type of policy approach currently fits the Czech needs and capacities. In 
other words, whilst the present direction of the EU’s innovation policy allows for much 
more flexibility and, in doing so, may overcome some of the criticisms of earlier policies, 
the experience in the Czech Republic suggests that it is at risk of becoming too broad 
and unclear for policy-makers. Moreover, due to the fragmentation of the governance 
structure, the Czech Republic lacks the leadership which is necessary for successful 
policy implementation. In short, the attempts of the EU to influence innovation policy 
in the Czech Republic are being mediated by the weak public management of the NSI, 
which, in turn, is reducing the Czech Republic’s ability to both formulate and 
implement an effective national innovation policy.  
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Area of misfit 3: Lack of trust and collaboration 
 It is, however, not just problems of fragmentation that are affecting the 
effectiveness of governance in the Czech Republic but also issues relating to a lack of 
trust. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
(World Economic Forum 2017), although the level of ‘trust in politicians’ has improved 
slightly, at 89th (out of 137 countries) in 2017, the Czech Republic still ranks very low 
for this dimension. In fact, an international audit identifies the lack of trust in the 
Czech Republic as the most significant factor currently preventing progress within the 
Czech NSI. The main conclusion of the report is that ‘the low overall levels of trust, and 
in particular distrust of government, is a major obstacle to the further development of 
an NRIS [National Research and Innovation System] that has many of the ingredients 
needed for success and that given its endowments and circumstances ought to be able 
to develop rapidly’ (Arnold 2011:53). Interviews (Academic 1 2016; Business Leader 3 
2016; Government Official 1 2016; Research Institute Specialist 3b 2016) suggested that, 
whilst distrust in government is particularly high, it is not confined to government and 
actually exists between the academic and business sectors as well. The prevalence of 
mistrust between business partners, for example, has been highlighted in a study by 
Blažek & Uhlíř (2007) as has the distrust between academia and business in a study by 
Kadlec and Blažek (2015). An OECD report (OECD 2017b) looking at a range of general 
well-being dimensions classifies the Czech Republic as being in the bottom-performing 
tier for the ‘trust in others’ dimension.  
There are several causes of this lack of trust which can be identified. Firstly, and 
most significantly, the lack of trust has been demonstrated to be a direct path 
dependent legacy of the communist period (Bowser 2002). The pervasive nature of the 
Soviet dictatorship, its longevity and a generally negative attitude towards public 
organisation had a very damaging impact on the public trust towards politicians and 
one which still affects Czech society today. The initial post-communist years did little 
to improve this situation and trust from businesses towards the public sector (as 
discussed in Section 5.1) was considerably damaged by the lack of law enforcement 
during the transition period and the defrauding of privatised property. Indeed, a study 
of former communist countries has recognised that corruption ‘significantly lowers the 
public trust in state institutions and erodes the foundations of civil society’ (Bowser 
2002:93). In 2017, the Czech Republic was ranked 42nd according to Transparency 
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International’s Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2017). 
Although this does represent an improvement from previous years, in which it ranked 
47th, the report notes that corruption is still considered to be widespread by a majority 
of the public in the Czech Republic. With regard more specifically to trust within the 
Czech NSI, the government has itself recognised that trust towards the public sector 
has in more recent years been weakened by ‘the negative experience with the real-life 
implementation of existing strategies, which has been caused by the inadequate 
capacity and quality of the public administration office responsible for implementing 
R&D policy’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2016a:66). Again this demonstrates a 
situation in which the problem of the lack of trust has historical origins but has since 
been reinforced by a number of factors which are hindering improvement.  
In terms of the lack of trust between the academic and business sector, a study 
conducted by Kadlec and Blažek (2015:336) noted the existence of a ‘strong and 
enduring distrust between academics and private firms that severely hinders 
cooperation’. Indeed, an interview with an academic (Academic 2 2016) drew attention 
to the fact that a negative stigma still remains attached to the idea of academics 
collaborating with the private sector as they are perceived to be neglecting their 
academic duty. Kadlec and Blažek (2015) argue that this attitude can be traced back to 
the transition period during which time a number of researchers left the public sector 
to find more lucrative work in the private sector. This has created a situation in which 
working for the private sector is seen to be driven by financial motivation and ‘could 
even be construed as a betrayal of academic values and an outright abuse of public 
funds’ (Kadlec & Blažek 2015:333). The negative perception of the business sector from 
academics could provide some explanation for the ongoing problem of limited linkages 
between the public and private sectors which has been a focus of Czech innovation 
policy for considerable time (Government of the Czech Republic 2005). 
Regarding the EU, the lack of trust within the Czech NSI has two important 
ramifications. Firstly, the lack of trust prevents policy-making in the way promoted by 
the EU, and especially its Smart Specialisation Strategy approach. The EU claims that 
‘[t]hrough its partnership and bottom-up approach, smart specialisation brings 
together local authorities, academia, business spheres and the civil society, working for 
the implementation of long-term growth strategies supported by EU funds’ (European 
Commission 2017:1). The Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) which is seen as a 
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key feature of Smart Specialisation Strategies is supposed to encourage interaction 
between actors from different sectors in order to identify potential opportunities which 
then form the basis for policy-making decisions. However, in a country in which lack of 
trust is prevalent, it is very difficult to encourage collaboration and cooperation 
between the different sectors. As noted by an expert interview participant, ‘how can 
you ensure an Entrepreneurial Discovery Process within such an atmosphere?’ 
(Academic 2 2016). Again, this highlights the poor fit of the EU’s Innovation Policy for 
the Czech Republic and raises serious questions about the ability of the EU to influence 
the Czech NSI using this strategic approach.  
The second impact of the lack of trust relates to the EU’s Structural Funds and 
how successful they have been as an EU policy tool with which to encourage 
Europeanisation. An interview with a regional policy-maker (Government Official 1 
2016) suggested that the lack of a collaborative culture in the Czech Republic was 
negatively affecting the ability of the Czech Republic to realise the full investment 
potential of the Structural Funds. In order for the funding to be well utilised in the 
long-term, it requires the relevant local actors to ‘buy into’ and contribute collectively 
towards the particular project being undertaken. However, as the Czech Republic 
lacks a collaborative culture, interview participants (Government Official 1 2016; 
Government Official 6 2016) suggested that there has been insufficient commitment 
from the local actors and that this is restricting the success of projects. It was noted 
that collaboration between relevant actors does take place whilst funding is available, 
yet once the funding is exhausted, this collaboration is rarely ongoing. It was indicated 
that without greater collaboration and commitment from local actors, the long-term 
success of projects funded by Structural Funds will continue to be notably limited.   
In short, the lack of trust is a major obstacle to the ability of the EU to influence 
the Czech NSI. The collaborative style policy-making approach promoted by the EU 
requires significant interaction and cooperation between actors within the Czech NSI, 
something which is currently limited in the Czech Republic due to a lack of trust 
between the various actors. Although the EU’s Structural Funds appear to be able to 
supply an incentive for some collaboration, interview evidence from this research 
suggests this is only temporary in nature as it often does not continue after the funded 
period. In other words, the Structural Funds are unable to offer a long-term solution or 
overcome the Czech Republic’s longstanding issues of fragmentation and lack of 
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cooperation. The effectiveness of the EU’s innovation policy approach and the use of 
Structural Funds as a policy tool with which the EU can influence the Czech NSI, 
therefore, can be seen to be being impeded by the historical legacies still affecting the 
Czech Republic. 
 
Area of misfit 4: Lack of innovative entrepreneurialism 
A further impediment to implementing the EDP concept advocated by the EU in 
the Czech Republic relates to a lack of innovative entrepreneurialism. Similarly to the 
lack of trust, the roots of the lack of innovative entrepreneurialism in the Czech 
Republic can be traced back to its communist past during which time the Czech 
Republic, as previously discussed, had very limited private business activity. Concern 
about the lack of innovative SMEs in the Czech Republic has been recognised in a 
recent Research and Innovation Observatory report (Shrolec & Sanchez-Martinez 
2017). This has often been attributed to a lack of finance available to start-ups which 
does, indeed, seem to have been problematic. When conducting interviews for this 
research, the CEO of a now very successful IT company explained that they had had to 
take out a personal loan with an extremely high interest rate as, at this time, there was 
no other funding available for what was classified as a high-risk enterprise. The funding 
situation is gradually improving and there are now several public and private funding 
options. For example, there are currently a considerable number of angel investors, 
affluent individuals who provide capital for small businesses with growth potential, 
operating in the Czech Republic.  
However, insufficient start-up finance is perhaps not the only factor 
contributing to the lack of innovative Czech SMEs. In fact, the cultural perception of 
entrepreneurs is arguably a more concerning problem. It was noted in interviews 
(Government Official 5 2016; Research Institute Specialist 3a 2016) that, owing to the 
Czech Republic’s Soviet history, businessmen are traditionally perceived as ‘thieves’ 
and receive a lower level of societal recognition. Further evidence for this is provided by 
‘The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’, a global study carried out by a consortium of 
universities which, using surveys and interviews, aims to analyse entrepreneurship in 
over 100 countries. The study provides data on various factors including the number of 
18-64 year olds who believe successful entrepreneurs receive high status in their 
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country. According to the study, only 47.8% of the Czech population in 2013 agreed 
that a high status is attached to entrepreneurship. Not only is this a comparatively low 
percentage (for example, the global average is 72.92%) but it even represents a slight 
decrease from the previous study in 2011 in which the percentage agreeing with this 
statement was 48.7% (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2018). 
One of the ongoing problems with a complete absence of private enterprise for 
over 40 years is that the Czech Republic still suffers from a shortage of entrepreneurial 
role models who can help inspire and offer advice to budding entrepreneurs. Combined 
with the cultural perception of entrepreneurs it is perhaps not surprising that local 
SMEs have been slow to develop in the Czech Republic. Interviews (Business Leader 2 
2016; Research Institute Specialist 3b 2016) suggested that the situation is changing 
and there are now an increasing number of successful Czech entrepreneurs, however, a 
shift in attitudinal perception of course takes time. Without a change in the attitude 
towards entrepreneurship it could be argued that making more finance available will 
not, in itself, be sufficient to solve the problem of a lack of SMEs in the Czech Republic. 
In terms of the impact of FDI on domestic entrepreneurialism, research has 
shown mixed results. On the one hand, foreign companies provide knowledge and 
superior technology that can spillover into the local economy and benefit domestic 
companies (Barrios et al. 2005; Javorcik 2004; Markusen & Venables 1999). On the 
other hand, FDI can lead to greater competition to the disadvantage of domestic 
companies and increase the barrier to entry which can potentially prohibit local 
companies from entering the market (Aitken at al. 1997; Kathuria 2000). A study in the 
Czech Republic in 2008 (Kosová & Ayyagari 2008), suggested that FDI can have a 
positive impact on domestic entry, particularly in terms of vertical spillovers, however, 
this varies by industry – for example, service industries may benefit whilst 
manufacturing industries do not experience any positive entry spilllovers – and also by 
the country of origin of FDI. On the other hand, a large study by the Institute of Labor 
Economics (IZA) in 2013 used data gathered over 10 years from 70 countries, both 
developed and developing, to investigate the effect of FDI, measured by mergers and 
acquisitions, on domestic entrepreneurial entry. This study found that FDI has a 
‘negative and significant effect on domestic entrepreneurship at the aggregate level’ 
(Danakol et al. 2013:22), citing competition as the principal source of this crowding out 
effect. A second, alternative, explanation is provided by the tendency of foreign 
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companies to add competitive pressures to labour markets ‘with the potential to 
change the entrepreneurial landscape in the local economy’ (Danakol et al. 2013:23). 
As a DME, the Czech Republic relies heavily on investment from foreign 
companies but interviews undertaken as part of this research, repeatedly indicated that 
this is leading to considerable competition in the labour market. As a result, domestic 
Czech companies claim they are losing out as they are unable to compete with the 
wages and prestige offered by MNEs (Business Leader 2 2016; Business Leader 3 2016). 
Furthermore, as many well-educated Czechs are attracted to work in the large, well-
known foreign controlled companies the space for the establishment of new innovative 
Czech companies has been reduced. In other words, as a result of the availability of jobs 
with foreign companies, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship compared to 
employment becomes greater and, thus, entrepreneurship becomes a less attractive 
career option (Danakol et al. 2013). ‘This results in a situation where a class of talented 
people with the prerequisites for an entrepreneurial career are employed in middle and 
upper management of foreign companies rather than becoming entrepreneurs’ 
(Government of the Czech Republic 2016a:17). This is seen as a mechanism of negative 
spillover from FDI to domestic entrepreneurship. The problem with this is that, 
without targeted policy action, it may prevent the ability of the Czech Republic to 
develop its own endogenous companies which are needed to help develop the Czech 
NSI and improve the Czech innovation performance 
Ongoing concerns about the lack of innovative entrepreneurialism highlight a 
circumstance in which a historical cultural trait, the low perception of entrepreneurs, is 
being aggravated by current conditions, the dependency on foreign companies. This is 
creating a situation in which the ability of the Czech Republic to develop its own 
innovative entrepreneurs, the people who are able to make the greatest difference in 
developing the Czech NSI, is being hindered. This, in turn, prevents the Czech 
Republic from reaching the innovation goals and following the EDP as set out by the 
EU. Whilst increasing the funding available to potential entrepreneurs is clearly 
important, this will not be able to solve the problem unless well-educated, talented 
people view entrepreneurship as an attractive career option. Given the attractiveness of 
working for globally renowned foreign companies, encouraging individuals to pursue 
the potentially more risky option of entrepreneurship is a considerable challenge for the 
Czech Republic.  
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Area of misfit 5: Education system and skilled labour 
Since publishing its first innovation policy in 2005, the Czech Republic has 
been aware of the need to develop its workforce and to provide human resources for 
innovation. Indeed, the country appears to have shown some progress in this respect 
and following the introduction of per capita payments for students in 2000/2001, 
universities were motivated to increase their intake of students leading to a notable 
surge in the number of secondary school students entering into university (Figure 6). 
Whilst this is generally a positive development it should, however, be noted that by far 
the highest percentage of the students in 2012 were studying social sciences, business 
and law, 36% in total. The number of students studying STEM subjects, those which 
are most important to developing and improving the performance of the Czech NSI, 
was much lower. For example, the percentage of students studying science (including 
mathematic and computing) and engineering, manufacturing and construction was just 
10% and 13% respectively (OECD 2016).   
 
Figure 6: Number of graduates in the Czech Republic 1998-2012 
 
(Source: OECD 2018b) 
 
Recognising the need to continue improving and expanding the workforce of 
the Czech Republic, one of the objectives identified in the Czech Republic’s Smart 
Specialisation Strategy is to create a system for attracting and adapting people to the 
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foreign students to study at Czech universities (by promoting Czech universities 
abroad, the introduction of English as a second official language at universities, the 
introduction of compulsory subjects in English, the purchase of foreign literature for 
libraries) and (b) encouraging highly qualified foreigners (especially in technical 
professions) to work in the Czech Republic. Although, in theory, this could offer some 
solution to the Czech Republic’s labour problem, the challenge of achieving this is 
considerable. Given that according to QS World University Rankings (QS 2018), in 
2018 the Czech Republic has no universities in the top 100 and only 2 in the top 500, it 
may be difficult for the Czech Republic, in practice, to attract the top students, those 
who could potentially make the biggest contribution to the development of the Czech 
NSI. Furthermore, in order for these students to contribute to the Czech NSI, the 
Czech Republic would need to retain them in the country after the completion of their 
studies. However, given that wages are significantly lower in the Czech Republic and, 
as previously discussed, only a small percentage of jobs in the Czech Republic require a 
high qualification, the Czech Republic may not possess the conditions which would 
attract these students to remain in the country.  
Whilst the general trajectory in graduate numbers would suggest a positive 
development, interview participants (Academic 1 2016; Government Official 1 2016; 
Government Official 5 2016) expressed frequent concerns about the quality of the 
tertiary education and the standard of the students now graduating from these 
universities. Indeed, an EU report states that ‘[p]articipation in tertiary education has 
rapidly increased but concerns have emerged over its quality and labour-market 
relevance’ (European Commission 2015:22). This was also noted in a study carried out 
by TA CR which, after interviewing a large number of companies based in the Czech 
Republic, concluded that the ‘main changes required in the education system relate to 
changes of funding from quantity to quality, a systematic cultivation of creativity, 
technical competences and skills for the 21st century in combination with an emphasis 
on practical development’ (Technology Agency of the Czech Republic 2016:23). In 
other words, although the number of graduates may have increased, the decline in 
quality and their lack of research experience may limit the potentially positive impact 
on the Czech NSI.    
A factor which could offer some explanation for the Czech Republic’s inability 
to produce graduates with the relevant skills, especially research skills, could be 
142 
 
provided by considering the historical legacies and how they have shaped path 
dependency within the tertiary education system. As previously discussed, during the 
communist period, the research system was highly compartmentalised and there was 
very little link between universities and the industrial sector. Public-private 
collaboration remains a significant problem in the Czech Republic which is certainly 
not helped by the aforementioned reluctance from the academic sector to collaborate 
with the business sector. This has a negative impact as not only does it prevent the 
academic sector from contributing knowledge to the business sector which may, in 
turn, help develop and improve the performance of the Czech NSI, but it also prevents 
the academic sector from engaging with the business sector and gaining a better 
understanding of the needs of businesses in the Czech Republic. With this information, 
the academic sector could better tailor its syllabuses to specifically meet the 
requirements of the business sector. In this respect, it could be suggested that the lack 
of trust and collaboration between the sectors is contributing to weaknesses within the 
Czech tertiary education system.  
The lack of knowledge transfer within the Czech Republic is further 
exacerbated by the stasis of the academic sector itself. Interviews with academics 
(Academic 1 2016, Academic 2 2016) noted that there is a lack of inter-university 
mobility with many academics undertaking their studies and entire academic career at 
the same university. Again this prevents knowledge exchange within the academic 
sector which, in turn, limits the Czech Republic’s ability to embrace new theories and 
concepts which could help to develop academic knowledge and improve teaching 
quality. The lack of knowledge transfer, both between universities and industry and 
between universities, has created a path dependency which continues to limit the 
contribution that the academic sector is presently able to make towards developing the 
Czech NSI and improving its innovation performance. This concerns not only academic 
research itself but the ability of the academic sector to produce students with the 
necessary skills to contribute to the development of the Czech NSI.As education is a 
national policy area, and one in which the EU has limited authority, the EU is very 
limited in its ability to influence the Czech education system. This is a critical 
weakness in the EU’s capacity to influence the development of the Czech NSI.  
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Conclusion 
The past 40 years have been a period of dramatic change for the Czech NSI. 
Having inherited a highly compartmentalised Soviet-influenced research system, the 
Czech Republic embarked on reorganising the structure, governance and funding of 
research and innovation. FDI has played a significant role in shaping the development 
of the Czech economic structure and is increasingly important to the Czech Republic’s 
innovation capacity. Nonetheless, as this chapter has highlighted, the impact of FDI is 
very complex and there are some concerns regarding the Czech Republic’s dependence 
on foreign companies. The EU, at least in the period leading up to accession, had a 
considerable impact on the Czech research and innovation system, particularly in terms 
of drawing political attention to the importance of innovation and an accompanying 
innovation policy, promoting the decentralisation of the system and enabling the 
country to attract even more FDI, including that of more sophisticated investors. 
However, since EU accession, in spite of being heavily influenced by the EU’s vision for 
innovation success, the Czech Republic is failing to achieve a corresponding 
improvement in its innovation performance. In drawing attention to this incongruity, 
five areas of misfit have been highlighted which are impeding the EU’s attempts to 
influence the development of the Czech NSI. As a result of historical legacies and 
economic structure, the Czech Republic has developed a number of embedded national 
traits for which the EU’s innovation policy is a poor fit. This chapter has also indicated 
that there remain a number of problems within the Czech NSI and unless the Czech 
Republic is able to overcome these issues, they could become serious impediments to 
improving the Czech innovation performance.  
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6) Hungary 
 
Introduction 
 In the initial years following the fall of communism, Hungary showed much 
early potential and there were high expectations, not least within Hungary, for strong 
economic growth in the future. Unfortunately, 30 years later, Hungary has experienced 
several severe recessions and has not been able to live up to much of its earlier promise. 
In terms of R&D and innovation, Hungary has encountered notable difficulty in 
translating its exceptional scientific record (Hungary has produced numerous Nobel 
Prize winning scientists), into a strong innovation performance. With regard to the 
influence of the EU, this research suggests that, similarly to the Czech Republic, 
Hungary has developed a number of national specificities, related to both historical 
legacies and economic structure, which are preventing the EU from having a greater 
influence on the Hungarian NSI. Similarly to the format in Chapter 5, this chapter 
begins by looking at the development of the Hungarian NSI during three timeframes: 
(1) pre-1989, (2) the transition period and (3) post-accession to the EU. This section 
also considers the role of FDI and assesses whether any clear progress in the Hungary’s 
innovation performance can be identified since becoming an EU Member State. The 
second part of this chapter considers the role of the EU in influencing the development 
of the Hungarian NSI and identifies a number of impediments which are currently 
being faced. 
 
6.1) Development of the Hungarian NSI 
Pre 1989 
 Formally, and more so initially, the institutional structure of the Hungarian 
science and research system was based on the Soviet model, the key elements of which 
were described in Chapter 5. During the early period in which Hungary formed part of 
the Soviet bloc, both social and economic activities became highly centralised and a 
rigid division of responsibilities was imposed on science and research organisations. 
Comparable with the Czech Republic, three functionally separate sectors were 
established – (1) academies, (2) universities and (3) an industrial or ‘branch’ sector. The 
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) – which had been established in 1825 by a 
wealthy aristocrat, István Széchenyi – was exclusively assigned to carry out basic 
research whilst the industrial institutes, supervised by branch ministries, performed 
applied research. Universities were expected to perform the sole role of teaching 
institutions and, as such, were not provided with public resources in order to conduct 
research projects. Following the Soviet model, each sector was functionally separate 
from the other and, consequently, ‘[h]orizontal links among academia and industry 
were also cut off’ (Havas 1995:194). 
 However, as noted by Mosoni Fried (2004:235), it is perhaps no coincidence 
that as the Hungarian scientific community was accustomed to relative autonomy, 
‘Hungary never accepted the orthodox model of Soviet S&T and always tried to move 
away from its very strict management system’. In fact, especially after the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution, Hungary’s system increasingly diverged from the model 
promoted by the Soviet Union in a number of ways. For example, from the 1960s, HAS 
research institutes began to carry out some applied research and teaching and, 
conversely, research, although weakened, was never entirely neglected by Hungarian 
universities which had long and highly respected research records. A 1965 legal 
provision actually made scientific research at universities obligatory, leading to a 
‘revival of former science schools with beneficial effects’ (Pungor & Nyiri, 1993:28). 
Nonetheless, although the scope of activities carried out by universities and HAS 
research institutes was broader than the standard Soviet model – breaking the strict 
demarcation of labour – there remained a lack of significant cooperation between these 
sectors (Havas 1995). In fact, Pungor & Nyiri (1993) describe the relationship between 
the major R&D players as ‘feudalistic’, characterised by hierarchical relations in which 
privileges and social positions were closely connected.  
In terms of the management of the research and innovation system in Hungary, 
during the 1960s, a move towards decentralisation occurred. R&D policy-making was 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Science Policy Committee, HAS became responsible 
for basic science and the National Committee of Technological Development, set up in 
1964, was placed in charge of technology. It is worth noting that HAS – which acted as 
(1) a society of scholars, (2) the government agency responsible for basic science and 
(3) an institution for financing research – occupied a particularly influential and 
privileged position within the Hungarian research system, similar to the Czechoslovak 
146 
 
Academy of Sciences discussed in Chapter 5. Regarding funding, in comparison to 
other Central and Eastern European countries, R&D was gradually administered in a 
less centralised manner. For example, the introduction of a multi-channel funding 
system in the 1980s significantly supported the decentralisation movement. In fact, the 
Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) which was established in 1986, 
represented ‘the first transparent system in a planned economy providing subsidies for 
basic research’ (Mosoni Fried 2004:235). In addition, Hungary also had a well-
established patent regulation system in place long before the transition period. 
With regard to the business sector, in-house research witnessed a significant 
decline during this period as companies typically relied on Academy or industrial 
research institutes for their development needs. ‘Quite often the companies performed 
very little research activity of their own, and their technological development activity 
consisted mostly of adapting foreign results’ (Pungor & Nyiri 1993:29). Towards the 
end of the communist period, however, some in-house research was taking place and 
the business sector actually provided the majority of funding for R&D activities, which 
did, to an extent, encourage the linking of R&D activities to economic objectives. 
According to an OECD report, over half of Hungary’s R&D expenditure came from 
companies with another 25% from the Central Technology Research Fund (KUFMA), a 
fund which was supported by a 4.5% levy on enterprise profits (OECD 1993). Thanks 
to the contribution of private funding, during the 1980s, Hungary was able to maintain 
R&D expenditures at around 2.4% of GDP, a figure which compared relatively 
favourably with OECD countries of a similar size. However, as discussed below, the 
collapse of the COMECON markets greatly hindered Hungary’s ability to sustain 
private funding levels post-1989.   
In terms of the standard of the research institutes and their output, there was 
considerable variation in the quality of the research equipment used in the R&D 
organisations. Whilst some were quite poorly equipped, the equipment in others 
actually met international standards (Pungor & Nyiri, 1993). Nonetheless, on the 
whole, Hungary’s research output was quite favourable and the country was not only 
seen as ‘a technological leader in trade within the CMEA group, but Hungarian 
technological development was also important in exports to the West, notably in 
pharmaceuticals’ (OECD 1993:120). This was no doubt assisted by the fact that, since 
the 1960s, Hungarian researchers were even comparatively free to develop international 
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relationships. In fact, as cooperation with Western partners was given increasing 
priority during the 1980s, by 1986 there were more than 2,000 industrial contract 
relations registered between Hungary and Western partners (Pungor & Nyiri, 1993:29). 
In short, through decentralisation, greater flexibility and increased business 
relationships with Western countries, by the time of transition, Hungary had for some 
time been moving away from the promoted Soviet model.  
Overall, Hungary’s experience contrasted with the Czech Republic in two 
particularly significant aspects. Firstly, following the Hungarian Revolution, from the 
1960s onwards Hungary followed a much less rigid and centralised form of 
communism. This so-called Goulash Communism was far less authoritarian than other 
Communist regimes and Hungarians, including scientists, had more freedom than their 
counterparts in the Soviet bloc. Secondly, whereas the Czech Republic retained a fairly 
orthodox version of the Soviet economic system until the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
political liberalisation in Hungary actually began earlier in the 1980s when the waning 
power of the Soviet Union became clear and, after 1987, an opposition party to the 
ruling Communist party even began to work openly. This political transition was 
accompanied by an economic transition which had been necessitated by the economic 
crisis of the mid 1980s, during which time the economy grew ever closer to collapse. As 
a consequence, Hungary chose to introduce some aspects of a liberal market economy 
and partially open the Hungarian economy to the Western world. For example, 
Hungary joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1982. Furthermore, Hanson & Pavitt 
(1987) note that a number of venture capital organisations, known as Innovation Funds, 
had been set up by the mid-1980s. Whilst these changes to the economic set-up did 
mean that, by the time of transition to a full market economy, Hungary was in many 
ways better prepared than the Czech Republic, it also resulted in high levels of foreign 
debt, rising government debt and moderate to high inflation (European Commission 
2014). 
 
Transition Period 
Due to the fact that, by the end of the 1980s Hungary already had a partially 
liberalised economy with some private sector companies, the worrying level of foreign 
debt notwithstanding, Hungary chose to introduce reforms on a more gradual basis 
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between 1991 and 1993. The transition to a market economy progressed in a smooth, 
organic manner without any true revolution such as the Velvet Revolution which took 
place in the Czech Republic in 1989. An interview with an expert with extensive 
knowledge of the history of the Hungarian NSI suggested that Hungary is, in fact, now 
paying a high price for this seemingly seamless transition. This was attributed to a lack 
of catharsis as there was ‘no real recognition by the layman that something important 
had happened’ (Government Official 6 2017). Moreover, Hungary lacked perhaps not 
only the recognition of change but also the public’s sense of ownership in the creation 
of a new and different system.  
At the beginning of the transition period, FDI began to flow quickly into 
Hungary whose markets, having already undergone some liberalisation before the fall of 
the Soviet Union, afforded Hungary first-mover advantage (see Figure 7). Support from 
foreign investors diminished slightly in the second half of the decade as the Hungarian 
economy went through a significant period of vulnerability and instability. Similarly to 
the Czech Republic, the rapid infiltration of MNEs into the Hungarian system is 
claimed to have resulted in a ‘dual economy’ (Aide à la Décision Economique 1999). 
Whilst, on the one hand, Hungary ‘has large, often foreign-owned companies, which are 
well integrated in international production, distribution and, in some cases, 
R&D(…)On the other, there is a large sector of domestic firms, notably small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) characterised by low productivity and insufficient 
innovation capabilities, which typically operate in local markets with relatively 
unsophisticated demand’ (OECD 2008:10). In fact, Havas (2002) has even indicated 
that the catch-up provided by the new technologies brought in by foreign investors 
during the early 1990s actually created a misconception, masking the need to focus on 
developing indigenous R&D and misleading the focus of policy-makers away from 
innovation-oriented policies. Furthermore, whilst foreign investors transferred new 
technology to Hungary, the majority proved to be uninterested in domestic R&D 
(Mosoni-Fried 2004). 
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Figure 7: Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Hungary 1993-2003    
(Million US$) 
 
(Source: OECD 2013) 
 
In terms of innovation, this was a period of considerable change for Hungary. 
Firstly, the loss of the COMECON markets and the fall in GDP at the beginning of the 
transition period led to a dramatic decrease in the amount of both public and business 
investment in R&D, with many formerly state-owned enterprises either going out of 
business or redirecting their funds away from R&D and towards projects which would 
result in more short-term profitability. During this period, ‘nearly all specialised state 
financed R&D programmes were abandoned and the previously dominant top-down 
funding system for R&D was by and large replaced by a bottom-up approach and by 
application for support for individual projects by research institutes and companies’ 
(OECD 2008:156). Public support was provided via institutional financing and 
competitive project financing through the previously discussed OTKA fund as well as 
the newly introduced Competitive R&D Grant for Higher Education (FKFP) and the 
Research Fund of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (AKP). By the mid-1990s, 
economic instability led to further substantial reductions in public spending, including 
for R&D, as the government introduced its fiscal stabilisation programme, the ‘Bokros 
package’ (OECD 2008). 
With regard to research activities, the position of universities within the 
Hungarian NSI was notably strengthened during the transition period. In fact, 
universities became the largest and even most active part of the Hungarian scientific 
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community, with up to 60% of human resources affiliated to higher education 
institutions (Mosoni-Fried 2004:243). HAS also enjoyed relative stability and actually 
became a ‘public body’, or public law association, that was completely independent of 
the government. As noted by Mosoni-Fried (2004:244) the ‘[s]kilful manoeuvring by 
HAS presidents successfully repulsed political attacks and secured a peaceful transition 
for scientists involved in basic research’.  Applied research, on the other hand, became a 
weak link in the Hungarian research system. The only organisation established was the 
Zoltán Bay Foundation for Applied Research which had been modelled on the German 
Frauenhofer Institutes. Lack of resources, however, limited the growth of the new 
applied research foundation and, as a result, only three institutes – biotechnology, 
logistics and material sciences – could be established during this time period.  
The total number of R&D personnel fell by almost half between 1988 and 2000, 
from 45,069 to 23,534 (Havas 2002). To a considerable extent this can be accounted for 
by the decline in industrial and in-house R&D. Despite the Hungarian Government’s 
attempt to preserve industrial research institutes, notably the 1995 Act on the Sales of 
Company Assets in State Ownership, the lack of both capital and markets for their 
products or services led to most eventually being shut down (Mosoni-Fried 2004). 
Additionally, in-house R&D was severely weakened due to income losses and 
privatisation activities which took place at the beginning of the transition period. 
Company R&D units were either closed or disappeared as a result of the loss of 
markets for Hungarian products and companies consequently being forced to declare 
bankruptcy. Whether ownership fell to domestic or foreign owners, after privatisation 
most in-house R&D capacities were either discontinued or, at the very least, 
significantly reduced. The total number of company R&D units fell by more than a 
quarter between 1988 and 1990, from 235 to 174. Although the number of company 
R&D units did significantly increase during the latter half of the 1990s, reaching 478 in 
2000, the number of researchers in 2000 totalled only 3,901 which represented less than 
half the 8,504 researchers employed in company R&D units in 1988 (Mossoni-Fried 
2004:247).  
In terms of government efforts, the beginning of the transition period was 
dominated by the tremendous task of political and economic transformation – not just 
macroeconomic stabilisation but also introducing fundamental organisational and 
institutional changes – which was both financially demanding and also required huge 
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political and intellectual input. As Hungary grappled with these challenges, limited 
resources meant that science and innovation received very little attention during this 
initial time period. By the end of the 1990s, however, innovation and R&D had begun to 
return to the political agenda leading to some significant changes in government policy. 
These included the formulation of the Széchenyi Plan (Hungary’s first National 
Development Plan), changes in the institutional setting for R&D policy and the 
creation of a new research funding system. As noted by Mosoni-Fried (2004:241), the 
‘end of the transition period saw a shift away from laissez-faire policy and the 
decentralisation of decision- and policy-making toward an active S&T policy based on 
the concentration of political power and financial resources in public-sector R&D’. The 
Széchenyi Plan was particularly notable as, through identifying innovation as a priority 
area, it was Hungary’s first attempt at an innovation strategy with a long-term view. 
The objectives at this point were ‘to strengthen information and knowledge flows, to 
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and skills by domestic human resources, to 
channel foreign direct investment (FDI) to high-technology sectors and to accelerate 
the computerisation of the economy’ (OECD 2008:157).  
As part of the Széchenyi Plan, the Hungarian Government also launched a 
number of national research and development programmes which included the ‘Science 
and Technology Policy 2000’ (Government of Hungary 2000). However, in 2002, only a 
few years after the introduction of the Széchenyi Plan, facing another period of financial 
instability, the newly elected government cut back on some of the activities set out in 
the original plan in an attempt to make savings on public spending. In fact, from the 
outset it appears that innovation and R&D have received little public spending 
protection during times of financial difficulty (Havas 2002). Additionally, there was 
also considerable fluctuation in terms of the policy advisory bodies and the government 
authority responsible for overseeing this policy area (Havas 2002; Mosoni-Fried 2004). 
This finally culminated in the introduction of the National Office of Research and 
Technology (NORT) in 2004. In other words, whilst this can in some respects be seen 
as a period in which considerable development in terms of governmental support for 
innovation and R&D took place, the process was in many respects also chaotic and 
inconsistent.  
Although Hungary had entered the transition period considerably ahead of 
other Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, largely 
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due to the fact that Hungary had already begun adopting elements of a market economy 
before the official collapse of the Soviet Union, by the beginning of the 2000s Hungary 
appears to have encountered a number of issues which have ‘hampered the 
transformation of the R&D sector in the transition period’ (Mosoni-Fried 2004:235). 
For example, whilst some positive developments occurred, such as the increase in 
university research, other areas, such as industrial and applied research, were severely 
weakened. Furthermore, the number of researchers fell considerably and, with regard 
to Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D, this decreased from 1.46 of GDP in 1988 to 
just 0.65% in 1996 and remained below 1% until after Hungary’s accession to the EU 
(OECD 2016b). It is also important to note that, although the formal institutional 
structure was significantly overhauled and increasingly resembled that of a Western – 
rather than Soviet – model, the legacy of the planning period still had a non-negligible 
impact on informal institutions such as managers behaviour and policy-makers 
thoughts. Indeed, as noted by Havas (2002: 381) ‘[t]hese experiences, expectations, 
attitudes and behavioural norms – together with the inherited economic problems; of 
course – constitute a relatively controversial legacy for the transition process’ (Havas 
2002:381).  
 
Post-accession to the EU 
 Hungary’s accession to the EU resulted in a notable shift in terms of the 
development of innovation-related policies in Hungary. Following the introduction of 
the Széchenyi Plan  (Government of Hungary 2000b) and the Science and Technology 
Policy 2000 (Government of Hungary 2000a), in 2007 the Mid-Term Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) Policy Strategy (Government of Hungary 2007) was 
approved. After several unsuccessful attempts by the National Office for Research and 
Technology and HAS to compile a strategy, the STI Strategy was eventually drafted 
jointly by the Ministry of Economy and Transport, the Ministry of Education and 
Culture and HAS with an almost two year delay (Havas 2011:3-4). The aim of this STI 
Strategy was, by 2013, to make Hungary a country in which ‘knowledge and innovation 
are the driving engines of the economy and companies appear on the global market 
with competitive products and services’ (Government of Hungary 2007:3). In order to 
achieve this, the Strategy identifies several strategic goals related to strengthening 
153 
 
companies’ research, technological development and innovation (RTDI) activities, 
building internationally competitive RTDI capacities and centres, strengthening 
knowledge to support the competitiveness of the society and improving the RTDI 
capacities of the regions. 
In addition to identifying the main strengths and weaknesses of the Hungarian 
NSI, the Strategy sets out several extremely ambitious targets to be reached by 2010 
and 2013 respectively. For example, the first objective of the Strategy is that Gross 
Expenditure on R&D should reach 1.4% of GDP in 2010 and 1.8% of GDP in 2013. 
Although the Gross Expenditure did witness some increase, having started at 0.96% of 
GDP in 2007 and rising to 1.14% in 2010 and 1.39% in 2013 (Eurostat 2018e), the total 
amount being spent on R&D was still considerably below the target set out in the 
Strategy. In fact, according to subsequent statistics, instead of showing a slow but 
continual upward trajectory, Gross Expenditure on R&D in 2016 had even decreased to 
just 1.21% of GDP. Moreover, in terms of Government Expenditure on R&D, this 
increased only minimally during the period covered by the Strategy from 0.42% of GDP 
in 2007, to 0.45% in 2010 and 0.5% in 2013. In another example of overly optimistic 
target setting, the Strategy also stated that Hungary’s Summary Innovation Index 
according to the European Innovation Scoreboard should reach the EU average by 2013. 
However, according to the Scoreboard not only did Hungary fail to meet the EU 
average in 2013, it even showed a decline in its performance (European Commission 
2013).  
The STI Strategy has since been succeeded by the latest policy; the National 
Research and Development and Innovation Strategy (2013-2020) (Ministry for National 
Economy 2013) which was developed by the Ministry for National Economy (ME). The 
vision of this latest Strategy is that:   
‘By 2020 the key participants of the national innovation system will be 
significantly reinforced through the active support of RDI policy and will 
become equal partners in global innovation processes in Hungary. They will 
then be able to invigorate the national innovation system as a whole, due to 
the follow-through effects, and thus contribute significantly to enhancing the 
competitiveness of the Hungarian economy together with transforming it to a 
sustainable knowledge economy’ (Ministry for National Economy 2013:28). 
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This most recent Strategy is complex with a number of ambitious, quantified targets, 
such as supporting the integration of 300 ‘gazelles’ (high-growth companies) into the 
global market, funding 1,000 innovative start-ups and over 80 proposed objectives. 
There is already concern, however, that Hungary has not made sufficient progress at 
developing policy actions to meet these objectives and that those which have been 
developed are poorly aligned with the National Development Strategy (European 
Commission 2016:24-25). The implementation of this Strategy may be further 
compromised by the fact that (a) it was designed by ME and this Ministry is no longer 
responsible for innovation policy in Hungary and (b) the Secretary of State in charge of 
developing this Strategy is no longer a member of the government.   
This, however, is not the only innovation-related strategy which is currently 
being pursued in Hungary. In fact, innovation has received increasing policy attention 
and Hungary now has a considerable number of strategies in which innovation plays a 
key role. Of particular interest to this research is the Research and Innovation Strategy 
for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) which, as discussed in Chapter 4, has become a 
prerequisite to receive funding from the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF). For the 2014-2020 funding period, Hungary has been allocated €25 billion in 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI) of which €10.76 billion is funded via 
the ERDF. Hungary’s RIS3 was drafted in 2014 by the recently established National 
Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDIO). The scope of the Strategy is 
vast and has been described by the EU as ‘very broad and almost all-encompassing’ 
(European Commission 2016c:25). According to the RIS3, ‘Hungary plans to become a 
knowledge economy by the end of the decade, where internationally competitive 
knowledge bases and intensive knowledge flows are created and, thus, the use of 
knowledge becomes more effective’ (Government of Hungary 2004:46). A clear attempt 
has been made to meet the criteria set by the EU through mention of stimulating the 
‘Entrepreneurial Discovery Process’ and discussion on encouraging stakeholder 
involvement and joint management. 
The Smart Specialisation approach, it was claimed by the EU (European 
Commission 2014:3), would  improve evidence-based policy making and encourage 
stakeholders to unite under a shared vision. Whilst the rationale for requesting all 
Member States to produce this document is understandable, interview participants 
(Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 12 2017) questioned the effectiveness 
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of using obligatory methods to encourage collaborative thinking. In the case of 
Hungary, due to the restructuring of the governance system for innovation and the 
establishment of a new office, the RIS3 had to be drafted in a very short period of time, 
roughly 6 months. This meant that, in order to ensure that the Strategy was completed 
in time, some of the exercises which had initially been planned, such as focus groups 
with relevant actors, had to be abandoned (Government Official 6 2016). Expert 
interviews conducted for this research suggested that developing the RIS3 had had to 
contend with a number of methodological problems which will likely have a strong 
adverse effect on its impact. (For further discussion, see below.) 
An interview with a government official with expert knowledge of policy-
making in Hungary (Government Official 12 2017) indicated that the preparation of the 
Smart Specialisation Strategy had essentially resulted in a tick box exercise which had 
to be completed in order to access the Structural Funds. Although the Strategy was 
adopted by the Commission on certain conditions, it is doubtful whether these 
conditions are being met (Government Official 6 2016) and the EU’s ability to monitor 
Hungary’s progress in this area seems limited. Furthermore, the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy is poorly aligned with other innovation-related strategies, which further 
highlights the lack of strategic thinking discussed earlier. A report by the EU found 
that the ‘R&I Strategy, developed by the Ministry for National Economy, does not seem 
to directly guide the current activities of the NRDIO, which offered a different set of 
priorities and approaches in the Smart Specialisation Strategy’ (European Commission 
2016b:30). Given all the problems encountered in the development of Hungary’s Smart 
Specialisation Strategy and the lack of alignment with other national strategies, 
interview participants (Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 12 2017) were 
very dubious about the Strategy having any significant impact.  
 With regard to governance, the governance structure for innovation in Hungary 
has consistently been plagued by upheaval which has caused much disruption 
including delays in developing and processing calls for projects and confusion amongst 
the various stakeholders. For example, towards the end of the 2000s Hungary 
attempted to overhaul the governance structure for innovation which included the 
abolition of the highest level coordinating body in the field, the Science and Technology 
Policy Council, in 2009. Although the overhaul could not be fully implemented due to 
the political turmoil at the time, following the resignation of then Prime Minister, 
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Ferenc Gyurcsány, in April 2009 and the subsequent formation of a new government, 
two important changes did take place. Firstly, a new policy coordination body, the 
Research and Science Policy Council, was established as a replacement for the previous 
Science and Technology Policy Council. This Council held its first and only meeting in 
April 2010 before yet more organisational changes to the governance structure took 
place after the general elections held in 2010. Secondly, the position of a minister 
without a portfolio – the government minister who had until then been responsible for 
overseeing and coordination research and development, technological innovation and 
science – was dissolved and the Minister for National Development and Economy took 
over the responsibilities of the Minister without a portfolio. 
In 2010, after just over one year, the Research and Science Policy Council was 
disbanded and, in its place, the National Research, Innovation and Policy Council was 
created by government decree. This Council was chaired by one of the Deputy Prime 
Ministers, co-chaired by the President of HAS and consisted of the Minister for 
Economy, the Minister for Natural Resources and the Minister for National 
Development. Yet again, this Council was dissolved and in September 2013 was 
replaced by the Council for Science Policy and Innovation. The composition of this new 
Council was similar to that of the previous Council with the exception of being chaired 
by the Prime Minister instead of a Deputy Prime Minister. As of 2014, however, the 
Council had not even held its inaugural meeting and has since been replaced by the 
National Science Policy and Innovation Board. In principal, this Board remains the main 
body responsible to Parliament, however, there is no record of it actually having had a 
meeting (European Commission 2016c:21). Meetings with the International Scientific 
Advisory Board, which was established to gain strategic advice from foreign experts, 
have also been infrequent. 
More recently, in January 2015, following the approval of the new Law LXXVI 
(25th November 2014) on Scientific Research, Development and Innovation, the 
governance structure for innovation in Hungary underwent yet more change with the 
establishment of NRDIO. This new office integrated the activities of the previous office, 
the National Innovation Office (NIH), together with the various ministerial 
departments with responsibility for innovation. Under the leadership of Prof Jósef 
Pálinkás, former President of HAS, the Office occupies a central position in the research 
and innovation system different from that of most countries due to its lack of 
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ministerial accountability. Rather than delivering policy on behalf of a ministry, the 
President of NRDIO is subordinate to the Prime Minister’s Office and reports directly 
to Parliament.   
The two main missions of NRDIO are: (1) RDI policy-making, implementation 
and integration into the economy and (2) allocation and management of RDI funding. 
By fulfilling both the role of research and innovation policy-maker and research and 
innovation funder, NRDIO has enormous responsibility within the system. As has been 
noted, ‘[i]n an international comparison, the Hungarian approach seems exceptional 
because of the scope of vertical and horizontal integration of responsibilities within 
NRDIO’ (European Commission 2016c:20). Horizontally, NRDIO is responsible for 
science and innovation funding and vertically, ‘it integrates almost all political 
responsibilities and the accompanying accountability for designing, implementing, 
evaluating and reforming the support measures’ (European Commission 2016c:20). In 
addition to the establishment of NRDIO, 2015 also witnessed the creation of the 
National Research, Development and Innovation Fund which integrated the two 
previous funds, the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund and the Research and 
Technological Innovation Fund. For the implementation of measures based on the EU’s 
Structural Funds, however, the NRDIO is required to respond to ME which is in charge 
of managing the operational programmes for the 2014-2020 financial period.  
Whilst the unique role and positioning of NRDIO could increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of research and innovation governance, there are however several 
concerns about the amount of authority enjoyed by NRDIO. Firstly, NRDIO does not 
have a supervisory board ‘or other forms of external control that would ensure the 
checks and balances appropriate in relation to the extensive responsibilities and 
budgets overseen by NRDIO’ (European Commission 2016c:21). Furthermore, there is 
‘no evidence that meaningful external advice has largely supported the Office in 
performing its comprehensive functions’ (Ibid). Although there are several advisory 
bodies, such as the International Advisory Board and the National Science Policy and 
Innovation Board already discussed, these meet only sporadically and appear to have 
minimal, if any, practical influence. The International Advisory Board does not have any 
decision-making or controlling powers and the role of National Science Policy and 
Innovation Board is just to provide advice, evaluate and make recommendations.  
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A Peer Review carried out by the EU suggests that with the establishment of 
NRDIO, there is a period of ‘new beginning’ in Hungary and that ‘a long period of 
instability appears now to have come to an end’ (European Commission 2016c:17). This 
idea, however, was met with a degree of caution in expert interviews (Government 
Official 6 2016; Government Official 11 2017) in which it was suggested that there is 
some scepticism about how successful the new office has been and questions about the 
certainty of its future were raised. Whether a true shift in the importance attached to 
innovation by the Hungarian government and a resolute commitment to its funding 
(which has traditionally wavered during periods of economic bust) has occurred, 
cannot yet be guaranteed. Given the number of times the governance system for 
innovation has been restructured in Hungary within the past two decades, it is still too 
soon to say whether the establishment of NRDIO represents just another restructuring 
exercise or something more permanent and significant. Furthermore, the establishment 
of NRDIO and, more specifically, its governance method, does somewhat seem to go 
against the current method being promoted by the EU. For example, the aim of the 
RIS3 approach was to encourage a more bottom-up approach to strategy development 
and management, yet the NRDIO represents a more centralised and top-down style of 
governance. In terms of the EU, therefore, there does seem to be something of a 
contradiction between the vision being encouraged by the EU and the direction 
actually taken in Hungary. 
With regard to HAS which, as previously noted, wielded considerable influence 
and power during the communist period, the Academy and its ‘academicians’ –namely 
members of the Academy and scholars holding a science degree obtained or accredited 
in Hungary – continue to have considerable weight in the Hungarian research system. 
In recent years, HAS has essentially performed a dual role in which, on the one hand, it 
influences the political decision-making process and participates in the elaboration of 
national policies and strategies. On the other hand, HAS also manages its own research 
centres and laboratories, employing a substantial number of researchers and accounting 
for a considerable percentage of R&D expenditure (European Commission 2015:34).  In 
addition to performing research in its own institutes, HAS also directs some funds to 
research groups in the higher education sectors and participates in education 
(especially doctoral training). The current governance structure of the Hungarian NSI 
is shown in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8: Governance structure of innovation in Hungary 
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In summary, the period since EU accession has been a particularly chaotic one 
for innovation policy and governance in Hungary. This situation has been exacerbated 
by the considerable economic and political turmoil, including the resignation of the 
Prime Minister in 2009. Each restructuring of the governance system has resulted in a 
tendency to disregard the previous policy, start again and, in the words of a government 
official with considerable experience of innovation policy-making in Hungary, ‘then 
fingers crossed’ (Government Official 12 2017). The ongoing restructuring activities 
have caused much disruption to the Hungarian NSI and confusion for actors therein. 
Whilst a number of policies have been produced, the actual commitment of the 
Hungarian Government to fulfilling its obligations, notably its funding commitments 
(see below), has been dubious. Not only has innovation policy in Hungary lacked 
consistency of leadership but it has also lacked a clear strategic direction and one 
which is aligned with the overall economic development plan. At present, therefore, a 
realisable strategy with which to achieve the many ambitious innovation-related aims 
Hungary has set for itself, still remains undefined.  
 
The role of FDI 
Foreign owned companies, attracted by the reasonably well-educated, cheap 
labour force, occupy a dominant position in Hungary. These MNEs have become key 
players in the Hungarian system and appear ‘critical for the present economic 
development of Hungary’ (European Commission 2016c:58). According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development 2018), FDI as a percentage of GDP increased from 24.4% in 1995 to 
74.5% in 2017. Hungary, which having already started to liberalise its economy before 
the fall of the Soviet Union, was able to attract FDI very quickly and, as such, became a 
frontrunner in the competition for FDI. However, it has been suggested than Hungary 
has since lost its early mover advantages as other Central and Eastern European 
countries have also begun offering attractive packages, including friendly business 
environments and lower labour costs, for foreign investors (Sass 2004). In fact, in both 
2015 and 2016, divestments outpaced investments in Hungary resulting in a negative 
inflow of US$14,751 million and US$5,855 million respectively (United Nations 
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Conference on Trade and Development 2018)2. Furthermore, the number of Greenfield 
Investments in Hungary, investments in which a parent company builds its operations 
in a foreign country from the ground up, has fallen considerably, from 110 in 2016 to 83 
in 2017 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2018).   
The fall in FDI has partly been blamed on the financial and economic crises 
which hit Hungary particularly hard and from which the country has since struggled to 
recover (Tarró & Krámli 2013). Indeed, the data in Figure 9 show a significant decline 
in FDI at the time of the crises. A study by Sass and Kalotay (2012), however, found 
that the financial and economic crises had had a dual effect and although negative in 
terms of the scaling back of FDI and a decline in the overall amount of FDI, the same 
period also witnessed the announcement of some large scale projects. These 
investments were particularly notable in the automotive industry with Daimler AG, 
Audi and General Motors/Opel all launching sizeable projects in Hungary. However, 
since the beginning of the 2010s, Hungary has been sending a mixed message to 
investors, especially to investors in certain service industries, by adopting policy 
measures including the introduction of windfall taxes, which were supposed to help 
Hungary recover from the crises by controlling the budget deficit. The main industries 
affected were banking, energy, retail and telecommunications. These measures ‘could be 
interpreted as problematic for the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors as 
the latter are overrepresented in the group of firms affected by the new taxes’ (Sass & 
Kalotay 2012:8). Sass and Kalotay's study concludes that the windfall taxes had a 
negative impact on investor confidence which would be difficult to remedy and could 
cause long-term damage to Hungary’s ability to attract FDI. Given Hungary’s 
dependence on foreign-owned companies and investments, this represents a potentially 
concerning development and one which would benefit from ongoing monitoring.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 FDI figures dropped to negative levels in 2015 due to ‘large reimbursements of intercompany loans and 
to large net disinvestments in equity recorded in the last quarter of 2015 (OECD 2016:6). 
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Figure 9: Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to  Hungary 2004-2018    
(Million US$) 
 
(Source: OECD 2019) 
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decision to include in its staff only some of the former ITD employees. As a result, not 
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challenging time in Hungary due to the fact that, in 2010, the newly elected 
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In spite of the recent downward trend, FDI stock, which in 2017 amounted to 
US$93,332 million, still remains very significant in Hungary. With 49% of FDI in 2017, 
the manufacturing sector is the main recipient of foreign funding (Hungarian Central 
Bank 2018). The biggest proportion of FDI in the manufacturing sector is spent on 
vehicle and other transport equipment (21%), followed by basic pharmaceutical 
products (19%) and computer, electronic and optical products (12%) (Ibid.). In terms 
of research and development, Hungary is also host to a number of major automotive 
R&D centres including well-known companies such as Bosch, Audi, Knorr-Bremse and 
Continental. More recently, Jaguar Land Rover announced plans to open a new 
technical engineering office in Budapest in 2019 with the creation of 100 new jobs. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Hungary, Péter Szijjártó, claimed that the 
‘decision of the UK’s largest automotive manufacturer to open a technical engineering 
office in Budapest reaffirms our foreign direct investment strategy and in particular our 
specific focus on high quality automotive-related growth’ (Hungarian Investment 
Promotion Agency 2018b:4). HIPA claims to have recently shifted its emphasis away 
from ‘made in Hungary’ toward ‘invented in Hungary’ and is promoting a quality rather 
than quantity approach to its FDI promotion activities (Hungarian Investment 
Promotion Agency 2018a:4).  
In terms of the impact of these foreign companies on the Hungarian NSI, 
however, expert interviews conducted during the course of this research (Academic 4 
2016; Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 12 2017) suggested that foreign-
owned MNEs are generally poorly integrated into the NSI and that MNEs typically 
work with suppliers from foreign countries. This was, in part, attributed to the fact 
that domestic Hungarian companies are often not sufficiently innovative and lack the 
ability to produce the goods required by MNEs. There are, however, examples of 
foreign companies which have integrated better into the Hungarian system and Suzuki, 
for instance, was highlighted during interviews as a ‘good’ example. Suzuki has been 
established in Hungary since 1992 and over time more and more innovation activities 
have been moved to Hungary. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, according to 
interview participants (Academic 4 2016; Government Official 6 2016), many of these 
innovation activities are confined to developing the production lines and not the 
product itself. Whilst there are some pockets of good practice, on the whole, the 
picture is not that favourable and there was frustration expressed (Academic 4 2016; 
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Government Official 6 2016) that the Hungarian Government is not doing more to 
incentivise MNEs to carry out more of their research activities in Hungary.   
With regard to the R&D which is being carried out in Hungary at present, 
these activities are ‘highly concentrated in a limited number of large companies 
(including multinational corporations)’ (European Commission 2016c:57). Business 
Expenditure on R&D, as shown in Figure 10, has increased considerably in Hungary 
and in 2016 actually comprised more than half of the total R&D expenditure. This 
contrasts strongly with Government Expenditure on R&D which started at a similar 
level to Business Expenditure and after some increase, albeit not as significant as the 
increase in Business Expenditure on R&D, dropped notably in 2016. Whilst the 
increase in the level of Business Expenditure on R&D may at first glance appear 
impressive, some caution should be taken when reading these figures. Attention has 
been drawn to the fact that some irregularities appear to have taken place due to 
confusion and ambiguity surrounding the classification of R&D activities for tax 
incentive purposes. As a result, the ‘actual Business Expenditure on Research and 
Development is likely to be much lower than officially reported due to the incorrect 
classification of other corporate investments as R&D by the reporting companies’ 
(European Commission 2016c:58). This would also suggest that Hungary’s Gross 
Expenditure on R&D is lower than recorded and that it is even further behind the 
target of 1.8% of GDP on R&D which Hungary has aims to achieve by the end of this 
decade (Ministry for National Economy 2013).  
 
Figure 10: Total expenditure on R&D in Hungary by financial source 2006-2016 
(HUF Million) 
 
(Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) 2018b.) 
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In summary, the period since EU accession has been a tumultuous one for 
Hungary in terms of FDI. Hungary appears to have lost the advantage held over its 
Central and Eastern European counterparts at the start of the transition period and 
political decisions at the beginning of the 2010s created a particularly challenging 
environment for attracting FDI. Although HIPA has recently begun to focus more on 
the quality of FDI and to encourage a more innovation-driven approach towards FDI 
promotion, it is not yet clear how successful this approach will be. Indeed, there are a 
number of potential impediments to this development strategy including a lack of 
highly skilled employees and insufficient innovative firms (see below). Although 
Hungary has witnessed a sizeable increase in Business Expenditure on R&D, in terms 
of the size of company in which the Business Expenditure was invested, only 49.5% of 
the total Business Expenditure on R&D was invested in companies with 500 
employees or more (Eurostat 2018a). As discussed in the previous chapter, this amount 
for heavily industrialised, innovation-driven countries is usually between 70% and 84%. 
Clearly Hungary is still considerably below this percentage at present.  
 
Innovation performance of Hungary 
In spite of the ongoing policy attention that innovation has received in Hungary 
and an overall increase in expenditure on R&D, particularly from the business sector, 
there has been a disappointing and paradoxical lack of improvement in Hungary’s 
innovation performance (see Table 10). For example, according to the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission 2004; European Commission 2016a), 
Hungary remains considerably below the EU average and it has even been surpassed by 
Malta and Slovakia, countries which Hungary was ahead of in 2004. Even more 
concerning is the fact that according to the 2017 Scoreboard, Hungary’s performance 
has actually ‘declined by 3.5% relative to that of the EU in 2010’ (European Commission 
2017a:58)3. The World Economic Forum (2006; 2016) also shows a worrying trajectory 
in Hungary’s ‘Innovation’ index which has declined from 2006 when Hungary was 
ranked 31st (out of 125) with a score of 3.82 (out of 7) to 80th (out of 128) with a score of 
3.24 (again out of 7) in 2016. This raises serious questions about why, with such a 
number of strategies and policies being produced, Hungary’s innovation performance is 
                                                             
3 Incidentally, this was the same percentage of decline observed in the Czech Republic during this 
period. 
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not only failing to catch up with the performance of Western Member States but is 
even falling behind that of comparable Central and Eastern European neighbours. 
 
Table 10: Hungary’s overall innovation ranking in the European Innovation 
Scoreboard (EIS) 2007-2017 
Year Ranking 
2017 23rd (Moderate Innovator) 
2016 21st (Moderate Innovator) 
2015 20th (Moderate Innovator) 
2014 20th (Moderate Innovator) 
2013 21st (Moderate Innovator) 
2011 19th (Moderate Innovator) 
2010 21st (Moderate Innovator) 
2009 22nd (Moderate Innovator) 
2008 21st (Catching-Up Country) 
2007 Catching-Up Country 
(Source: European Commission 2007-European Commission 2017a) 
 
Based on the dimensions of the Scoreboard (European Commission 2017a:58), 
areas in which Hungary shows relative strengths are in ‘Employment impacts’, ‘Sales 
impacts’ and ‘Innovation-friendly environment’. The dimensions in which Hungary is 
notably weak are ‘Innovators’, ‘Finance and support’ and ‘Intellectual assets’. In fact, 
Hungary’s score for the ‘Innovators’ dimension is particularly low and has even 
witnessed a sizeable decrease especially in the area of SMEs producing marketing or 
organisation innovations. By far the greatest decrease however, has been in the 
‘Linkages’ dimension with a very sharp 70.4% decline in the private co-funding of R&D 
expenditure.  
Considerable frustration was expressed during expert interviews conducted for 
this research (Government Official 11 2016, Government Official 12 2016, Government 
Official 13 2016) that the same problems are constantly recurring and that the 
government is not taking sufficient action in order to tackle these issues. Indeed, the 
weaknesses of the Hungarian system during the transition period as identified earlier, 
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such as chaotic governance of the innovation system, low level of innovation within 
SMEs and insufficient human resources, continue to be the main weaknesses identified 
in the Peer Review carried out by the EU (European Commission 2016b) and also 
throughout the course of this research. Whilst pockets of improvement can be noted, 
such as an increase in expenditure from the business sector on R&D, there are still 
critical issues which are preventing the development of the Hungarian NSI. Similarly to 
the Czech Republic, this research suggests that explanation for this can be provided by 
understanding the role of historical legacies in shaping present institutions, especially 
informal institutions or the accepted ‘ways of doing things’.     
With regard to the influence of the EU, although acceding to the EU appears to 
have resulted in formal institutional change and greater attention being paid towards 
innovation policy, this has not led to a comparative improvement in Hungary’s 
innovation performance. As a result, Hungary’s disappointing innovation performance 
weakens the ability of the EU to reach its goal of becoming the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world. The following section looks at the steps the 
EU has taken to try and influence the development of the Hungarian NSI and identifies 
how a number of the institutional constraints, specifically informal institutions with 
historical origins and, in more recent years, those which have developed as a result of 
Hungary’s dependence on FDI,  are currently impeding the Europeanisation process.  
 
6.2) The Europeanisation of the Hungarian NSI 
As noted previously, innovation has been a key focus of the EU since the 1990s 
and, consequently, the EU has invested considerable effort into the task of improving 
the innovation performance of its Member States. However, much like the Czech 
Republic, this research suggests that there are various national characteristics, many of 
which have historical origins, for which the EU’s policy is a poor fit and which are 
preventing the EU from being able to influence the Hungarian NSI more significantly. 
This study shows that there are a number of areas of misfit, most of which are similar to 
those of the Czech Republic, which are limiting the influence of the EU. In order to 
analyse this in more detail, the following sections look firstly at how the EU has tried to 
influence the Hungarian NSI and the outcomes that can be observed. Secondly, the 
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areas of misfit between the EU’s innovation policy approach and the Hungarian NSI are 
identified and discussed.    
 
The EU’s Innovation Policy and the Hungarian NSI 
The EU’s involvement in assisting Hungary with its transition to a decentralised 
liberal democratic system began in 1989 through the ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
for Restructuring their Economies’ (PHARE) programme. As noted in Chapter 4, 
PHARE was an EU initiative which provided grant finance to support countries to the 
stage where they were ready to assume the obligations of membership of the EU 
(European Parliament 1998). Hungary subsequently submitted its membership 
application to the EU on 31st March 1994 and in 2002, subject to a national referendum, 
Hungary was invited to join the EU. The referendum on Hungary’s membership to the 
EU took place in 2003 and with a turnout of 45.6%, lower than had been anticipated, 
the proposal was approved by 83.8% of the voters. Finally, on 1st May 2004, together 
with the Czech Republic and eight other countries, Hungary became an EU Member 
State.  
In terms of the impact of accession to the EU on the Hungarian NSI, one area of 
significant change was that, on becoming an EU Member State, a sizeable amount of 
funding became available to Hungary through the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 
which emphasise R&D and innovation. During the period between 2004 and 2006, 
Structural Funds supported almost 20,000 projects in Hungary creating nearly 22,000 
jobs and 47 Cohesion Fund projects were approved by the EU (European Commission 
2009a). In other words, Structural Funds began to play an important role in supporting 
the public financing of innovation-related activities. However, as discussed in more 
detail below, there are various concerns about how effective this funding has been at 
achieving its aims in practice.  
With regard to the policy documents that Hungary has produced since joining 
the EU, the documents repeatedly claim to be guided by the EU’s innovation vision. For 
example, the Mid-Term Science and Technology Policy 2007-2013 references the 
strategic goals of the EU and notes that ‘[r]eaching Europe’s common competitiveness 
goal demands a harmonized strategic approach in the whole of the EU and individual 
member countries’ (Government of Hungary 2007:5). Some of the targets set out in the 
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policy are even based on the EU’s main benchmarking tool, the European Innovation 
Scoreboard, such as the previously mentioned target that Hungary should reach the EU 
average for the Scoreboard’s Summary Innovation Index by 2013. A similar observation 
can made of more recent strategies which, it is claimed, ‘have been strongly driven and 
inspired by the EU context (e.g. the new Horizon 2020 and other policies adopted for 
the new programming period 2014-2020) and have a broad coverage of relevant R&I 
issues’ (European Commission 2015:24). In terms, therefore, of meeting the EU criteria 
and appearing to comply with the EU’s innovation policy approach, at a nominal level, 
Hungary can be seen to have done so.   
However, Havas (2011) notes that, in practice, Hungary has adopted a ‘special’ 
way of planning in which policy-makers simply repeat the EU guidelines and submit 
the requested documents to Brussels to meet the formal requirements without any 
proper strategic thinking. A major repercussion of this is that innovation policy is not 
aligned with the national development strategy (a previously highlighted problem) and 
thus public funding, as well as EU resources, cannot be efficiently spent. Indeed, 
although Hungary generally appears to comply with the requirements of the EU, 
Szalavetz (2014) notes that what has actually taken place in Hungary is more akin to 
façade compliance and represents a considerable ‘missed opportunity’. Stressing the 
role of agency, she argues that Hungary is an example in which ‘rationalist adaption 
occurred (i.e. formalistic adaptation, driven by actors’ opportunistic response to 
incentives) rather than sociological adaptation (driven by norms of appropriate 
behaviour and identification with the EU)’ (Szalavetz 2014:46). This research concurs 
with these observations and finds that Hungary’s inability to adapt to the EU’s ‘ways of 
doing things’ can, at least in part, be explained by a poor fit between the EU’s 
innovation policy and the Hungarian national institutions, both formal and informal 
institutions, which are strongly influenced by its path dependent historical legacies and 
economic structure. The following five areas of misfit are presented in support of this 
observation.  
 
Area of misfit 1: Dependency on foreign companies 
 Similarly to the Czech Republic, the dependence on FDI was, at least during the 
transition period, necessitated by the weak economic conditions inherited from the 
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communist period. The recent slowdown in FDI notwithstanding, Hungary has been a 
major recipient of FDI and the reliance on foreign investment has become a path 
dependency for both the Hungarian economy and its NSI. Although, in terms of 
numbers, SMEs make up the majority of businesses in Hungary, the importance of 
large, typically foreign owned, companies is much higher than their number would 
suggest. In fact, in 2014, the share of foreign controlled enterprises in the total number 
of enterprises was three times higher than the EU average, 3.55% compared to 1.14% 
(Döry et al. 2018:5). The average share of these companies in total employment was 
26.4% and, in some industries, particularly electricity, manufacturing and information 
and communication, the share of employment was even higher, 52.7%, 48.3%, and 
39.3% respectively. As a result, the ‘Hungarian economy still suffers from the duality of 
its economic structure where, in general, the few large, foreign-owned enterprises 
perform technology-intensive, export-oriented activities and the large number of 
smaller domestic owned enterprises struggle with inadequate capital, lack of 
technologies and low level networking’ (Döry et al. 2018:5-6). 
Hungary is undoubtedly very dependent on these foreign companies and being a 
Dependent Market Economy (DME) has created a particularly specific set of 
conditions in which MNEs have considerable influence over the Hungarian NSI. Not 
only are these foreign investors significant players in terms of their economic and 
innovation contribution but, and largely as a result of this, they also hold a considerable 
amount of political power. As noted in an interview with a government official with 
experience within this field of policy-making (Government Official 12 2017), the MNEs 
are easily able to contact the decision-makers and can, therefore, have a direct impact 
on the type of programmes being offered. One such example, which at the time of 
writing was still not officially documented, concerns pressure from MNES to initiate a 
programme that will support the process of exporting for large companies. In other 
words, foreign companies have become so powerful in Hungary that their influence 
even extends to policy-making decisions.   
 In addition, these MNEs also have significant power within the labour market 
as the kudos attached to working for these bigger, well-known companies makes them 
desirable to young graduates. Their advantage is further heightened by the fact that 
they are able to offer a higher wage with which smaller, national companies often 
struggle to compete. An interview with the CEO of a domestic company (Business 
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Leader 5 2016), for example, suggested that it would need government subsidies to be 
able to compete for labour with the MNEs. This presents a very challenging situation in 
Hungary as, in order for smaller, indigenous companies to improve their innovation 
capacity, they need to be able to attract the brightest and most capable employees. 
However, they are struggling to do this due to the fact that these sought-after 
employees are lured by the prestige and higher wages offered by the MNEs. Given that, 
as previously discussed, these foreign companies are generally poorly integrated into 
the national NSI and that by dominating the labour market they are making it more 
difficult for national firms to attract the brightest and most talented employees, this 
places Hungary in a very vulnerable position. Similarly to the Czech Republic, there is 
the potential that these companies may at some point move their activities to another 
location, leaving a sizeable hole in both the Hungarian economy and its NSI.  
With regard to the EU, the reasons for which the EU’s innovation policy and 
measurement methods are a poor fit are similar to those for the Czech Republic 
discussed in the previous chapter. In short, the EU’s current policy approach, the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy, fails to sufficiently recognise or accommodate one of the main 
characteristics of the Hungarian political economic structure, namely its dependence 
on FDI. In its present format, the Smart Specialisation Strategy lacks emphasis on 
internationalisation in terms of learning from MNEs in order to improve local capacity, 
something which is vital to both improving and protecting the Hungarian NSI in the 
long-term. The nature of the Hungarian political economic structure requires a distinct 
policy approach that emphasises the role of MNEs for developing the Hungarian NSI. 
Due to the fact that this element is lacking within the EU’s present innovation policy 
approach, the EU is unable to provide the guidance and assistance which are necessary 
for tackling the challenges currently facing the Hungarian NSI. 
 
Area of misfit 2: Public management of NSI 
 A significant legacy of the collapse of the Soviet Union was that, on returning to 
a liberal market economy, Hungary inherited a research system which was, firstly, 
highly compartmentalised with a considerable amount of power wielded by HAS and, 
secondly, policy-makers had very little experience with designing innovation policy 
and had to develop this capacity from a low starting point. Developing a successive 
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governance structure for innovation has been hindered by the frequent restructuring 
exercises and interviews (Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 7 2016; 
Academic 5 2016) suggested that power struggles were preventing a more collaborative 
approach with HAS, in particular, resistant to change and reform. In addition, 
Hungary’s ability to develop achievable and effective policies has likely been impeded 
by the lack of an evaluation culture which was frequently highlighted in interviews 
conducted for this research (Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 7 2016; 
Government Official 10 2016) as well as a number of external reports (European 
Commission 2016; OECD 2008). Not only has the lack of evaluation exercises limited 
Hungary’s ability to understand the efficiency of the policies it has developed but it has 
also reduced the potential to learn from previous policy in order to inform subsequent 
policy decisions. Indeed, such a poor evaluation culture means that Hungarian policy-
makers still have very limited information on what works, what does not and why. This 
could provide some explanation for the previously mentioned lack of strategic 
awareness in the innovation policies designed to date as well as concerns about an 
implementation gap (European Commission 2015c). 
 It was noted earlier that during the transition period, innovation-related 
activities received minimal attention as the Hungarian Government, as well as other 
governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe, managed the weak economic 
conditions which were a legacy of the communist period and focused on the tasks of 
overseeing the transition and establishing economic stability. The fact that, since EU 
accession, Hungary has devoted more attention towards the task of developing 
innovation policies, albeit with the weaknesses previously discussed, might suggest 
that innovation has now become a greater government priority. This in turn, would 
mark a notable departure from the status quo during the transition period. However, 
evidence uncovered during the course of this research raises doubts about this having 
occurred. Various expert interviews (Academic 3 2016; Academic 5 2016; Government 
Official 9 2016) suggested that innovation is still given insufficient attention by the 
Hungarian Government. Due to the fact that innovation is a long-term investment and 
one which is unlikely to produce immediate gains, it was noted that innovation in 
Hungary has continually been sidelined as attention has primarily focused on areas 
related to macroeconomic concerns. Some major economic challenges, especially after 
the financial and economic crises, have arguably reinforced this tendency. Difficulty 
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with long-term planning has been further exacerbated by, the previously discussed, 
institutional instability and frequent restructuring of the governance structure for 
innovation with each new institution and leader tending to forge a new direction.  
 An example of this can be seen in the government’s commitment, or lack 
thereof, towards R&D funding. In fact, in terms of Government Expenditure on R&D, 
Hungary is one of the worst performers in Europe. Even more worrying is the fact that 
government spending has, in recent years significantly decreased from a peak of 0.5% in 
2013 to just 0.32% in 2016 (Eurostat 2018e). This is very concerning for Hungary 
because ‘[t]he decline in the public intensity in R&D intensity combined with the 
intrinsic difficulties to sustain the past trend of increase in business R&D expenditure, 
raises difficulty in reaching the target set by the government in the National RDI 
Strategy 2013-2020 to increase the country’s R&D expenditure to 1.8% of the GDP by 
2020 and 3% by 2030’ (European Commission 2015b:27). Indeed, with a Gross 
Expenditure on Research and Development of just 1.3% in 2017, Hungary still remains 
considerably behind this target. 
Perhaps even more striking is the fact that the Hungarian Government has 
repeatedly reneged on its agreed contribution towards innovation-related activities. 
For example, as previously discussed, the reorganisation of the governance structure for 
innovation at the beginning of 2015 was, accompanied by a restructuring of the funding 
system in which the two previous funds, the Research and Technological Innovation 
Fund and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, were amalgamated into the National 
Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The Research and Technological Fund 
part of the fund is comprised of an innovation levy (0.3% of the tax base) paid by large 
companies (more than 50 employees) – which is reduced if that particular company 
incurs R&D expenditures – and also a contribution paid by the central budget. The 
government, however, has consistently failed to match the amount of collective levies 
by additional funding (European Commission 2016c:64) and, as a result, the innovation 
levy has become yet another unwelcome tax burden for companies with very 
questionable benefit.  
An interview with a government official (Government Official 6 2016) suggested 
that the Fund is currently being poorly and inconsistently managed with a tendency to 
produce an unsustainable and unrealistic number of calls whilst the Fund is healthy, 
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leading to an overstretching of the Fund and then a drastic reduction in the number of 
calls until the Fund is able to recover. For example, this happened in 2010 when the 
incoming Hungarian Government suspended all disbursements from the Research and 
Technological Innovation Fund and ceased accepting new project proposals. This 
practice has also been noted in a previous study (Szpor et al. 2014) which found that 
Hungary has traditionally opted for a boom and bust policy in which the budget deficit 
would soar before being followed by a number of austerity measures with innovation-
related funding among the first ‘victims’ of the public spending cuts. The research by 
Szpor et al. (2014:11) goes on to note that the lack of commitment to the funding of 
innovation-related activities in Hungary ‘clearly suggests that STI [Science, Technology 
and Innovation] policy is not perceived as a solution; but rather as a burden on the 
budget’. Unsurprisingly, interview participants (Government Official 6 2016; 
Government Official 10 2016; Government Official 12 2017) were very concerned about 
the long-term effects on the Hungarian economy of continuing with this short-sighted 
approach towards priority setting. 
The lack of increase in government funding has, to a certain extent, been offset 
by an increase in funding from the EU and the increase in Business Expenditure on 
R&D. In fact, as shown in Figure 11, Gross Expenditure on R&D has witnessed a 
gradual increase. The decline in Government Expenditure on R&D means that, at 
present, Hungary is highly reliant on the contribution of EU funding to support the 
public funding of innovation. However, there are concerns that EU funds are essentially 
being used a substitute for national funding ‘rather than ensuring complementarity 
between the two funding streams’ (European Commission 2015:28). Even as a 
substitute, nonetheless, the effectiveness of the Structural Funds should be questioned. 
Indeed, interviews conducted for this research suggested that the system through 
which EU funding is distributed prevents it from having a more significant impact on 
the Hungarian NSI. Owing to the fact that Central Hungary is classified as a ‘more 
developed region’, it is eligible for a much smaller proportion of Structural Funds than 
the surrounding ‘less developed regions’. It is important to note though that Hungary is 
a highly centralised country with an overwhelming majority of innovative firms located 
in Central Hungary (European Commission 2017b).  
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Figure 11: Gross expenditure on R&D in Hungary 2004-2017 (% GDP) 
 
(Source: Eurostat 2018c) 
 
Interview participants expressed much frustration with the EU’s method for 
allocating funding as, although the rationale for investing in lesser developed regions is 
clear, the outcome is that a much smaller proportion of funding is available to the 
companies driving innovation in Hungry and that could use the funding more 
effectively, which are located in the central region. In other words, as noted by the EU 
itself, the ‘differentiated eligibility for EU funding among the capital region and the rest 
of the regions creates complexities in ensuring the resources for the operations of the 
most important R&I [Research and Innovation] capacities of the country that are 
located in the capital region’ (European Commission 2015:28). It was claimed by an 
interview participant who had been heavily involved in funding decisions in Hungary 
(Government Official 6 2016) that the small amount of national funds which are 
available have to be used to ‘recover these holes’ and to ensure that the companies most 
able to improve Hungary’s innovation performance are able to receive the funding they 
require.   
It is worth noting that the situation in Hungary is considerably different from 
that in the Czech Republic due to the fact that, in Hungary, the entire central region, 
which includes and surrounds Budapest, is considered more developed. In the Czech 
Republic, on the other hand, whilst Prague is classified as being more developed, the 
areas immediately surrounding Prague are not and are therefore eligible to receive a 
greater proportion of Structural Funds. One example of this in practice is the Extreme 
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Light Infrastructure (ELI) laser research centre which, in Hungary, has been set up in 
Szeged, a city roughly 170 km South-East of Budapest (the ELI research centre in the 
Czech Republic was set up roughly 20km from Prague). The increased geographic 
distance in Hungary makes it more difficult for linkages and collaboration to occur 
between the ELI research centre and the more innovative companies which are based in 
Central Hungary. This raises important questions about whether the EU’s method for 
allocating funding is effective for a highly-centralised country such as Hungary.  
In short, the lack of government commitment to the funding of innovation in 
Hungary would suggest that there is a clear inconsistency in terms the EU’s vision for 
an innovation-driven economy and that of Hungary in which innovation is seen as 
something of a budgetary burden. For example, whilst the EU has substantially 
increased its budget for innovation, Hungary is actually showing the opposite 
trajectory and Government Expenditure on R&D has recently decreased. Although, on 
the one hand, the fact that Hungary has produced a number of innovation-related 
policies and strategies since its accession to the EU (see earlier section) would suggest 
that greater emphasis is now being placed on the role of innovation for economic 
growth, this, on the other hand, is somewhat contradicted by the lack of commitment 
towards government funding. Indeed, from this perspective, it could be suggested that 
the tendency to sideline innovation, as was done during the transition period, and focus 
primarily on macroeconomic policy has become a characteristic of the government’s 
approach to policy prioritisation in Hungary. Moreover, the EU’s Structural Funds are 
unable to effectively substitute the lack of public funding in Hungary as they are less 
available to companies in Central Hungary, the area with the greatest concentration of 
innovative enterprises. As a result, the dichotomy in terms of the EU’s approach 
towards innovation and the one currently being pursued in Hungary is a major obstacle 
to the Europeanisation process. 
  
Area of misfit 3: Lack of trust and collaboration 
Stakeholder involvement has for some time been particularly problematic in 
Hungary due to reluctance on the part of some actors to collaborate and cooperate with 
one another. This could, in part, be explained by the fact that Hungary is both 
politically and geographically a highly centralised country. With the creation of the 
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new NRDIO office, innovation is now an even more centralised topic, with interviews 
suggesting that this new office has taken a particularly top-down approach and is less 
actively seeking the contribution of stakeholders. Another explanation for this lack of 
stakeholder involvement, and a problem which was repeatedly identified in interviews 
(Academic 3 2016; Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 10 2016; 
Government Official 12 2017) as well as other studies (European Commission 2015b; 
Havas 2011), is the lack of trust, or even distrust, between actors in the Hungarian NSI, 
particularly between government and companies and, to a certain extent, between the 
companies themselves. It was claimed by a government official (Government Official 12 
2017) that this lack of trust is a path dependent trait inherited from the communist 
period and, indeed, it is argued that a number of Hungary’s deficiencies ‘pertain to a 
long-lasting institutional legacy and culture that did not place a strong emphasis on 
openness, collaboration and communication’ (European Commission 2015:22). Given 
that the lack of trust has become so embedded in the Hungarian NSI, this is likely to be 
particularly difficult problem for Hungary to overcome. 
The problem of lack of trust is being perpetuated by ongoing concerns relating 
to corruption and transparency. The issue of corruption is currently very problematic in 
Hungary as was highlighted in a number of interviews with business leaders who had 
experienced issues with corruption to the extent that, in some cases, it had discouraged 
them from continuing to expand their business profile in Hungary (Business Leader 3 
2016; Business Leader 5 2016). Not only can corruption discourage investments from 
foreign companies but research also suggests that political corruption can impede firm 
innovation by reducing innovation incentives due to high extortion risk and by 
decreasing the threat of competition (Huang & Yuan 2019). According to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2017), 
Hungary is ranked 66 out of 180 and has a transparency score of 45 (with 0 being highly 
corrupt and 100 being very clean). In fact, according to this measurement index, 
Hungary is one of the worst performing EU Member States (only Bulgaria, which is 
ranked 71st, is lower than Hungary).  
In recent years, concerns about corruption and dedemocratisation in Hungary 
have been gaining momentum thanks, in large part, to negative tendencies affecting 
civil society and independent media enacted by the current Hungarian Government 
(Bogaards 2018). However, corruption is not a new issue in Hungary and, in fact, was 
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seen as a potential impediment to the establishment and of a well-functioning 
democracy during the transition period and sustainment thereafter (Rose 2001). The 
reasons for this concern were twofold. Firstly, corruption was increasingly being seen 
as a legacy of the communist period during which time bribes, kickbacks and payoffs 
were ubiquitous and corruption was even seen as ‘normal in Communist regimes’ (Rose 
et al. 1998:219). Holmes (1993:55) for example, notes that ‘public ownership of the 
means of production and state involvement in virtually all areas of society, added to the 
relatively low level of answerability of public officials to the citizenry meant that 
communist states were among the most susceptible to the phenomenon of corruption’. 
Secondly, rather than breaking with this practice, on entering the transition period, the 
process of privatisation combined with weak formal intuitions created yet more 
opportunities for corruption to take place. This was confirmed in a report by the World 
Bank (World Bank 2000) which identified that corruption had played a part in 
numerous cases in transition countries where control of state assets was transferred 
through nontransparent means to those with political influence.  
In terms of legacy, Sandholtz and Taagepera (2007:109) argue that not only did  
communism create the structural incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviours but 
that these ‘became such a widespread fact of life that they became rooted in the culture 
in these societies – that is, the social norms and practices prevailing in communist 
societies’. Indeed, the ongoing issues of corruption during the transition period, 
indicate that the collapse of the communist regime was not sufficient to ‘erase the 
cultural values and attitudes that tolerated, if not encourage, corrupt practices’ 
(Sandholtz & Taagepera 2007:111). Explanation for this observation can be provided by 
a closer understanding of the role of formal and informal institutions and how they are 
both shaped by and shape behaviour. For example, North (1990) notes that whilst 
formal institutions can be changed relatively quickly, informal institutions require 
longer periods to establish change as actors adjust their behaviour to correspond to the 
advantages and costs of the new system. If, as in the case of corruption during the 
transition period in Hungary, actors continue to associate benefits with the original 
informal institutions, there will be a resistance to breaking with the past and, 
consequently, the path dependency will continue to exist.  
The ongoing issue of the lack of accountability and the tendency for too much to 
be done behind closed doors was frequently reiterated in interviews (Government 
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Official 6 2016; Business Leader 5 2016; Academic 3 2016). The over-centralisation of the 
new system and the considerable power of just one actor, the President of NRDIO, 
were also recurrent concerns. In the words of one interview participant with expert 
knowledge of the Hungarian situation, ‘because the resources are very finite they must 
be distributed carefully and it is much better if such a board discusses this than by 
various bargains, gives and takes behind the scene’ (Academic 5 2016). There was, 
however, little confidence expressed that accountability and transparency would 
improve under the current regime. It was suggested in interviews with experts from 
within the field (Academic 3 2016; Government Official 6 2016) that much of the system 
is gripped by power games, impeding the vitally important progress and changes which 
need to be achieved.  
With regard to the EU, the lack of trust and collaboration has two important 
implications. Firstly, the difficulties of ensuring stakeholder engagement caused by the 
lack of trust raises questions about the extent to which the latest innovation strategy, 
the Smart Specialisation Strategy, and its emphasis on a bottom-up approach to policy-
making is realistically feasible in the current Hungarian environment. Given that the 
country lacks the necessary conditions, such as stakeholder involvement and a 
collaborative culture, the Hungarian experience casts strong doubt on the 
appropriateness of such a strategy for a country in which lack of trust is an embedded 
problem. Interview participants (Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 12 
2017) claimed that the Smart Specialisation Strategy approach was better suited to 
developed countries with more advanced funding systems and more experience with 
stakeholder engagement. Indeed, it was already accepted, less than two years since the 
establishment of the Smart Specialisation Strategy, that it would be unlikely to have 
the impact that was hoped for and that ‘after five years no one would have read this 
Strategy again’ (Government Official 12 2017).   
Secondly, in terms of the EU’s Structural Funds, a number of concerns were 
expressed during interviews that the potential benefits of this funding are not being 
realised due to the inefficient use of this funding. One of the main issues relates to the 
problem of corruption which, according to various recent studies investigating the 
misuse of EU funds (Fazekas 2017; Transparency International Hungary 2015), is 
having particularly negative consequences in Hungary. For example, a study by 
Corruption Research Centre Budapest (Hajdu & Miklós 2017) on competition and 
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corruption risks in Hungarian public procurement found that EU-funded projects 
suffered more strongly from corruption than those funded from the national budget. 
The study concluded that ‘EU funding has perverse effects in public procurement’ 
(Hajdu & Miklós 2017:9-10) due to the fact that it has aided in reducing the intensity of 
competition as well as increasing both the level of corruption risk and the weight of 
price distortion. This raises serious questions about, firstly, the effectiveness of 
maintaining such a high level of EU funding to Hungary when, despite the national 
programmes being negotiated with Brussels, Hungary is unable to use the funding 
efficiently and instead ‘it is practically stolen’ (Academic 5 2016). Secondly, it also 
highlights limitations in the EU’s current monitoring of the use of Structural Funds. 
Interviews conducted for this research (Academic 3 2016; Government Official 6 2016; 
Government Official 10) suggested that the EU’s monitoring capacity was generally 
seen as weak and that reversing these trends in the misuse of funds will be extremely 
challenging.   
 The lack of trust in Hungary, which has historical origins and continues to be 
reinforced by ongoing issues of corruption, is a major obstacle to the EU’s attempts to 
influence the development of the Hungarian NSI. In particular, the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy, which requires stakeholder involvement and actor collaboration, is especially 
difficult in Hungary, a highly-centralised country which lacks the open environment 
that is critical to this style of policy-making. Moreover, not only is the EU’s innovation 
policy approach a poor fit for the Hungarian situation but the impact of the EU’s main 
policy tool, the Structural Funds, is also highly questionable. In fact, the influx of EU 
funding has possibly even exacerbated the longstanding issues relating to corruption. 
This finding is very concerning because in addition to deepening Hungary’s ‘lack of 
trust’ path dependency, it also prevents the EU funding from being used in a way which 
can maximise its benefit for the Hungarian NSI.   
 
Area of misfit 4: Lack of innovative entrepreneurialism 
An issue on which interview participants were unanimous concerns the lack of 
innovative activity amongst small and medium sized indigenous companies in Hungary. 
The number of SMEs (between 10 and 249 employees) classified as ‘Innovative 
Enterprises’ in 2014 was just 3,428 (compared to  an EU average of 12,789) (Eurostat 
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2018c). As was noted in an interview with an academic (Academic 4 2016), Hungarian 
firms typically carry out little ‘R&D’ and tend to focus their activities on just ‘D’. Based 
on the categories identified in Chapter 2, Hungarian companies typically follow a 
‘dependent’ or ‘traditional’ strategy in which very little research is actually conducted 
by the companies themselves. Again, this is not a new problem for Hungary as the 
country’s previous institutional structure and recent economic development strategy 
has for some time hindered industrial innovation. The tendency for companies to focus 
on development is a path dependent legacy of the communist era, in which the roles of 
research and development were clearly divided between the research institutes on the 
one hand and the companies on the other. 
As discussed previously, during the communist period most industrial research 
was transferred to the industrial, or branch, institutes. Whilst this led to a sizeable 
growth in the number of research institutes engaged in industrial research, 
paradoxically, the benefits of this development to industry were limited. The reasons 
for this were, firstly, serious problems of technology transfer were caused by the fact 
that the institutes performing R&D were not directly attached to companies. Secondly, 
the average qualification of the industrial R&D’s personnel was low, with only 4% 
holding a ‘Candidate of Science’ degree which is comparable to a PhD in 1991 
(Biegelbauer 2019). Finally, as a result of the establishment of the branch institute 
system, in house R&D was severely neglected. Whilst there were pockets of success, 
especially in organic/inorganic chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Inzelt 1994), the 
institutional structure for industrial research, on the whole, was riddled with 
inefficiencies that restricted the innovation capacity of companies. These problems 
were exacerbated during the transition period for two reasons. Initially, the sudden loss 
of markets and exposure to greater competition meant that many companies either 
closed or were forced to focus their efforts on survival and away from investing in 
R&D. Subsequently, the privatisation process saw many companies being bought by 
foreign purchasers who chose to conduct R&D in the parent country and cease R&D 
activity in Hungary (Romijn 1998). Thus, for some time, Hungarian companies have 
endured a number of circumstances which have stifled research and innovation.  
Whilst indicators of Hungary’s innovation performance do suggest areas of 
improvement (European Commission 2016a), this is due predominantly to foreign or 
foreign dominated multinationals which, as already discussed, have a significant 
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presence in Hungary. The innovation performance of SMEs is, by contrast, much 
weaker suggesting, again, that Hungary’s progress toward becoming an innovation-
driven economy is very much dependent on foreign-controlled MNEs. The poor 
innovation performance amongst SMEs is even more puzzling considering the sizeable 
amount of public support for SMEs in Hungary (Table 11 below). As can be seen from 
these data, there is a clear incongruity between the percentages of SMEs receiving 
public support, nearly half, and those which are classified as innovative, which is 
considerably lower.  
 
Table 11: Innovative firms in Hungary 
Innovative firms (product/process or organisational/marketing) 
Total (as a percentage of 
all firms) 
SMEs (as a percentage of 
SMEs) 
Large (as a percentage of 
large firms) 
31.3 29.9 65.5 
Firms receiving public support 
45.6 47.2 35.1 
(Source: OECD 2015b) 
 
As show in Table 11, the difference between the percentage of innovative SMEs 
and innovative large firms is very significant in Hungary. A report undertaken by the 
EU suggested that these ‘opposite trends of declining shares of innovative firms and 
increasing levels of business R&D expenditure(…)demonstrate a weak capacity of the 
R&D conducted in Hungarian firms to significantly contribute to innovation’ 
(European Commission 2015:16). In interviews conducted for this research, two key 
factors were highlighted which could potentially provide some explanation for this 
observation; (1) insufficient human resources and (2) lack of targeted funding. In terms 
of human resources, this is a problem which has been made particularly acute due to 
the fact that, as discussed earlier, national Hungarian SMEs have to compete for labour 
with the large MNEs. This problem is further exacerbated by the inability of the 
183 
 
Hungarian tertiary education system to supply sufficient qualified labour available in 
the first place. (For a detailed discussion of this, see below.)  
With regard to funding, given that SMEs are receiving considerable public 
support and yet failing to significantly improve their innovation performance, it could 
be suggested that, at present, the use of government subsidies is having an adverse 
effect. Hungary has directed a significant proportion of its public expenditure on R&D 
towards the business sector and expert interviews (Academic 4 2016; Academic 5 2016; 
Business Leader 5 2016) noted that the poor targeting of this funding was having a 
negative impact on encouraging an environment that would enable innovation in 
Hungary. Indeed, some companies are being deterred from applying for government 
funding due to the administrative burden and the perceived lack of transparency and 
clarity with which the funding is allocated. In addition to this, interviews also 
highlighted concerns with the reviewing bodies and the ability of those individuals to 
capture the innovative values of a new product or idea. It was indicated that there is 
little motivation for personnel with higher expertise to participate in reviewing bodies 
and that, therefore, these bodies are not best positioned to judge the potential benefits, 
or drawbacks, of a new direction. Based on this evidence, it would seem that a key 
element for improving the efficiency of public investment in R&D would be to make it 
more attractive for firms to apply by reducing the administrative burden, improving 
transparency of the application and review process and increasing the expertise of the 
reviewing panels. 
In summary, Hungarian companies have for some time faced an environment 
which has made innovative activity more challenging. From the communist era, during 
which time the main role of firms was essentially seen as one of development and not 
related to the undertaking of research itself, to the transition period, in which the loss 
of income and privatisation led to the cessation of much company R&D activity. This 
section has shown that these intuitional legacies continue to restrict the role of 
national firms within the Hungarian NSI. The lack of innovative national companies 
has become a path dependency which is severely hindering the ability of Hungary to 
improve its NSI and to reach both its own national targets and the targets of the EU. It 
also represents a further impediment to the successful implementation of a Smart 
Specialisation Strategy, and more specifically the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process, 
which is a key feature of the EU’s Smart Specialisation approach (similar to the 
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situation in the Czech Republic as discussed in Chapter 5). Yet, the experience of 
Hungary has also shown that a greater amount of financial investment is not necessarily 
a solution to this problem. Indeed, in order for funding to be effectively used not only 
must it be well targeted but other factors, such as the provision of qualified human 
resources, need to be provided. Creating the framework conditions which can 
encourage and support the establishment of innovative local companies in order to 
overcome this path dependent trait, is vital to improving the Hungarian NSI.   
 
Area of misfit 5: Education system and skilled labour 
On entering the transition period, not only did the Hungarian research system 
face the challenge of reinstating research at universities but also that of redesigning the 
teaching curriculum so that they were based on market needs and research interests 
and not on political planning as had been expected during the communist period. As 
was noted earlier, the lack of research being carried out in universities during the 
communist period meant that universities were poorly integrated into the innovation 
system which, in turn, resulted in a mismatch between university syllabuses and the 
skills required by the business sector. Interviews conducted for this research 
(Government Official 7 2016; Government Official 8 2016) indicated that this remains a 
major problem within the Hungarian tertiary education system and that graduates 
frequently require retraining when entering the workforce as they lack the knowledge 
and skills required by the company. As it is, however, common for students to work at a 
company whilst undertaking their studies, retraining in these instances is of course not 
necessary. Nonetheless, it does mean that the individual is often already committed to a 
particular company and will therefore not be available for other companies to compete 
for their employment. This would likely place companies who are not in a position to 
offer a position to an undergraduate student, such as SMEs with fewer resources, at a 
disadvantage.  
According to interviews with various expert participants (Academic 4 2016; 
Government Official 7 2016; Government Official 8 2016), students who work whilst 
undertaking their degree frequently drop out of degrees as there is a significant 
incongruity between the university teaching and the skills required by the company. 
With a dropout rate of 47% in 2011, Hungary is one of the worst performing OECD 
185 
 
countries in this area (OECD 2015a). Whilst this is not direct proof of a lack of fit 
between Hungarian university syllabuses and the skills and knowledge requirements of 
companies, a high dropout rate can ‘indicate that the education system is not meeting 
students’ needs’ (OECD 2009:62). It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that 
insufficient skilled labour was repeatedly mentioned as the main concern for the future 
of the Hungarian innovation system amongst interviewees (Academic 4 2016; Academic 
5 2016; Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 7 2016; Government Official 8 
2016; Government Official 10 2016; Government Official 12 2017). This issue is being 
further exacerbated by (1) the education system and (2) emigration. In terms on the 
former, problems within the Hungarian education system were frequently identified as 
one of the principal causes of this problem. The Hungarian education system was 
described as outdated and failing to equip students with the necessary skills before 
joining the labour market. In fact, the Hungarian approach towards education is 
considered content-centred with insufficient focus on knowledge application and 
problem solving (OECD 2017).  
Perhaps the cause for greatest concern, however, is the apparent lack of priority 
given to education by the government. According to OECD data (OECD 2014), 
Hungary is one of the last OECD member countries in terms of education spending 
with only Columbia, Argentina and Chile spending less. This lack of spending is 
reflected in PISA statistics (PISA 2018) in which Hungary is in all areas – science, 
mathematics and reading skills in children aged 15 – slightly behind the OECD average 
with a decline in all three indicators since 2006. In terms of higher education, Hungary 
does not even rank in QS’s 50 world’s strongest higher education systems and has no 
universities in the top 500. This should be an area of considerable alarm because, as was 
repeatedly stated in interviews (Academic 4 2016; Academic 5 2016; Government 
Official 8 2016), human capital is vital for innovation. Or, in the words of an academic 
(Academic 5 2016), ‘without people, there can be no innovation’. The insufficient 
investment in the education system highlights an earlier point related to the lack of 
commitment being made by the Hungarian Government towards prioritising and 
acting on the task of developing its NSI. One potentially positive development is the 
Higher Education Strategy which was approved by the government in 2016 as part of 
its Change of Pace in Higher Education initiative. It is still too soon, however, to assess 
the impact of this new strategy.  
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With regard to emigration, this and the accompanying brain drain, has for some 
time been a concern in Hungary, especially since joining the EU and accepting the EU’s 
principle to allow free movement of labour. It was suggested in interviews (Business 
Leader 5 2016; Academic 5 2016) that this has become an even more problematic issue 
in Hungary owing to the considerable number of highly talented and well-educated 
people leaving due to political differences with the current government which came to 
power in 2010. Emigration statistics (Figure 12) do show that there has been a 
considerable rise in the number of people emigrating from Hungary since 2010 
although, of course, it is not possible with these data alone to make a direct correlation 
between emigration and political dissatisfaction. Hungary’s emigration problem is 
confounded by the fact that Hungary is not a particularly attractive opportunity to 
highly-skilled foreign workers owing in large part to the relatively low wages in 
comparison to, for example, Western European countries. The total number of foreign 
residents immigrating to Hungary in 2016 was 23,803 and the most significant number 
of foreign residents came from Romania (3,090), followed by Germany (2,282) and then 
China (1,461) (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2018a). Furthermore, the 
involvement of foreign personnel in science and technology in Hungary remains low 
(European Commission 2016c:49).  
 
Figure 12: Emigration from Hungary 2006-2015 
 
(Source: Eurostat 2018a) 
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of young researchers, provide a new supply of talented researcher, extend career 
possibilities and increase the competitiveness of MTA’s research institutes and 
participating universities’ (Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) 2018). In order to 
achieve this, the programme offers young researchers grants to support their research 
projects and establish a research team. The Momentum programme has helped to 
establish more than 100 groups and interviews suggested that the programme was 
generally seen as having been very successful. Some of the concerns, however, include 
the fact that the salaries of principal investigators are still not internationally 
competitive, the future of the newly-established research team is uncertain after the 
funded period comes to an end and also it has resulted in some tensions between 
beneficiaries of the grant and those who were not able to benefit from such a funding 
opportunity (European Commission 2016c:50). The task of encouraging researchers 
living outside Hungary is particularly challenging considering that, according to a 
study by the OECD in 2016, only about 10% would consider returning to their home 
country. In short, whilst Momentum has not offered a complete solution to the problem 
of emigration of young research personnel, it has at least provided a certain amount of 
assistance.  
The mismatch between university syllabuses and business needs, a legacy of the 
communist period, and Hungary’s ability, or lack thereof, to provide a tertiary 
education which can equip sufficient students with the knowledge and skills needed 
for an innovation-driven workforce remains an area of major concern. This is 
particularly worrying as not only does it prevent the tertiary education system from 
producing graduates with the necessary skills but it could also limit the perceived value 
of gaining academic qualifications. Indeed, the sizeable university dropout rate in 
Hungary indicates that there is a serious problem with the tertiary education system. 
Given the increasing rate of emigration, the inability to attract skilled workers and the 
problems within the education system, the labour force shows signs of becoming an 
area of serious concern for Hungary. This would impact significantly on Hungary’s 
ability to improve its NSI in the future and, in turn prevent greater improvement in its 
innovation performance. As noted in the previous chapter, the fact that the EU has 
limited authority or hard policy tools in the area of education policy significantly 
weakens the EU’s capacity to influence the development of this aspect of Hungarian 
NSI. 
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of the transition period, Hungary appeared to have the 
potential to be a star performer amongst Central and European countries. Almost three 
decades later, Hungary has not progressed as rapidly as had been hoped and, in fact, in 
recent years it has even shown a decline in some indicators. With regard to research 
and innovation, there has been a considerable lack of continuity in terms of its 
governance since the transition period and, whilst there is some hope expressed that 
the establishment of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office marks 
a new beginning, there is currently not sufficient evidence to support this assertion. In 
terms of the impact of the EU, similarly to the Czech Republic, there are a number of 
areas of misfit which are preventing the Europeanisation process. These areas of misfit 
are, in large part, the result of Hungary’s path dependent historical legacies and 
economic structure. The experience of Hungary suggests that the EU’s Innovation 
Policy and policy tools are a poor fit for these national specifics and this, in turn, is 
preventing the EU from influencing the Hungarian NSI more significantly.  
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7) Conclusion: Comparison of the Czech Republic and Hungary 
 
Introduction 
The Czech and Hungarian case studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 have 
sought to shed light on the role played by Europeanisation in the development of these 
NSIs. The aim of this chapter is to draw together the information presented in this 
thesis in order to answer the research questions and hypotheses set out in the initial 
chapters. The first section of this chapter, therefore, highlights discussion from the 
previous chapters concerning the extent to which the EU can be considered to have 
influenced the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. Secondly, this chapter compares the Czech 
and Hungarian experiences in order to identify why, notwithstanding the various 
problems discussed in Chapter 5, the Czech Republic has shown greater improvement 
in its innovation performance than Hungary. Using this information, a number of policy 
implications are then highlighted which could assist the EU in its attempts to exert a 
more significant influence on the NSIs of its Member States. A fourth section looks at 
the contributions of this research to knowledge. Research limitations and potential 
options for further research are discussed in the final section.  
 
7.1) The EU and the Czech and Hungarian NSIs 
The preceding chapters have provided a detailed discussion about both the 
historical development and the current status of the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. By 
tracing the history of these NSIs, this research approach has helped identify a number 
of factors which explain the reasons for the current problems facing the Czech 
Republic and Hungary in terms of improving their innovation performance. It is 
important to note that as research and innovation were essentially sidelined in both 
countries during the transition period, the task of promoting innovation actually only 
began to receive any notable attention at the time of EU accession and, as such, is still a 
relatively new policy area. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that there has been 
considerable change and disruption to their innovation systems as these countries have 
sought to ‘find their feet’ in this new policy area, a challenge which has been made even 
more difficult by the lack of experienced policy-makers with expertise on this topic. 
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Nonetheless, despite both the Czech Republic and Hungary having a notable 
history of scientific success, since returning to a market economy these countries have 
encountered difficulties in improving their innovation performances. At present, a 
considerable disparity continues to exist between the Czech Republic and Hungary 
and their Western European counterparts, which is showing only minimal signs of 
diminution. This is partly due to the fact that, as already mentioned, during the 
transition period the topic of innovation received very little attention as governments 
focused on the task of completing the socio-economic transformation whilst trying to 
maintain economic stability. Indeed, a major way of achieving this was through 
attracting FDI which, after the financial challenges caused by the disbanding of the 
Comecon and the related loss of foreign markets, was an important method with which 
to encourage economic growth. However, even though in more recent years the topic of 
innovation has returned to the political agenda of both countries, this research has 
shown that the Czech Republic and Hungary are still facing a number of obstacles 
which are preventing them from improving their innovation performance more 
significantly.   
Concerning the EU, since the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and, 
more recently, Horizon 2020 in 2014, the EU has been acutely aware of the need to 
promote innovation in order to ensure economic growth and solve societal challenges 
and, consequently, innovation has become an important EU topic. With this in mind, 
the main aim of this research was to investigate the extent to which Europeanisation is 
affecting the nature and development of national innovation policies in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. In addition, this research has sought to identify the manner in 
which this process of Europeanisation is mediated by, firstly, national factors and, 
secondly, economic factors, specifically, in the case of these countries, the role of MNEs. 
The central argument of this thesis is that there are a number of areas of misfit, caused 
by the Czech and Hungarian path dependent historical legacies and economic 
structure, which are impeding the process of Europeanisation. The main factors, as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, that are mediating the Europeanisation process are; (1) 
dependency on foreign companies, (2) public management of NSI, (3) lack of trust and 
collaboration, (4) lack of innovative entrepreneurialism and (5) education system and 
skilled labour. The following section will provide a brief summary of each area of misfit. 
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As noted in Chapter 2, the dependence of the Czech Republic and Hungary on 
foreign investment has created a specific type of political economic structure, namely 
that of a Dependent Market Economy (DME). In terms of innovation, this research has 
noted that foreign firms have also begun playing an increasing role in the NSIs of the 
Czech Republic and Hungary and now account for a sizeable share of their total R&D 
spending. As a result, the Czech Republic and Hungary have, to a large extent, 
developed Dependent National Systems of Innovation. This refers to the fact that both 
countries have developed systems in which their innovation capacity and performance 
is heavily reliant on not only the funding from but also the output of foreign companies. 
From a historical institutionalist viewpoint, therefore, the dependency on foreign firms 
has become a path dependent trait in both countries. However, with regard to the EU, 
this dependency on foreign firms is not addressed in the EU’s innovation policy 
documents which focus on innovation from an upstream perspective (mainly R&D 
activities) rather than a downstream perspective (related to global value chains). By 
failing to recognise the importance of foreign firms to the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, 
the EU’s innovation policy is not able to fit their specific needs.  
In terms of the public management of the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, the 
historical legacies resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the 
centralised system meant that on returning to a liberal market economy, these 
countries had (a) fragmented innovation systems due the inherited separation of 
research sectors and (b) limited policy making experience. This has led to problems of, 
firstly, policy design and realistic target setting and, secondly, policy implementation. 
The various governance restructuring exercises undertaken, which have been especially 
frequent in Hungary, have failed to solve the governance issues and the recurrent 
upheavals have created confusion and delay. As a result, although, as promoted by the 
EU, both countries have designed and regularly updated their national innovation 
policies, the inherited weaknesses within the public administration of the Czech and 
Hungarian NSI are limiting the practical impact of these policies. Indeed, given the 
current weaknesses within the Czech and Hungarian governance systems for 
innovation, the realistic expectations of what any innovation policy can presently 
deliver, are highly questionable.  
Another inherited legacy of the communist period, and one which was 
exacerbated during the transition period, is the lack of trust and collaboration between 
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actors. Although the lack of trust has historical origins, it has been perpetuated by 
recent problems, especially those relating to corruption which has been problematic for 
both the Czech Republic and Hungary. In addition, the lack of experience of 
collaboration – as discussed, the Soviet system was highly compartmentalised – has 
resulted in a poor collaborative culture in both countries. With regard to the EU, this 
research has shown this to be impeding the influence of the EU in two important ways. 
Firstly, the success of the latest policy approach advocated by the EU, the Smart 
Specialisation Strategy, requires a high degree of cooperation between actors which is 
being prevented by the lack of trust and collaborative culture present in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. Secondly, this research has also indicated that the lack of 
collaboration is preventing a more effective use of the EU’s Structural Funds and, in 
fact, the high degree of corruption associated with Structural Funds is even 
exacerbating the problem of lack of trust.  
A further impediment to the successful implementation of a Smart 
Specialisation Strategy, and more specifically the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process 
which is a key feature of the Smart Specialisation approach, in both the Czech Republic 
and Hungary is the lack of innovative entrepreneurialism. Again, this can be traced 
back to the legacies of the communist era in which, firstly, a very negative perception of 
entrepreneurs existed. Indeed, especially in the Czech Republic, this remains a problem 
and this research has suggested that in order to overcome the lack of SMEs, this will 
require an attitudinal shift in the way in which society perceives the role of 
entrepreneurs. This legacy has also led to a lack of role models for entrepreneurship as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Secondly, in terms of the innovative capacity of the Czech and 
Hungarian SMEs, the tendency for little R&D to be carried out within companies, as 
was the case during the communist period, remains a problem within both countries. In 
fact, at present, the lack of innovative SMEs is a major impediment to the EU’s 
attempts to develop the Czech and Hungarian NSIs and improve their innovation 
performance.  
A final legacy of the communist period that this research has identified as 
continuing to affect the development of the Czech and Hungarian NSIs is the poor 
integration of the tertiary education system. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, during the 
communist era, the role of universities was essentially confined to that of a teaching 
institution and universities carried out very little research. Ongoing weaknesses within 
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the tertiary education system mean that Czech and Hungarian universities are failing to 
produce sufficient students with the necessary research skills and knowledge, yet it is 
this human capital which is vital to improving the innovation capacity of both 
countries. As education is a national policy area, and one in which the EU has limited 
authority, the EU is very limited in its ability to influence the Czech or Hungarian 
education system. This is a critical weakness in the EU’s capacity to influence the 
development of the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. 
 In short, this research has shown how national factors related to path 
dependent historical legacies and economic structure are mediating the process of 
Europeanisation in both the Czech Republic and Hungary. The role of agency in 
maintaining path dependencies when individuals perceive a benefit in doing so has also 
been highlighted. In addition, it has been observed that, in some cases, there is an 
interaction between these factors which is further reinforcing the path dependent traits 
observed in the previous chapters. For example, the dominance of MNEs places 
considerable tension on the labour market with smaller local companies struggling to 
compete against the attractiveness of the high salaries and prestige of working for these 
globally renowned enterprises. As a result, many of the most talented employees are 
absorbed by the MNEs instead of working in smaller indigenous companies or even 
establishing their own companies, where they would make a more significant 
contribution to developing the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. Similarly, the lack of trust 
within the Czech Republic and Hungary prevents greater collaboration between actors 
which, in turn, exacerbates the already severe problems of fragmentation within the 
system. In other words, a vicious cycle develops in which one path dependency feeds 
into another creating an ever deeper embedded trait. This intertwining could 
potentially mean that the greater the importance of these factors becomes, the greater 
their mediating power on the Europeanisation process. This is, however, only an initial 
suggestion and would require further research to corroborate.    
In terms of the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2, therefore, this research 
suggests that the role of the EU’s Innovation Policy on influencing the Czech and 
Hungarian NSIs has been much less than expected (Hypothesis 1). It is important, 
however, to distinguish a difference between the impact of EU accession and that of the 
EU’s ongoing influence. Whilst the latter has been less impressive, the former did 
actually have a notable influence. Indeed, during the pre-accession period and the very 
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initial period of EU membership, the impact of EU’s innovation agenda on the Czech 
and Hungarian innovation systems was very significant, not only in terms of its direct 
impact but also its indirect impact. Directly, the application of conditionality to EU 
membership had a significant impact on the formal institutional transformation in both 
countries. Furthermore, with regards specifically to research and innovation, the 
Lisbon Agenda played a notable role in drawing political attention to the importance of 
innovation as a source of economic growth and as a tool with which to tackle the 
challenges currently facing society, such as environmental concerns and an ageing 
population. In other words, having spent most of the transition period in the 
background, the EU was instrumental in returning the topic of innovation back to the 
political agenda. As observed in Chapters 5 and 6, it is during this period that both 
countries began to pay more attention towards actually developing their innovation 
strategies and promoting a more innovation friendly environment. Nonetheless, 
although the EU drew attention to the need to produce innovation-related strategies, 
the actual implementation of these strategies has encountered a number of problems 
(discussed below). Therefore, although accession to the EU may have increased policy 
awareness, this has not necessarily been accompanied by a development in the Czech 
and Hungarian NSIs as a result of policy outcomes. 
With regard to the indirect impact of the EU, accession to the EU also improved 
the perception of stability within these countries and, consequently, both the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, who were already benefiting from FDI, became even more 
attractive to foreign investors. These new investors came with certain requirements 
and meeting these needs required government and policy action (Hypothesis 3). 
Indeed, the Czech Republic and Hungary have become highly dependent on foreign 
investment for not only their economic development but also their innovation capacity 
and development of their NSIs. In other words, as previously mentioned, it could be 
suggested that the Czech Republic and Hungary have developed Dependent National 
Systems of Innovation. This is due to the fact that improvement in the Czech and 
Hungarian innovation performance has been largely driven by foreign companies whose 
investment in R&D now accounts for a considerable amount of business R&D 
expenditure in both countries and without these foreign companies, a sizeable hole 
would be left in their NSIs. Indeed, the impact of FDI on the Czech and Hungarian 
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NSIs has been so significant that what has in practice taken place is FDI-sation of these 
systems which has, in turn, limited the impact of Europeanisation.   
Although EU accession had a notable impact, the ability of the EU to exert an 
ongoing influence has been much less significant. As discussed, a major reason for this 
is that there are several areas of misfit between the EU’s innovation policy approach 
and the Czech and Hungarian national institutions, both formal and informal 
(Hypothesis 3). A clear example of this mismatch can be seen in the EU’s latest 
approach towards innovation strategy, the Smart Specialisation Strategy, which has 
encountered a number of problems in the Czech Republic and Hungary. One of the 
major issues with the Smart Specialisation Strategy approach is that it requires 
cooperation and collaboration between actors from the various sectors. This is 
something which is currently extremely challenging in both countries due to the 
historical separation of the different sectors of the research system and also the 
problem of lack of trust, a legacy of the communist period which was exacerbated by 
corrupt activities during the transition period and continues to be an area of concern. 
In addition, the problems within the public management of the NSI, and the related 
issue of a policy implementation gap, raise serious doubts about how achievable the 
implementation of this ambitious and complex strategy approach is in either the Czech 
Republic or Hungary. As a result, the Smart Specialisation Strategy approach at a 
national level has essentially become an exercise which had to be completed in order to 
gain access to the EU’s Structural Funds and its likely long-term impact currently 
appears limited. It should be noted, however, that this contradicts some findings for the 
regional Smart Specialisation approach across the EU which, it is claimed, ‘was being 
viewed more positively and had become increasingly accepted by policy-makers’ 
(McCann & Ortega-Argilés 2016:1417). Further research is required in this area in order 
to provide more conclusive evidence.   
Another concern with the EU’s latest policy approach is that this research 
suggests the EU’s guidelines for innovation have become less clear, which is creating 
confusion for policy-makers who are struggling to understand exactly what the EU is 
requesting. The change in the EU’s approach towards innovation policy could likely be 
an attempt to overcome some of the criticisms made of earlier EU policy attempts 
which were considered too rigid and ‘one size fits all’. It may also be a somewhat 
inevitable result of the accession to the EU of new Member States with very different 
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innovation systems and challenges, which has led to the broadening of the guidelines in 
order that they provide relevance to both the older and newer EU Member States. The 
potential problem of expanding the guidelines in this respect though is that the policy 
becomes less specific which can cause the clarity of direction to become lost and thus 
reduce its capacity to influence the innovation strategies as intended. In other words, 
given that there is so much variation across Member States in terms of, for example, 
national institutional arrangements and political and economic structures, an attempt 
to develop a single policy approach which can respond to all these divergent needs may 
actually weaken the ability of the EU to exert influence.   
However, it is not just problems with the policy approach which are limiting 
the EU’s influence but also the effectiveness of the policy tools being used by the EU. 
The most notable of these is the Structural Funds which, this research suggests, are not 
working as efficiently at producing the desired outcomes as would be expected. One 
area of particular concern relates to the issues of misuse and corruption of Structural 
Funds, which is preventing the funding from reaching the location for which it is 
intended. Given that corruption was identified as a factor which has contributed to the 
lack of trust within both countries, it could be suggested that by supplying so much 
funding, the EU is actually exacerbating this problem. This also raises questions about 
the monitoring procedures currently being used by the EU and the ability of the EU to 
ensure that the funding is being used in the manner envisioned. A considerable amount 
of research has indicated that, by providing additional public resources, EU funds have 
contributed to problems of corruption in Central and Eastern European countries and 
has identified a need for the EU to improve its monitoring and controlling framework 
(Fazekas 2017; Fazekas et al. 2014; OECD 2019; Transparency International Hungary 
2015).  This is a serious concern across the EU as it has been estimated that ‘from 
detected cases alone, over EUR390 million every year are stolen from the Structural 
Funds’ (OECD 2019:4). Additionally, another major issue is to ensure that the 
investments are spent in a way that is likely to produce tangible outcomes and is not 
invested primarily in physical infrastructure which is poorly connected to the local 
environments and which, therefore, fails to produce any significant benefit. Given that 
the Structural Funds are the principal tool with which the EU can exert influence, 
tackling some of the current weaknesses of the funding system could bring about 
considerable results.  
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 Finally, a major weakness of the EU’s current innovation approach for the 
Czech Republic and Hungary is that is still focuses only innovation mainly from an 
upstream perspective, i.e. driven by R&D, rather than a downstream method of 
innovation, i.e. downloading knowledge and skills from MNEs in order to develop local 
competencies. This latter method for NSI development is largely missing from EU 
policy documents. In fact, it does not feature in either the Smart Specialisation Strategy 
(European Commission 2012) guidance or the Peer Review recently conducted of the 
Hungarian NSI (European Commission 2016). As DMEs, however, this aspect of 
innovation is vital to both countries studied in this research. The fact that the EU failed 
to include this in the Peer Review does represent something of a missed opportunity 
(see discussion below). It also indicates that insufficient emphasis is currently being 
placed on the role of economic structure in influencing the development of innovation 
systems. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the poor integration of foreign companies 
into their NSIs is resulting in a dualistic system which is weakening the overall 
innovation environment. Unless this addressed, this could present a major impediment 
to more rapid and significant improvement in their innovation performances. 
 
7.2) Similarities and differences between the Czech Republic and Hungary 
 By comparing the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, various similarities and 
differences can be observed which may provide some information as to why (a) both 
countries have struggled to improve their innovation performance more significantly 
and (b) the Czech Republic is beginning to show better innovation potential despite 
having entered the transition period in a weaker position than Hungary. The main 
similarities which can be observed concern the dependence of both countries on FDI, 
changes in public funding for R&D, the organisation of the governance structure for 
innovation and problems relating to an implementation gap. In terms of differences, 
these include contrasting innovation performance in SMEs, labour force development 
and political commitment. These are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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Czech and Hungarian similarities 
Perhaps one of the most significant similarities is the dependence of both 
countries on large, foreign-owned companies. This is hardly a new observation, indeed 
the existence of a dual economy has for some time been acknowledged (Aide à la 
Décision Economique 1999). However, as previously noted, it is not just economically 
that the Czech Republic and Hungary depend on these MNES as they are also amongst 
the most active and important actors within the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. These 
companies, consequently, have significant power and influence within the national 
landscapes. This creates a very challenging situation in which the Czech and Hungarian 
national governments need to find a balance between responding to the wants and 
needs of foreign-owned MNEs, on which the countries are heavily dependent, whilst 
also cultivating an environment in which domestic companies can thrive. Although 
there are some instances of good connections between foreign and domestic companies, 
the linkages between foreign and domestic companies are generally poor and foreign 
companies typically represent more of a challenge to domestic companies rather than 
offering consistently positive spillover benefits.  
A serious concern with the dependence that the Czech Republic and Hungary 
have developed on these foreign-owned MNEs is that they may at any moment decide 
to relocate their activities to another country which offers some competitive advantage, 
such as even lower wage costs, with which the Czech Republic or Hungary cannot 
compete. As the innovation capacity and performance of the Czech Republic and 
Hungary rely so heavily on these companies, any potential relocation could have 
profound effects on their NSIs. The competitive advantage of the Czech Republic and 
Hungary has depended until now on the availability of a reasonably well-educated, 
cheap labour force and maintaining this has several negative consequences. Firstly, if 
the average salaries in the Czech Republic and Hungary remain lower than in, for 
example, other Western EU Member States, capable and talented people, those who 
are best positioned to develop the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, will continue to be 
attracted to the better paying work opportunities being offered abroad. Secondly, the 
need to provide only a reasonably well-educated labour force, many of whom are 
retrained by the MNEs anyway, also reduces the incentives for these countries to invest 
more in improving and upgrading their education systems, yet the provision of a highly 
skilled labour force is vital to a strong and successful NSI.  
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This creates something of a paradoxical situation for the Czech Republic and 
Hungary as maintaining the competitive advantage on which they have so far relied for 
their economic development, is also, in many respects, impeding their development. 
Retaining their current competitive advantage, in other words, could be detrimental to 
the development and improvement of their NSIs. This research suggests that although 
there is considerable awareness of this problem, there is no consensus as to how it can 
be solved. Clearly this is an exceptionally complex issue and one which will require 
ongoing monitoring by both countries. Although interviews conducted during the 
course of this project seem to suggest that there is a growing confidence in the Czech 
Republic that the country is beginning to establish a competitive advantage based on 
the quality of the labour force and not just the lower price of its labour force, more 
research, and perhaps some more time, will be needed for this assertion to be 
confirmed.  
With regard to the second similarity, public funding for innovation-related 
activities is an area in which both the Czech Republic and Hungary have witnessed 
significant improvement, largely thanks to the EU’s Structural Funds. Indeed, this 
research would suggest that access to finance has become much less problematic for 
companies and entrepreneurs than it was previously. Whilst this is largely a positive 
trend, the experience of Hungary and the inefficient use of its public funding does 
highlight the importance of ensuring that the funds are properly targeted and that the 
results are carefully monitored. Ensuring that companies are able to access finance is 
clearly imperative to developing the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. However, problems 
within both countries, especially Hungary, mean that this funding is not always 
producing the outcomes that would be expected. Without resolving some of the issues 
currently facing these countries, such as the public management of their NSIs and lack 
of trust, the setting of targets which aim to increase public funding for R&D, as 
advocated by the EU, may not result in the intended benefit to the Czech and 
Hungarian NSIs.  
In terms of the governance structure for innovation, both the Czech Republic 
and Hungary inherited very fragmented innovation systems after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, in which the roles of universities, research institutes and companies were 
highly compartmentalised and involved little collaboration or overlap. In order to 
improve this situation, at least at a governmental level, both countries have attempted 
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to merge innovation-related tasks under the jurisdiction of specifically created 
authorities, the Government Office for Science Research and Innovation in the Czech 
Republic and the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDIO) in 
Hungary. Whilst, on the one hand, this does suggest that a strong political 
commitment is being made towards promoting and supporting innovation, whether 
these new authorities will be able to overcome the fragmentation issues and have more 
long-term impact remains unclear. The NRDIO, which is responsible for both policy 
and funding, represents a particularly centralised approach to solving the problem. 
This, it would seem, goes against much of the EU’s efforts to encourage a more bottom-
up and region-specific approach towards innovation strategy.  
Although the rationale for restructuring the governance systems for innovation 
in both countries is clear, one of the problems with any restructuring exercise is that it 
causes a considerable amount of disruption and requires a significant amount of time 
for adjustment to take place. This has been particularly notable in Hungary where, as 
noted throughout this thesis, restructuring has been a frequent event. In the case of the 
latest restructuring exercises in both countries, it has also meant that some strategies 
have been lost, becoming, in effect, collateral damage. For example, as noted in Chapter 
5, the Czech Smart Specialisation Strategy was developed by the Ministry of Education, 
Youth and Sports but the management of the Strategy was subsequently transferred to 
the Section for Science, Research and Innovation upon the latter’s creation in 2015. This 
has led to a situation in which actors within the NSI are unclear as to who is actually 
responsible for or willing to implement the Strategy. Similarly, in Hungary, the 
Ministry for National Economy developed the national innovation strategy, ‘Investment 
in the Future: National Research and Development and Innovation Strategy (2013-
2020)’. Yet NRDIO, which following the restructuring took charge of policy-making in 
this area, produced a Smart Specialisation Strategy which showed very little 
convergence with the innovation strategy prepared by the Ministry for Economy. If the 
new authority is reluctant to adopt and implement the strategies developed by the 
previous authority, not only is the original strategy never fully realised but neither can 
its results be evaluated in order for lessons to be learnt which can inform future 
strategy and policy decisions. In other words, restructuring has a number of 
consequences which can result in a temporary delay in the development of the NSI.  
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Finally, another problem which currently seems to be affecting both countries is 
that of an implementation gap. Indeed, especially since becoming EU Member States, it 
could hardly be said that there has been a lack of documented strategies. Yet, the 
implementation of these strategies and their ability to overcome the problems currently 
facing the Czech Republic and Hungary has been relatively weak. One explanation for 
this lies with the fact that both countries have struggled to overcome their lack of 
experience within this policy area. Inexperienced policy-makers have simply not had 
the expertise to construct strategies with feasible targets, good implementation 
prospects and realistic timeframes. This problem was, until recently, particularly acute 
in the Czech Republic which witnessed a high turnover of public servants. The 
specificities of the Czech and Hungarian situations also mean that best-practice 
transfer is not always possible or, indeed, effective. Furthermore, the lack of evaluation 
exercises has meant that learning opportunities have often been missed. Although 
experience with policy-making is gradually developing, implementation issues which 
are preventing more significant strategy outcomes currently remain in both countries. 
The lack of successful strategy implementation in both countries may go some 
way to explaining why there has not been more impactful change in both the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. A notable concern in both countries which has been identified 
during the course of this research, is the fact that many of the problems which are 
currently present in the Czech and Hungarian NSIs have now existed for considerable 
time. In Hungary, for example, the main weaknesses of the Hungarian innovation 
system as recognised by the OECD report in 2008 (OECD 2008) are still the same as 
the issues affecting Hungary over a decade later. A number of the problems in both 
countries have historical and cultural underpinnings and are exceptionally difficult to 
resolve. Indeed, the role of history is particularly important as innovation and growth 
are largely about long-run changes. This research suggests that the current measures 
are ineffective at overcoming the historically-related problems which are being faced in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary.  
 
Czech and Hungarian differences 
Although there are a number of similarities affecting the Czech and Hungarian 
NSIs, there are also some increasingly significant differences which account, in part, for 
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the current variations in performance between the two countries and which could 
potentially have an even greater and divergent impact on their future capacities. As the 
previous chapters have highlighted, at the beginning of the transition period Hungary 
had some notable advantages, such as a greater amount of private sector activity, which 
had largely resulted from the fact that Hungary had begun its transition to a liberal 
market economy before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union and earlier than the 
Czech Republic. However, the performance indicators gathered and discussed during 
the course of this project suggest that, 30 years later, the Czech Republic now leads 
Hungary in most, if not all, areas in which the success of an NSI is measured. Whilst 
both countries have witnessed some development and improvement of their NSIs, such 
as better access to finance for innovative companies and projects and more investment 
in R&D, the progress in Hungary has been much less than would have been expected 
given its initial potential and strong scientific history. This research suggests that 
Hungary currently has some important challenges which need to be addressed in order 
to prevent its performance from slipping further behind that of comparable countries.   
The first difference concerns the differing innovative contribution of SMEs in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Indeed, the previously discussed dependence on 
foreign firms is arguably worse in Hungary due to the weaknesses within its SME 
sector, possibly the Achilles heel of the Hungarian NSI. This finding is slightly 
perplexing given the fact that, in terms of the public perception of entrepreneurship, 
Hungary actually has a considerable advantage over the Czech Republic. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 13, a significantly higher percentage of Hungarians believe that high 
status is given to successful entrepreneurs than is the case in the Czech Republic. It is 
difficult to explain the considerable difference in perception between the Czech 
Republic and Hungary but it seems feasible that it could, at least in part, be due the fact 
that the Czech Republic adopted and retained a far more orthodox version of 
communism as opposed to the ‘Goulash Communism’ in Hungary where some elements 
of a free market economy were introduced several years before the Soviet Union 
disbanded. The limited change in data between 2011 and 2013 could, in turn, highlight 
how perception and attitudes are slow to change. From the Czech Republic’s point of 
view, the less favourable perception of entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic could 
represent a deterrent to entrepreneurship as an occupational choice. 
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Figure 13: High status to successful entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary 2011-2013 
 
(Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2018) 
(NB. These statistics are based on the percentage of 18-64 population who agree with 
the statement that in their country, successful entrepreneurs receive high status.) 
 
In terms of innovation, however, a considerable amount of Hungarian SMEs 
carry out very little innovation-related activities, tending instead to follow a dependent 
or traditional firm strategy (see Chapter 2).  This research has noted that the 
innovation performance of Hungarian SMEs is particularly poor in spite of a 
considerable amount of public R&D funding being directed towards this sector. In fact, 
Czech SMEs are notably more innovative despite receiving sizeably less public funding 
(Table 12). This could indicate that, firstly, Hungarian companies are for some reason 
unable to use the funds efficiently and can therefore not convert the financial 
investment into more significant tangible outcomes. Secondly, it could suggest that the 
current method for selecting the recipients of public funding is poor and that subsidies 
are instead targeting uncompetitive companies rather than those with the potential to 
use the funding more efficiently. This problem is likely exacerbated by the considerable 
amount of bureaucracy in Hungary and the frequent systemic changes. Thirdly, the lack 
of openness and problems with corruption could mean that significant amounts of the 
public funding earmarked for R&D is essentially being lost and is not reaching its 
intended target. The poor performance of the SME sector in Hungary is an area of major 
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concern and one which is severely hindering the development of Hungary’s NSI. This 
issue would unquestionably benefit from receiving greater political attention.  
 
Table 12: Innovative firms in the Czech Republic and Hungary 
Innovative Firms (Product/Process or Organisational/Marketing) 
 Total (as a 
percentage of all 
firms) 
SMEs (as a 
percentage of 
SMEs) 
Large (as a 
percentage of 
large firms) 
Czech Republic 41.9 40.1 76.5 
Hungary 31.3 29.9 65.5 
Firms Receiving Public Support 
Czech Republic 24.8 23.1 39.2 
Hungary 45.6 47.2 35.1 
(Source: OECD 2015b) 
 
Another area in which the Czech Republic and Hungary are beginning to differ 
relates to the availability of labour. With regard, first of all, to the education system, 
whilst both countries are experiencing some problems with their education systems in 
terms of ensuring that they are providing students with the skills and knowledge 
which are now necessary, the problems do seem to be particularly exacerbated in 
Hungary. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 6, much frustration about the archaic nature of 
the Hungarian education system was expressed during the interviews conducted for 
this research.  PISA statistics, for example, show a particularly worrying trend for 
secondary education in Hungary (see Figures 14, 15 and 16). Hungary is below the 
OECD average in all areas – reading, maths and science – and has shown a downward 
trend, especially in reading and science. Whilst the Czech Republic too has shown a 
downward trend, with the exception of reading, the latest data still show the country is 
ahead of the OECD average in all three dimensions. Although, in this respect, the Czech 
Republic’s position has arguably been assisted by a slight decrease in the OECD average 
scores. The Czech Republic is also producing considerably more graduates with 86,741 
bachelor, master and doctoral graduates in 2017, compared with 60,267 in Hungary 
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(OECD 2018b). Some explanation for the lower graduate numbers in Hungary could be 
provided by the relatively high dropout rate from Hungarian universities discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 14: PISA reading performance in the Czech Republic and Hungary         
2006-2018 
 
(Source: PISA 2018) 
 
Figure 15: PISA mathematics performance in the Czech Republic and Hungary 
2006-2018 
 
(Source: PISA 2018) 
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Figure 16: PISA science performance in the Czech Republic and Hungary          
2006-2018 
 
(Source: PISA 2018) 
 
In addition to the problem of actually providing an education system which can 
produce a highly-skilled labour force, there is the problem of the highly-skilled workers 
who do exist being drained from the country. Although both countries have clearly 
experienced problems relating to brain drain, this research indicates that this is 
currently becoming less of a concern in Czech Republic. In Hungary, on the other hand, 
it was mentioned in nearly every interview. This problem, it appears, has been 
intensified by Hungary’s current political direction which is giving rise to considerable 
tensions. Attempts to retain or attract Hungarian scientists back to Hungary, such as 
the Momentum programme launched by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, have 
experienced some success but it is doubtful that, under the current circumstances, this 
will be sufficient to significantly reduce the impact of brain drain in Hungary. The 
lower average wages also mean that it is difficult for Hungary to attract highly-skilled 
workers. This research suggests that if the present situation of an underperforming 
education system and a high degree of brain drain continues, the lack of a sufficiently 
skilled labour force could potentially become a serious obstacle to Hungary’s attempts 
to improve its innovation performance. 
Another area in which some difference between the Czech Republic and 
Hungary can be observed relates to the political attention which innovation has 
received. The Czech Republic does appear to have maintained a more consistent effort 
towards supporting innovation as can be seen by the steady increase in public 
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investment in R&D (discussed in Chapter 5). Hungary, on the other hand, has been 
much more sporadic in its innovation-related efforts. The governance system for 
innovation has witnessed considerable disruption as a result of the numerous 
restructuring exercises and the government has repeatedly failed to meet its public 
funding commitments.  In this respect, this research supports the findings of Havas 
(2011) and suggests that Hungary has shown a lack of political and strategic 
commitment towards promoting innovation. What is particularly peculiar about this 
situation is that there is hardly a lack of awareness about the importance of innovation 
in Hungary. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 6, Hungary currently has a considerable 
number of innovation-related strategies. There does, however, appear to be insufficient 
targeted, coordinated and consistent action in order to actually realise Hungary’s 
innovation goals.  Innovation requires long-term strategic thinking, planning and 
implementation and this is something that seems to be lacking in Hungary at present.  
 
7.3) A positive development  
With regard to the influence of the EU, although Chapters 5 and 6 identified a 
strong misfit between the EU’s Innovation Policy and the national specificities of both 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, there is one area in which a positive development can 
be observed, namely the launch of the Policy Support Facility (PSF). The PSF is a new 
instrument which was introduced as part of the EU’s Horizon 2020 strategy and, at the 
request of Member States, independent high-level expertise and guidance can be 
provided by the EU in the form of peer reviews, mutual learning exercises and country 
specific support. The EU claims that the PSF ‘responds to the strong need to offer more 
customer-oriented services to support evidence-based policy making’ (European 
Commission 2018). Hungary was in fact, together with Bulgaria, one of the first 
countries to request a peer review. The ‘Peer Review of the Hungarian Research and 
Innovation System’ was published in 2016 having been preceded by a ‘Pre-Peer Review 
of the Hungarian Innovation System’ in 2015. The report is written by an independent 
panel of experts, from Ireland, Poland, the UK and the Netherlands, together with a 
small group of national peers. Information for the report was gathered through two 
field visits to Budapest (24th-26th February and 18th-20th April 2016) and is based on 
evidence provided through in-depth discussions with various stakeholders and experts 
as well as quantitative data (from Eurostat and the Hungarian Statistical Office).   
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 The report looks at (1) R&I Governance, Funding and Policy-Making, (2) 
Availability of Human Resources for R&I, (3) Framework conditions for Innovation in 
the Business Sector and (4) Science-Industry Cooperation, Technology Transfer and 
Entrepreneurship.  The findings have led to the development of seven ‘Policy Messages’ 
which are supported by a number of detailed recommendations presented throughout 
the report.  Although Hungary can continue to call upon the PSF for support, the report 
makes it clear that responsibility for the follow-up to the Peer Review, as well as the 
implementation of its recommendations, lies with Hungary. It is envisaged that the 
recommendations will be implemented within 3 years at which point a PSF Post-Peer 
Review can be requested.  
Interviews (Government Official 6 2016; Government Official 10 2016; 
Government Official 12 2017) revealed that, on the whole, the Peer Review had been 
well received and that it accurately reflected the current state of Hungary’s NSI. Indeed, 
the Peer Review does seem to have made some progress at addressing previous 
frustrations, namely that the EU had failed to understand and appreciate the specifics 
of the Hungarian situation. It was suggested (Academic 5 2016) that the EU had a 
tendency to ‘preach’ about best practice without understanding whether this form of 
best practice could feasibly be implemented in Hungary given its political and cultural 
environment. The Peer Review clearly lays out the main strengths and weaknesses of 
the Hungarian NSI and offers a total of 33 detailed policy recommendations. The report 
also draws on successful examples from other countries and highlights the potential 
lessons for Hungary. In this respect, both the methodological approach – which is both 
qualitative and quantitative – and the provision of policy recommendations together 
with supporting examples, does represent a more tailored approach in the policy 
support being offered by the EU. 
Nonetheless, although the Peer Review does in many respects indicate a 
positive development in the EU’s approach towards innovation policy guidance, there 
are a few concerns which should be highlighted. Firstly, although the Peer Review does 
accurately list a number of the problems which Hungary is facing, it fails to offer any 
real measures or advice on how these can be tackled. In other words, whilst the report 
is very clear in terms of explaining what needs to be done and why, it offers very little 
information on how it can be done. For example, it does not mention or offer any 
suggestions on the problem of distrust between the various actors which, as already 
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discussed, discourages stakeholder engagement and causes lack of collaboration. With 
regard to brain drain, a problem mentioned repeatedly in interviews, the Peer Report 
concludes ‘[t]his is a complex issue and since the panel was unable to analyse the 
phenomenon using solid, quantitative data, it is suggested that the situation should be 
further analysed by the Hungarian government in order to pro-actively shape the future 
of the R&I system’ (European Commission 2016c:49). Whilst this may be true, this 
statement does not really offer Hungary any concrete assistance in terms of addressing 
one of the most significant problems the country is currently facing. In short, whilst the 
report does offer a much more tailored approach to policy support which has been very 
much welcomed, the lack of specific guidance on how to achieve the recommendations 
may prevent it from having a more substantial impact in practice.    
A second major concern with the Peer Review of Hungary is that it fails to 
address one of the major characteristics of the Hungarian NSI, namely its dependence 
on foreign-controlled enterprises. In fact, foreign-controlled enterprises feature in only 
a few paragraphs of the report. What this suggests is that although the EU has 
recognised the need for a more tailored approach towards innovation policy guidance, 
it still fails to place sufficient emphasis on the importance of economic structure. Yet 
the role of foreign-controlled companies in Hungary has become so significant that they 
must, likewise, feature prominently in any strategy for development of the Hungarian 
NSI.  Hungary requires guidance on not only how to develop its own national factors, 
such as the governance structure and innovative entrepreneurship, but also how to 
integrate the foreign-controlled companies into its NSI, exploit the opportunities for 
developing indigenous knowledge capacity and mitigate the negative impacts such as 
labour market competition which is disadvantaging local companies. Without this, the 
opportunity to turn the Peer Review into a really informative and game changing policy 
tool will be missed. 
 
7.4) Policy implications 
 Although the Czech Republic and Hungary have witnessed some development 
of their NSIs in recent years, they both face a sizeable task in overcoming various 
problems inherited from the communist period, several of which were exacerbated 
during the transition period. This research has shown that the ongoing influence of 
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these path dependent historical legacies is a major factor that is currently preventing 
the EU from having a more significant impact on the innovation policies and 
institutional arrangements in these countries. If the EU is to provide better assistance 
to these countries in dealing with the challenges they are facing, there are several areas 
of the EU’s approach which would benefit from reconsideration. By better tailoring the 
EU’s policy and policy tools to the specific needs of these countries, the EU could play a 
much more influential role in developing their NSIs and improving their innovation 
performances. Not only could this lead to stronger economic growth but it could also 
improve the perception of the EU within these countries. 
 One of the key areas for development is ensuring that the EU’s policy guidelines 
are clear and relevant to the Czech Republic and Hungary. Concerns about the 
vagueness of more recent guidelines highlight the importance for the EU to strike a 
balance between allowing flexibility and yet retaining clarity. Whilst the requests of 
the EU must be clear, the methods of achieving these goals should be sufficiently 
flexible in order to allow them to be tailored according to the specific national contexts. 
The need for clarity is all the more important in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
countries for which innovation is still a relatively new policy area and which is still in 
the process of developing their NSIs. A fundamental problem for both countries in 
developing their innovation strategies has been the lack of actors with sufficient 
knowledge and ability to formulate strategic and effective innovation policies. Clarity 
on the part of the EU would seem vital in assisting these actors in learning and 
developing strategies which have the potential to produce positive, long-term results.  
 Not only must the guidelines be clear but they also need to consider the specific 
national conditions and challenges. An important factor in this respect is to consider 
the differences in economic structure between countries and the influence of this 
structure on the functioning of the country’s NSI. The dependence of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary on foreign-owned MNEs, for both their economic growth and 
innovation capacity, presents specific problems which differ from countries with 
contrasting economic structures. The dualistic nature of these countries’ economies and 
innovation systems requires policy actions which are particular to this type of political 
economy. This could include measures to improve the integration of foreign companies 
into the national environment, to create conditions which will encourage the 
possibility of spillover effects or to provide assistance to local companies who struggle 
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to compete against the larger MNEs for labour. As noted in this research, the 
dependency on foreign-owned MNEs is having a paradoxical effect on the Czech and 
Hungarian NSIs and requires ongoing attention.   
 Giving consideration to national conditions also means that attention should be 
paid to the influence of national history and culture. The cases of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary clearly demonstrate how significant the role of path dependency is in NSI 
development. Understanding how the Czech and Hungarian NSIs continue to be 
influenced by their histories would enable the EU to provide better fitting policy 
guidelines with a much greater likelihood of tangible outcomes. The lack of trust and 
problems of fragmentation limit the extent to which a bottom-up approach to policy, 
such as that advocated by the Smart Specialisation Strategy, currently stand any chance 
of success in either the Czech Republic or Hungary. In other words, giving 
consideration to national history and culture will not only help to identify the causes of 
the observed problems but it will also provide information on what type of policy 
approach is realistically feasible.  
 In addition to the importance of national conditions, such as economic 
structure, history and culture, the Czech Republic and Hungary are at very different 
stages of developing their NSIs than many of the older Member States. This raises 
questions about whether the EU having one innovation policy for all EU Member 
States is the most appropriate way in which to approach this policy area. For example, 
one of the criticisms of the Washington Consensus, a set of economic policy 
recommendations for developing countries produced in 1989, was that it did not give 
sufficient attention to the individual situation of each country (Stiglitz 2004). The EU’s 
innovation policy at present can also be seen to suffer from a similar weakness and this 
is perhaps even more concerning given the considerable diversity that exists between 
EU Member States. A differentiated policy approach which targets countries based on 
their stage of development and national specificities may be a more suitable direction in 
which to develop the EU’s innovation policy. Such a method could prove much more 
beneficial at tackling the recognised innovation divide between the old and new 
Member States than the EU’s current innovation policy approach.  
The more tailored approach offered by the Policy Support Facility is, in this 
respect, a step in the right direction. As this is only an optional support facility, the EU 
must encourage Member States to take advantage of this opportunity. The Peer Review 
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which was undertaken of Hungary offers some very useful policy advice although in 
some areas, such the issue of brain drain, the advice did not go far enough. In addition, 
the implementation of the policy recommendations is entirely the responsibility of the 
individual Member State which could be problematic in Hungary given the previously 
discussed implementation gap. It may be useful for the EU to provide a policy expert, 
who understands the national conditions, to help guide the implementation of the 
recommendations. Although the Policy Support Facility does offer a lot of potential 
benefits, these will only be realised in the facility is properly administered.  
A final area which would benefit from review concerns the EU’s current policy 
tools. The EU provides a substantial amount of funding for innovation-related activities 
in Member States, the Structural Funds being particularly important to the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, and each EU Framework Programme has committed a greater 
amount of funding. However, this research would suggest that some caution should be 
expressed about the EU’s current funding trajectory as increasing the funding is clearly 
no guarantee of an improvement in innovation performance. Indeed, as noted in 
Chapter 5, the Soviet Union invested considerably in R&D and yet weaknesses within 
the Soviet innovation system prevented the full potential of this investment from being 
realised. This research has highlighted several concerns about the EU’s Structural 
Funds which are limiting their ability to achieve the intended goals. Providing a smaller 
amount of funding, which is better targeted and monitored, may be more beneficial that 
the very generous funding which is currently available.  
 
7.5) Contributions to knowledge 
 This research has contributed to knowledge in several ways. Firstly, by 
integrating the concepts of National Systems of Innovation, Varieties of Capitalism and 
Historical Institutionalism it has demonstrated how these factors mediate the process 
of Europeanisation. This research has shown how the dependency of the Czech and 
Hungarian innovation systems on foreign actors and the impact of path dependency 
have  limited the extent to which the EU is able to impact upon their innovation 
policies and institutional frameworks. In doing so, this research has shown how 
integrating these variables can improve our understanding of Europeanisation. This 
could be valuable to future studies within this area. 
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 Secondly, this research has contributed to a better understanding of the current 
challenges facing the Czech and Hungarian NSIs. In doing so, it has also identified a 
number of the causes for these problems, many of which have historical and cultural 
underpinnings. This provides a better understanding of the reasons why the Czech 
Republic and Hungary are struggling to catch-up with the innovation performance of 
some of the more developed Western EU Member States. These findings could be of use 
to policy advisors and government officials who would benefit from this information in 
order to inform future policy decisions.  
 Finally, by identifying the factors which are impeding the influence of the EU, 
this research has been able to suggest a number of policy recommendations which the 
EU could consider in order to increase its role in this policy area. This could provide 
some more direction for the EU in terms of tackling the innovation divide which is 
currently affecting EU Member States and it offers useful advice on how the EU could 
better support the development of the NSIs in the newer Member States. By playing a 
more active role in improving the innovation performance of the Czech Republic and 
Hungary this could, in turn, improve their perception of the EU. As both countries are 
currently demonstrating Eurosceptic tendencies, this could be a particularly valuable 
contribution. 
 
7.6) Research limitations and further research 
Although this research has been able to draw attention to the interaction 
between the various actors in the Czech and Hungarian NSIs, the perspective of private 
businesses has been more limited. Difficulty in obtaining interviews with business 
leaders, particularly those of foreign-owned MNEs, meant that they made a lesser 
contribution to this research. Conducting more interviews with participants from this 
sector could be useful in providing an even fuller picture of their current role in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. 
 Another area in which this research could be further developed would be to 
compare these findings with another policy area. This may help elucidate whether the 
EU has had more, less or similar impact in other policy areas which, in turn, could 
identify other factors which assist or impede the EU’s influence. This might help to 
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identify factors which the EU may wish to include in its approach to innovation policy 
and other areas in the future.  
 A further potential research option would be to conduct a comparison of the 
Europeanisation of innovation policy between a new and an old Member State. This 
would help to identify whether the extent of Europeanisation in new Member States 
has been different from that in old Member States and whether there are any lessons 
that can be learnt from their respective experiences. This may add further evidence to 
the discussion on whether the EU should consider a more differentiated policy 
approach amongst Member States, as discussed here. 
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Example Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction 
 Could you briefly confirm your name and title for the benefit of the tape and tell 
me about your role in [NAME]? 
 Before we get into the detail, I wanted to start with a broad question, could you 
tell me about your view of the role innovation policy in the Czech 
Republic/Hungary?  
 
Policy making officials, government officials 
 Could you tell me a little bit about the process of developing Czech/Hungarian 
innovation policy? For example, who is involved and what are the main factors 
influencing policy decisions? In the past, say, 15 years or so have there been any 
significant developments in the way innovation policy in Hungary is developed 
or changes to the actors involved? 
 Clearly foreign direct investment (FDI) and multi-national enterprises (MNEs) 
play an important role in the Czech Republic/Hungary. What influence do you 
think these actors have on the development of national innovation policy? What 
are the main measures taken in the Czech Republic/Hungary in order to attract 
FDI? 
 And what about the EU? Given that innovation is now a key concern for the EU, 
do you feel that the guidance offered by the EU is an important factor in 
decisions relating to innovation policy?  
 Following on from this question, why do you believe that the EU has/has not 
had a significant impact on Czech/Hungarian innovation policy? (Who or what 
are the factors impeding the EU’s influence?)  
 What impact, if any, do you think the financial and economic crises of 2007-08 
have had on the development of Czech/Hungarian innovation policy? Are there 
any other events you can think of that have had a significant impact on 
innovation policy? For example, political changes or business pressures?  
 In your opinion, what are the strengths of the Czech/Hungarian innovation 
environment? And weaknesses?  
 (HUNGARY) The governance structure of science, technology and innovation 
policy has changed several times in Hungary. So, too, the science, technology 
and innovation policy coordination body has been dissolved and reestablished 
several times and the agency responsible for implementing innovation has also 
undergone several changes. Why do you think that so many changes have 
occurred? What has the impact of these changes been? 
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 (HUNGARY) It has been suggested that innovation policy in Hungary is 
perhaps seen as less of a priority than other policy areas and that science, 
technology and innovation policy is something of a burden on the national 
budget. How would you respond to this suggestion? What is your view of the 
importance of innovation policy in Hungary? 
 
Representatives of large companies, industry associations 
 How satisfied are you with the way in which innovation policy is being 
developed in the Czech Republic/Hungary? What do you see as the main 
strengths and weaknesses at present? 
 Do you feel that the needs of businesses like yours are fully understood by 
officials involved in making decisions related to innovation policy? Why? 
 What factors do you believe need to be provided in order to allow your business 
to be even more innovative? 
 As a native Czech/Hungarian business, what do impact do you believe the 
presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multi-national enterprises 
(MNEs) has on the innovation environment? Is it, on the whole, positive or 
negative? 
 And what about the EU? Do you think that EU guidance has a direct impact on 
innovation in the Czech Republic/Hungary?  
 Do you see any potentially serious impediments to innovation in the Czech 
Republic/Hungary in the (near) future? 
 
Conclusion 
 Is there anything else you feel is important to discuss about Czech/Hungarian 
innovation policy? 
 Is there anybody else you suggest I should speak to about this topic? 
 If I have any further questions, is it OK to drop you an e-mail? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
